Moe Shaik and I probably agree on more than either of us would like to admit.
For a start, I think we should all heed his call for the country to calm down.
At the moment reckless rhetoric over the ”Zuma problem” is doing enormous damage — and no one is sitting down and talking rationally about the consequences and the competing principles involved.
Because there are competing principles. Respecting the rule of law is one. Respecting the will of the democratically elected majority party is another.
Democracy is a fragile construct, dependent on a sufficient degree of consensus — a social contract — to sustain the checks and balances of the system.
Even mature democracies recognise that there might be situations in which the conflict between executive power — as an expression of popular will — and the disciplining power of the justice system can threaten the democratic consensus itself.
That’s why countries such as France and Italy make legal provision that charges against a sitting president may be deferred until he leaves office. The stresses set up by pitting one branch of government against another might be too great and so something has to give to keep the system intact.
Of course, we don’t have such laws here, and it is far from clear that the notion of justice deferring to presidential power enjoys widespread support among South Africans.
A phone-in this week suggested that at least many SAfm listeners, of all races, believe Zuma should face his charges as would any other accused and the courts should decide if he has been wronged or if he is guilty.
But it may (I stress may) be true that the prosecution of Zuma is now causing so much tension that it represents a threat to our democratic fundamentals.
Prosecuting Zuma is causing a degree of polarisation that is inhibiting rational discourse and decision-making across the state, from considering the costs and benefits of the Scorpions to a proper discussion of Zuma’s virtues and vices.
It may be that this dire situation represents little more than successful political blackmail by his supporters, but it doesn’t change the reality of the situation.
A part of our 1994 compromise represented the same kind of blackmail by some of the more odious politicians and generals who directed the apartheid war machine. The principle of justice gave way in terms of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission to secure a commitment to the transition from those giving up control of state power.
Of course, what everyone gained was well worth the temporary sacrifice of the principle of equal justice – and the circumstances were unique enough to limit the damage to the justice system.
The question is: what are the costs and benefits of a ”political solution” to the Zuma problem – and what might such a solution look like? But to even begin that deliberation we need a lot more honesty, a lot more real leadership.
The first thing to note is that for a rational discussion of the issue, Zuma’s supporters need to accept he has a problem.
The man’s backers proclaim his innocence, but have yet to mount a serious argument as to why then he should not simply refute the prosecution’s case in court. The notion that there is no real case against him is simply wishful thinking or deliberate propaganda.
No, of course Zuma didn’t have much to do with the arms deal — the R500 000 bribe he was supposedly offered by Thint was allegedly for his protection in the light of an investigation after the arms deal.
The argument that the Scorpions have abused Zuma’s rights is a valid one to make — but his supporters don’t really seem to have faith there is enough evidence to convince a court of this.
And why can’t Zuma get a fair trial? He is no more pre-judged than any other accused who enters the dock after a long and public investigation. Indeed, in every case the prosecution goes first and arrays its most damning evidence — albeit under cross-examination — before the accused’s version is aired in detail.
So Zuma’s supporters must stop arguing that Zuma is innocent and instead start telling us why it will be too costly right now for the nation to find out one way or another.
They must start to make suggestions as to what kind of political solution they want — and what they are willing to put in the balance to make this deal worthwhile to the rest of us, such as in the 1994 compromise.
An arms-deal TRC (including consideration of Zuma’s relatively minor R500 000 problem) is attractive, because it would shift the focus from Zuma to the sins of other party bigwigs and the ANC itself. The party would have to come to the party, as it were, and acknowledge how its thirst for covert money has polluted our public life.
Throw in a new constitutional provision to enforce transparency and fairness in party funding and we might be starting to look at a compromise, the benefits of which might outweigh its costs. As with the National Party, the absolution of a ”political deal” can only come with at least some truth-telling, some acknowledgement of error.
But Zuma’s main hurdle — his receipt of ongoing largesse from Schabir Shaik — would not be covered by this and would require some other process, making an awkward, two-pronged solution necessary.
It might be useful here to look at why Zuma is supposedly not guilty. He’s not guilty, says Moe Shaik, because he’s a victim, a victim firstly of Schabir Shaik’s good deeds corrupted by bad intentions. But both of them are really guilty of falling prey to a culture of greed, of material indulgence, which has been a destructive hallmark of our leadership where there should be a culture of frugality and restraint.
Sure, Zuma wasn’t personally financially extravagant, but the extra money from Shaik allowed him to indulge in unprotected casual sex and create a string of dependants without being especially concerned about being able to meet his paternal obligations.
And Zuma has not rebuked himself or others. He still surrounds himself with gangs of bodyguards, clads himself in speeding four-by-fours and basks in unseemly displays of the cult of personality.
So a bit of truth-telling here — from Zuma and the rest of the national leadership — might be put in the balance too.
Zuma is also a victim, says Moe Shaik, of the politicisation of state institutions. Well, hello, it’s not only the Mbeki camp and the Scorpions that are part of the problem. Let Zuma’s ANC deal with this abuse by ending the policy of cadre deployment, by explicitly accepting the separation of party and state. That might be worth a plea bargain or a pardon.
All of these suggestions are not easy, painless solutions — unlike the one proffered by Moe Shaik. Just allow Zuma to explain his side of the story, he says, ”in an environment free of political manipulation and prejudice”, and the NPA will surely see his innocence.
This is rubbish.
It has always been open to Zuma to present his explanations and to ask the NPA to review its decision on that basis. This gambit risks simply being a cover for the political pressure and manipulation that is going on from the Zuma camp to move from the public realm to behind closed doors at the NPA. It’s really another bid for a get-out-of-jail-free card.
Sorry, Moe. On this basis, no deal.
Maybe Zuma, assorted Shaiks and anyone else who feels the need should be offered indemnity in return for testifying against the arms companies.
Now there’s a deal I could live with.