Smoke rises as clashes continue between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), in Khartoum, Sudan on May 1, 2023. (Photo by Ahmed Satti/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images)
As the confrontation between Sudan’s de facto commander, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and his heavily armed adversary, General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, rages on, briefly interrupted by fleeting truce, the struggle for control of the capital Khartoum remains uncertain.
Each faction in the internecine conflict maintains that it has the upper hand. But, as foreign delegations evacuate, and diplomatic attempts to impose a cessation of hostilities reach a stalemate, a variety of potential outcomes emerge, and none bodes well for the nation’s future.
The situation unfolding in Sudan is akin to a battle among gangsters, and the world has chosen to turn away from it. It is understandable that this would be the initial reaction to a horrific conflict that has already compelled the warring parties to deploy the country’s most powerful weaponry on the streets of its capital. The citizens of Khartoum are trapped in their homes as attack helicopters and fighter planes buzz overhead, with battles raging in the streets and buildings being reduced to rubble. Vital resources such as water and electricity have become increasingly scarce, as has food, and the city’s hospitals are in shambles. The seven million inhabitants of the city are facing a humanitarian crisis of epic proportions.
The ongoing battles for strategic locations are cause for concern, because they suggest that neither side has made any substantial progress since the first day of conflict. This is particularly troubling news for the national army, which is undoubtedly better equipped and more organised than its adversaries.
In the middle of April, Sudan was plunged into chaos as the two main factions of the military regime clashed. The Sudanese armed forces are predominantly loyal to Burhan, while the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) — a collection of militias — follows the former warlord, Hemedti.
The roots of this power struggle can be traced back to the years preceding the 2019 uprising, which eventually led to the ousting of dictator Omar al-Bashir. During his rule, Bashir deliberately set his formidable security forces against each other, creating a tense environment that persisted even after his fall from power.
The current conflict is a bitter reversal of the progress made during the 2019 Sudanese revolution. Burhan and Hemedti, were key figures in the movement that led to the ousting of dictator Bashir after months of protests against his regime. At the time, the revolution presented a rare opportunity for the Horn of Africa to secure a nonviolent transition towards a democratic government.
Despite initial attempts to transition to a democratic civilian-led government, progress faltered, and it appeared that a showdown between the two factions was inevitable. Diplomats in Khartoum had been predicting such a violent outbreak since early 2022.
Since the 2019 uprising, a key source of tension in Sudan has been the civilian demand for greater oversight of the military and the integration of the RSF into the regular armed forces. The civilians have also called for the military to relinquish its profitable holdings in industries such as agriculture and trade, which have been a source of power for the army and its regional militias.
Furthermore, justice for alleged war crimes committed by the military and its allies during the Darfur conflict of 2003 has been a point of contention, with the International Criminal Court seeking trials for Bashir and other Sudanese suspects. The military’s involvement in the killings of pro-democracy protesters in June 2019, as well as the deaths of more than 125 people during protests since the 2021 coup, have further fuelled activists’ demands for justice and accountability.
Sudan’s strategic location at the intersection of the Red Sea, the Sahel region, and the Horn of Africa, coupled with its agricultural resources, has made it a hotbed for regional power struggles that threaten to derail efforts toward a successful transition to civilian-led government. The political upheavals and conflicts that have affected Sudan’s neighbouring countries, such as Ethiopia, Chad, and South Sudan, have also complicated matters. Tensions between Sudan and Ethiopia, in particular, have flared over disputes regarding farmland along their shared border.
In the wake of the violence, thousands of Sudanese refugees have fled to neighbouring countries, including Chad. Moreover, major global players, such as the United States, Russia, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are jockeying for influence in Sudan, adding another layer of complexity to the already volatile situation. The African Union has expressed concern that the conflict in Sudan could destabilise the wider region.
The violence suggests that the two generals are now locked in a fight for survival. The ongoing crisis in Sudan can, in part, be attributed to the actions of the international community, who prioritised the formation of a government above all else, even if it meant legitimising figures such as Hemedti and Burhani who were not committed to genuine reform. This approach lent credibility to the two military leaders and enabled them to obstruct the democratic transition process.
