If God wills, even a broomstick will shoot. That is an old Yiddish adage. One could add now: If God wills, even Ehud Olmert can sometimes tell the truth.
The truth, according to the Israeli prime minister’s testimony before the Winograd commission of inquiry into the war in Lebanon, which was leaked to the media recently, is that this was not a spontaneous reaction to the capture of the two Israeli soldiers, but a war planned a long time ago. We said so right from the start.
Olmert told the commission that immediately after assuming the functions of acting prime minister, in January last year, he consulted with the army chiefs about the situation on the northern border. Until then, the prevailing doctrine followed Ariel Sharon’s decision not to react with force to provocations in the north, so that the Israeli army could concentrate on fighting the Palestinians. But this enabled Hizbullah to build up a large stockpile of rockets of all kinds. Olmert decided to change that policy.
The army prepared a two-pronged plan: an operation on the ground aimed at the elimination of Hizbullah, and an aerial offensive, aimed at the destruction of the Lebanese infrastructure in order to put pressure on the Lebanese public, which, in turn, would put pressure on Hizbullah. As the Israeli Defence Force’s (IDF) Chief of General Staff Dan Halutz said at the beginning of the war: “We shall turn Lebanon’s clock back 20 years.” The Air Force was also tasked with destroying Hizbullah’s rocket arsenal.
But nowadays it is not proper to attack a country without a convincing reason. Before the first Lebanon war, the Americans demanded that Israel attack only after a clear provocation that would convince the world. The necessary justification was provided at the right time by the Abu Nidal gang, which tried to assassinate the Israeli ambassador in London. In the recent case, it was decided in advance that the capture of Israeli soldiers would constitute such a provocation.
A cynic might argue that this decision turned Israeli soldiers into bait. It was known that Hizbullah wanted to capture soldiers to force a prisoner exchange. The regular Israeli army patrols along the border fence were a standing invitation to Hizbullah to carry out their evil design.
The capture of Gilad Shalit by Palestinians near the Gaza border fence turned on a red light in Israel. In his testimony Olmert said that from that moment he was convinced that Hizbullah would attempt a similar exploit.
If so, the prime minister should have ordered the army to halt the patrols along the northern border, or to reinforce them in a way that would deter Hizbullah. That was not done. The members of the fateful patrol set out on their way as to a picnic.
The same cynic might argue that Olmert and the army chiefs were interested in a pretext to execute their war plans. They were convinced that the soldiers would be brought home in a jiffy. But, as the British royal motto says, Honi soit qui mal y pense — Evil be to he who evil thinks.
Hizbullah attacked, two soldiers were captured and the planned operation should have started rolling smoothly. But it did not. The war did break out, as planned, but from then on nothing went according to plan. Consultations were hasty, the decisions confused, the operations indecisive. It now appears that the plan was not yet finalised.
The Winograd commission has to find the answers to some tough questions: If the war was planned such a long time in advance, why was the army not ready for war? How come the army budget was reduced? Why were the emergency arsenals empty? Why were the reserve forces, which were supposed to carry out the operations on the ground, called up only when the war was in full swing? And after they were finally deployed, why did they receive confused and contradictory orders?
All these show that Olmert and the generals were grossly incompetent in their military decision-making. But they also lacked any understanding of the international scene.
Hizbullah’s Hassan Nasrallah has admitted he made a mistake. He did not understand that there had been a change in Israel: instead of Sharon, an old war-horse who was not looking for action in the north, a new man had arrived, an inexperienced politician itching for war. What Nasrallah had in mind was another round of the usual: the capture of soldiers and a prisoner exchange. Instead, a war broke out.
But Olmert’s mistake was bigger. He was convinced that the United States would give him a blessing for the road and allow him to roam in Lebanon at will. But US interests, too, had changed.
In Lebanon, the government of Fuad Siniora has succeeded in uniting all pro-American forces. They have loyally carried out all of Washington’s orders, have driven out the Syrians and have supported the investigation of Rafiq Hariri’s murder, which is to provide the Americans with a pretext for a massive strike against Syria.
