Gerhard Wisser, the German-South African who is a key suspect in an international nuclear technology smuggling network, was a supplier to apartheid’s nuclear weapons programme, the Mail & Guardian has been told.
Wisser was arrested in Germany on August 25 on charges of ”aiding the attempted development of atomic weapons”, but released on bail. He was rearrested in South Africa on Wednesday. Daniel Geiges, his co-director in a Randburg firm, Krisch Engineering, was also arrested and appeared with him in the Vanderbijlpark Magistrate’s Court on Thursday. They remain in custody pending a bail application on Tuesday.
Wisser and Geige’s arrests follow that of Johan Meyer, whose arrest last week focused world attention on South African links to the alleged nuclear network. Meyer, who the M&G has been told also worked on the apartheid-era programme as an engineer with the then Atomic Energy Corporation, was released without explanation on Wednesday and charges withdrawn. It is thought that he has agreed to turn state witness.
Wisser has been resident in South Africa since at least the 1970s. His Krisch Engineering is described as a specialist in vaccuum technology and metallurgy, as well as a supplier of equipment for power stations, saw milling and industrial plants.
According to a well-placed source, Krisch Engineering was a key supplier to the South African nuclear programme, which was shut down by former president FW de Klerk in 1993.
”[Wisser] used to brag about how he had evaded the authorities,” said the source, who knows the company well, but asked not to be named. South Africa was at the time under international arms embargoes and restrictions on the spread of nuclear-related technology.
”He made most of his money from that programme. I would estimate that R100-million worth of equipment flowed to Pelindaba [South Africa’s nuclear research facility] through Krisch Engineering.”
A senior source involved in the investigation of the South African node of the smuggling network confirmed that he was aware of allegations concerning Wisser’s history.
Cecilia Höller, an alternate director at Krisch Engineering, this week refused comment to the M&G. She said Wisser was not back at work and that others were not available.
Höller did say, however, that the R100-million figure was ”probably a massive, massive, massive exaggeration”. She also said it was unlikely for engineering firms not to have ”indirectly” worked on the grand apartheid-era projects, which also included Sasol and Mossgas.
She did not directly deny that Krisch had worked on the apartheid nuclear programme.
Meyer, whose lawyer Heinrich Badenhorst would not comment on his unexpected release this week, was originally charged with contravening the Nuclear Energy Act by possessing and producing components of a centrifuge uranium enrichment plant without authorisation.
According to a statement by the South African Council for the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 11 shipping containers were found at the premises of his company Tradefin Engineering containing components of an enrichment plant as well as related documentation. In an enrichment plant, cascades of centrifuges are used to isolate the highly enriched uranium necessary for nuclear weapons.
Dr Wally Grant, a leader of the South African weapons development programme, this week confirmed that Meyer had worked under him at Atomic Energy Corporation at the time.
According to a statement issued by the German federal prosecutor’s office, Wisser is suspected of acting as a middleman in a 2001 request to provide special tubes to Libya for use in a uranium enrichment facility.
To this end, he allegedly approached a South African company and tubes were manufactured according to designs provided by Wisser. It is not known if the company involved was Meyer’s Tradefin, but a source close to the company said there was a longstanding business relationship between Wisser’s Krisch and Tradefin.
The German authorities said, as far as was known, the equipment never reached Libya, but that Wisser was paid â,¬1-million (about R8-million) in commission.
Wisser and Meyer’s arrests are among several across the globe linked to a nuclear technology smuggling ring set up by Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan, who admitted earlier this year he had been involved in providing assistance to Libya, Iran and North Korea in their attempts to develop a nuclear capability.
As the revered ”father” of the first ”Islamic bomb”, he was considered untouchable and was immediately pardoned by Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf. Since then there has been a major push by Western powers to ”roll up” Khan’s network, which, according to an estimate by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), extended across 20 countries.
The German prosecutors’ statement said the extent of Wisser’s involvement in the Khan procurement network was the subject of further investigation. It added that another German citizen, Gotthard Lerch, resident in Switzerland, was also under investigation regarding to the same matter.
A Swiss newspaper reported last Sunday that police raided three Swiss-based companies in connection with a probe into the activities of Lerch, a businessman active in the nuclear industry.
The first link of Lerch and South Africa to the Khan network came following the seizure of cargo on a German ship bound for Libya in October 2003. British and United States intelligence officials traced the cargo — precision-engineered machine parts — back to a Malaysian company Scomi Prescision Engineering.
Malaysian police interviewed one Buhari ”BSA” Tahir, a Sri Lankan-born businessman based in Dubai.
It was from information obtained from Tahir, a trusted and close confidante of Khan, that the first details of the Pakistani scientist’s nuclear arms bazaar began to emerge.
Tahir, described by US authorities as the ”chief financial officer and money launderer” for Khan’s network, was accused of being actively involved in supplying centrifuge components for Libya’s uranium-enrichment programme.
According to a Malaysian police report, Tahir described how he had got to know Khan in 1985, when he supplied airconditioners to Khan’s laboratory.
In 1994 he was persuaded by Khan to send two containers of used centrifuge units from Pakistan to Iran. Tahir organised the trans-shipment of the two containers from Dubai to Iran.
According to the information obtained from Tahir, who remains in detention under Malaysia’s notorious Internal Security Act, Khan had been approached by Libya in 1997 to help with its enrichment programme. Tahir had accompanied Khan to a meeting with Libya’s chief atomic scientist, Mohamad Matuq.
Tahir provided details of individuals and companies allegedly involved in Khan’s supply network.
He named Lerch as having attempted to source components in South Africa to set up a machine shop in Libya to manufacture centrifuge components. The project, according to the Malaysian police report, was dubbed ”machine shop 1001”.
The penetration of Khan’s network appears to be at least partially responsible for the decision by Libya, in late December last year, to abandon attempts to develop nuclear weapons and invite inspectors from the IAEA to monitor the dismantling of its weapons programme.