What is particularly concerning is that despite the track record of Burhan and Hemedti, the international community and regional actors have continued to place their trust in them and their promises to hand over power to civilian leaders, only to be disappointed once again. Burhan’s uncharismatic persona and uninspiring leadership has been overshadowed by his significant military power base and corporate interests, known as the “deep state” among Sudanese democrats. Notably, Burhan orchestrated the coup just as the Empowerment Elimination, Anti-Corruption, and Funds Recovery Committee of the civilian administration was about to publish its investigation of corruption in military-affiliated companies. One of Burhan’s first actions was to raid the committee’s offices and confiscate its documentation.
Although the Sudanese Armed Forces appear to be a professional army and have the crucial support of the Sudanese air force, their track record in military engagements is less than impressive. Nonetheless, Burhan benefits from his connections to the former Bashir regime. Many of Bashir’s loyalists see Burhan as their best chance to regain power.
Hemedti possesses significant strengths as well. As the head of the RSF, he played a critical role in toppling Bashir in 2019. Despite being Burhan’s subordinate, he displayed the ambition and dynamism to overshadow his superior. Hemedti has also established a rapidly growing business empire and forged his own connections with foreign powers.
He rose to prominence as a member of the notorious Janjaweed, an Arab militia group from Darfur. When Bashir realised that the Sudanese Armed Forces were incapable of defeating the rebels in Darfur, he turned to the Janjaweed to conduct a brutal campaign of ethnic cleansing. In 2013, Bashir formalised the Janjaweed as the RSF, ignoring the objections of his chief of staff, who feared that they would become a rival to the Sudanese Armed Forces. Bashir made another misstep when he called on Hemedti, whom he called his “protector”, to station his fighters in Khartoum during civilian protests.
In Sudan’s current power struggle, Burhan refuses to entertain the idea of a permanent ceasefire followed by negotiations with his adversary Hemedti, because it would amount to admitting defeat and bolster Hemedtii’s power. Instead, Burhan is focused on ousting Hemedti’s RSF from the capital before any talk of a ceasefire can take place. For Burhan, failure to achieve this goal would leave him in a vulnerable position. Hemedti has capitalised on holding senior government positions as a platform to create a political clout for himself. Additionally, this has put Hemedti on an equal footing with Burhan in the eyes of the international community, creating a dilemma for Burhan. Despite calls for a ceasefire from various countries, none have publicly taken Burhan’s side, which undermines his claim of legitimacy.
In the coming days and weeks, various scenarios may unfold if the stalemate persists. The most optimistic scenario is that the army will eventually regain control of most of Khartoum, compelling the RSF to flee to the provinces, particularly Darfur, which is Hemedti’s power base. The army will also extend its reach over the majority of the country, battling the RSF in other urban areas.
Only then Burhan would be in a position to submit to both domestic and international pressure to expedite the transfer of power to a civilian government, which could then negotiate with Hemedti on a peaceful resolution. Since Hemedti supported the Framework Agreement and claimed that Burhan was on the verge of reneging on his promises, it will be difficult for him to reject a civilian administration in Khartoum.
There are several potential outcomes that may evolve, but none of them bode well for Sudan. One possibility is that external actors may choose to intervene and support one or both sides, leading to a protracted proxy war that could destabilise the entire region. Should this happen, an even more ominous scenario could emerge.
The fragile Juba agreement may collapse, and secessionist groups in Darfur, Blue Nile, South Kordofan and the eastern provinces may gain momentum.
With a weak central government and a divided army, there is a real risk that Sudan’s territorial integrity may slowly disintegrate. Beyond the already dire economic and social conditions, the spectre of partition and civil strife continues to loom over the country.
The economically crucial tribes in eastern Sudan are growing increasingly restless, with renewed calls for secession. Additionally, the fate of peace in Darfur and southern Sudan hangs in a precarious balance. A protracted military confrontation may also ignite tribal wars across various regions of the nation.
The defeat of the army would be a catastrophic event that would plunge the country into the worst kind of disintegration.
Dr Imran Khalid is a freelance columnist on international affairs based in Karachi, Pakistan. He qualified as a physician from Dow Medical University in 1991 and has a master’s degree in international relations from Karachi University.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Mail & Guardian.