President Cyril Ramaphosa. Photo: Rajesh Jantilal/AFP
Cyril Ramaphosa has always known what to do to reverse the decline both in his party and the state. That is why he adopted renewal as the defining theme of his presidency. “Thuma mina – send me!,” he proclaimed. And, the ANC appeared to embrace Ramaphosa’s mission and pledged to support him by adopting renewal as the party’s collective objective as well.
Not long into his presidency, however, it became clear that there were limits to what he could achieve. Those constraints have remained and now have prefigured his response plan to the Zondo commission’s state capture recommendations. The response is essentially a reflection of the limitations on what Ramaphosa can do.
A head of state in a parliamentary system, Ramaphosa leads both his majority party and government. These are separate bodies in which the president’s authority derives from different sources, thereby prefiguring that he exercises power differently. Yet, the two institutions – party and state – are totally delinked. To remain at the helm of government, Ramaphosa needs his party’s support. If he antagonises most in the leadership hierarchy of the party, he could be ousted. Removal from office was always a possibility, for Ramaphosa threatened a considerable number of individual party leaders with his mission of renewal. After all, as Ramaphosa himself declared, the “ANC is accused number 1” of corruption.
Though somewhat constrained, Ramaphosa was able to revive law enforcement agencies. This, in turn, triggered the commencement of prosecutions. Albeit provoking some backlash from other party leaders, especially Ace Magashule and Jacob Zuma, Ramaphosa was emboldened on this front by a number of factors. The majority of ANC members had elected him not only to reform the party, but the state as well.
In electing Ramaphosa, they also hoped that he would rejuvenate the party’s electoral fortunes, which had dwindled significantly under his predecessor for two successive elections. The electoral revival of the ANC, they believed, rested on Ramaphosa making changes, and he had to do so ahead of the 2019 elections.
Public outrage at the thievery of the Zuma administration buoyed Ramaphosa even further. And, because such changes were entirely within the state, where he had unchallenged executive authority, Ramaphosa had no resistance to reviving state institutions and fighting corruption.
Within his own party, however, the reform process was not as seamless as it was inside the state. Progress within the state was paralleled by resistance inside the party. Here Ramaphosa needed the support of the rest of the office bearers and his national executive committee (NEC), some of whom were implicated in the corruption that the Zondo commission was unearthing. Their complicity in corruption hardened their attitude to attempts at reforms.
Consider, for instance, the inclusion of individuals that Chief Justice Raymond Zondo had cited for corruption on the ANC list to be sworn-in as members of parliament in 2019. They included Nomvula Mokonyane, Malusi Gigaba and Mosebenzi Zwane. This attracted public outcry, leading to the removal of some, while others remained. The swearing-in of compromised individuals, such as Zwane, was justified on the basis of unity.
In this case, unity of the ANC trumped moral regeneration, with all its detrimental effect on the reputation of the party. The party chose to suffer ridicule, rather than remain steadfast to its claims of renewal. The subsequent lengthy and monotonous squabble over whether compromised leaders should be suspended, or step aside, was another sign of dithering, indicating just how strong the resistance was and his weak grip on the party.
Now that Ramaphosa has to implement the Zondo commission’s recommendations, his conundrum has still not changed. Both his authority and grip over the party and state remain uneven. This unevenness is reflected in his proposed course of action over the two bodies. The Zondo report made a number of recommendations, including further investigations, asset recovery, legislative changes, setting up new institutions and punitive measures against implicated cabinet members. His plan of action on implicated cabinet members is fudgy and non-committal, but precise, with timelines, in relation to the rest.
On further investigations and asset recovery, in addition to stating his plans, and quite correctly, the president also took the opportunity to remind the public of how much progress law enforcement agencies have made in its anti-corruption crusade. Of the 202 investigations Zondo recommended, 89 have been opened involving 165 individuals in 26 cases.
Some of the cases, if not all, are heard at specially created commercial courts to attend specifically to state-capture cases. The Asset Forfeiture Unit (AFU) and the South African Revenue Service have been granted preservation orders to the value of R12.9-billion, which belongs to individuals who are under investigation. The AFU has already recovered R2.9-billion.
Albeit a lot more still has to be done, the last two years or so have seen tremendous progress to recover stolen assets and hold culprits accountable. This is even more impressive considering how dismembered and hollowed law enforcement institutions were in 2018. The National Prosecution Authority (NPA) was a shadow of its former self, headed by underserving individuals that owed their positions to loyalty towards the parasitic political leadership.
The NPA required rebuilding to attract back qualified prosecutors and rid itself of moles. Without a reliable investigative unit, as was the case with the Scorpions, NPA prosecutions were also not guaranteed of success. Police dockets were simply not prosecutable. This changed somewhat with the formation of the Investigating Directorate (ID) within the NPA, meant to emulate the Scorpions. Though lacking the same powers as the Scorpions, the introduction of the ID has meant the NPA have investigators, analysts and prosecutors all working on the same investigations to optimise prospects of a successful prosecution.
Though not at the same level as its predecessor, the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigations, also known as the Hawks, also appears to be doing some meaningful work. Most importantly, the Hawks are working with the NPA and the Special Investigating Unit (SIU) sharing information and helping each other with investigations. The SIU has been particularly busy. Instead of setting up a commission to investigate the Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa as recommended by Zondo, the president has decided that the SIU takes up the assignment, alongside the Hawks, who are already involved.
This is a sensible route in light of the investigations already underway.
The seeming success of the collaboration has added impetus to the idea of establishing a broad investigative agency with all the various skills, for all manner of crimes, that will work closely with prosecutors. Ramaphosa promises a firm plan on this next year.
The clarity and purposefulness that Ramaphosa’s plan shows in relation to state institutions, however, is absent when it comes to dealing with implicated comrades in cabinet. The commission recommended further investigations into possible corruption by Gwede Mantashe and Thabang Makwetla, and the dismissal of David Mahlobo and Zizi Kodwa. Mantashe, Makwetla and Zizi received benefits from individuals and companies implicated in state capture. Mahlobo was part of a large-scale syphoning of state funds at the State Security Agency.
This recommendation has dire political implications for the president, especially because his party will host an elective conference in December. Both Mantashe and Kodwa have been his vocal supporters, going back to the previous conference, and certainly still needs their support at the coming conference. This calculation explains Ramaphosa’s non-committal and general response to Zondo’s recommendation: “… the president needs to exercise his or her judgment on whether members of the executive meet the standards of probity and integrity expected of them.”
How Ramaphosa acts towards his cabinet colleagues will determine the measure of credibility he gains for his claims to stamp out corruption. His reform measures within the state have gained him some applause, but his ambivalent approach within the party creates doubts as to whether he can see the reform process to completion.
This is a test, whose results will determine whether the president gains moral authority. Executive authority derives from legislation, by virtue of his position, for decisions in government. Moral authority, on the other hand, is conferred upon him by the public based on demonstrable actions towards the public good.
With moral authority, he can go on to achieve a lot more than executive authority allows. He’ll have a greater chance of re-energising the public mood and mobilising people towards national objectives. People will heed his calls because they trust and believe him. For all that to happen he simply has to honour his word.
Mcebisi Ndletyana is a professor of political science at the University of Johannesburg and co-author of a forthcoming book on the centenary history of Fort Hare University.
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