According to Olmert’s leaks, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice called him just after the outbreak of the war and conveyed to him the up-to-date US orders: it was desired that Israel should deal a crushing blow to Hizbullah, the enemies of Siniora, but it was absolutely forbidden to do anything that would hurt Siniora, such as bombing Lebanese infrastructure outside Hizbullah’s territory.
That emasculated the General Staff’s plans. The idea had been that if the civilian population in Lebanon was hurt sufficiently, it would put pressure on the government to act decisively against Hizbullah, enough to liquidate the organisation or, at least, to disarm it. It is very doubtful whether this strategy would have succeeded if it had been carried out, but because of US intervention it was not carried out.
Instead of the massive bombardment that would have destroyed the basic industries and facilities, the IDF’s Halutz had to be satisfied — after Rice’s phone call — with bombing the roads and bridges that serve Hizbullah and the Shiite population (including the supply lines for Syrian arms to Hizbullahland). The damage was extensive, but not sufficient to bring Lebanon to its knees. Apart from that, the air force succeeded in destroying some of the long-range missiles, but the short-range missiles were not hit, and it was those that created havoc among the population in northern Israel.
On the ground, the operation was even more confused. Only during the last 48 hours of the war, when it was already clear that the ceasefire was about to come into force, was the major offensive, in which 33 Israeli soldiers died, set in motion. What for? In his testimony, Olmert asserts that it was necessary to change some points in the United Nations resolution in Israel’s favour. We know today that these changes were worthless.
The intervention of Rice in the conduct of the war is interesting in another respect. It sheds light on a question that has been engaging the experts for some time now: in the relationship between the US and Israel, do American interests override Israeli interests, or is it the other way round?
This discussion came to a head when American professors Stephen Walt and John Mearsheimer published a research paper, according to which Israel imposes on the US a policy that is contrary to the American national interest. The conclusion upset many who believe the opposite: that Israel is but a small wheel in the imperial American machine.
When Rice encouraged Israel to go to war but vetoed an essential part of the war plan, it seems that she proved the two professors wrong. True, Olmert got American permission for his war, which served American interests (the elimination of Hizbullah, which opposed the pro-American Siniora government, though it officially belonged to it), but only with severe limitations.
The same principle is now operating on the Syrian front.
Bashar al-Assad offers Israel peace negotiations without prior conditions. This way, he hopes to avert an American attack on his country. Like the two professors, he believes that the Israeli lobby rules Washington.
Almost all the important experts in Israel are in agreement that the Syrian offer is serious. Even in “security circles” some are urging Olmert to seize the opportunity and achieve peace in the north. But the Americans have put an absolute veto on that, which Olmert has accepted. A vital Israeli interest has been sacrificed on the American altar. Even now, when Bush is already entering into some kind of a dialogue with Syria, the Americans are prohibiting us from doing the same.
Why? Simple: the Americans are using us as a threat. They hold us on a line, like an attack dog, and tell Assad: if you don’t do as we wish, we shall release the dog. If the Americans reach an agreement with the Syrians, it is they who will garner the political profits from any accord we reach with Syria.
That reminds me of the events of 1973. After the October war, Israeli-Egyptian ceasefire negotiations started at km 101 (from Cairo). At some stage, General Israel Tal took over as the chief of the Israeli delegation. Much later, he told me the following story:
“At a certain point, General Gamasy, the Egyptian representative, approached and told me that Egypt was now ready to sign an agreement with us. Full of joy, I took a plane and rushed to [Prime Minister] Golda Meir, to bring her the happy news. But Golda told me to stop everything immediately. She said to me: I have promised Henry Kissinger that if we arrive at an agreement, we shall transfer the whole matter to him, and he will tie up the loose ends.”
And that is what happened, of course. The negotiations at km 101 were stopped, and Kissinger took control of the scene. It was he who reached the agreement, and the US was credited with it. The Egyptians became loyal followers of the US. The Israeli-Egyptian agreement was postponed for five years. It was achieved by Anwar Sadat, who planned his historic flight to Jerusalem behind the backs of the Americans.
Now the same may happen on the Syrian front — in the best case. In the worst case, the Americans will not reach an agreement with the Syrians, they will prevent us from achieving an agreement for ourselves, and thousands of Israelis, Syrians and Lebanese will pay the price in the next war.
Uri Avnery is an Israeli journalist and peace activist