Supporters of the military administration in Niger storm French military air base as they demand French soldiers to leave the country in Niamey, Niger on August 27, 2023. On Aug. 25, Niger's military administration gave the French Ambassador Sylvain Itte 48 hours to leave the country, accusing him of refusing to respond to an invitation to meet Niger's foreign minister. (Photo by Balima Boureima/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images)
In a significant escalation of the already volatile crisis in Niger, the military leadership has taken a drastic step by asking for the French ambassador’s departure. This development comes in the wake of a destabilising coup that unseated the democratically elected president, intensifying the turmoil in this West African nation.
French Ambassador Sylvain Itte was asked to leave Niger within 48 hours in a letter that accused him of ignoring an invitation for a meeting with the foreign ministry. The letter cited “actions of the French government contrary to the interests of Niger” as among the reasons for Itte’s expulsion.
But France’s foreign ministry issued a resolute statement on 25 August, dismissing the authority of Niger’s “putschists” to demand the departure of its ambassador stationed in Niamey.
Emphatically underlining the source of the ambassador’s accreditation, the ministry emphasised that the ambassador’s legitimacy solely emanates from the duly elected authorities of Niger. This sharp retort underscores the intensifying clash of narratives and assertions between the involved parties.
Adding another layer of complexity to the situation, Niger’s military government has granted permission for troops from neighbouring Mali and Burkina Faso to stand in its defence.
This strategic move amplifies the tensions and stakes in an ongoing standoff with other West African countries that are considering the use of force to restore the democratically elected leader to power. The situation remains fluid, with potential consequences for regional stability hanging in the balance.
The latest coup episode in Niger, unfurled on 26 July, marks the seventh convulsion of its kind across West Africa in a span of three years. However, the repercussions of this domestic upheaval have rippled beyond the region, casting deep shadows over Western interests.
Notably, the cascade of events following the putsch harshly mirrors the trajectories witnessed in Mali and Burkina Faso. This disconcerting congruence underscores the intricate conundrum — a sort of geopolitical tightrope act — facing the West.
The backdrop reveals protracted tensions between Niger’s President Mohamed Bazoum and the coup conductor General Abdourahamane “Omar” Tchiani — both frontline players in Mahamadou Issoufou’s presidential regime from 2011 to 2021.
Bazoum’s plan to replace Tchiani, the head of the presidential guard, seems to have set things in motion. The following day, instead of supporting him, the military rallied behind the emerging junta on the pretext to prevent a potentially lethal showdown among different factions that could escalate into a catastrophic conflict.
The coup in Niger adds to the cascade of upheavals sweeping the Sahelian belt since the Sudanese Armed Forces ousted Omar al-Bashir in 2019. A chain of military regimes now holds sway across countries, forming a contiguous expanse from the Atlantic to the Red Sea.
The region has witnessed a series of botched coup attempts in the recent past. In 2021, Niger thwarted a putsch only days before Bazoum’s inauguration. Alongside, countries like Benin, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau and São Tomé and Príncipe have fended off military inroads into their politics.
This tableau underscores the waning of Western influence and the failure of multilateral engagement to counter the region’s deteriorating political and security landscape.
Niger’s strategic importance is amplified by its abundant natural resources. The country boasts valuable reserves of gold, silver, coal, tin and, notably, uranium. This radioactive element, particularly, garners attention. Renowned for its premium uranium ores, Niger contributed around 5% of worldwide mining output in 2022, producing 2 020 metric tons, while France’s state-owned Orano spearheads Niger’s primary mining, despite recent mine closures and new ventures.
Niger is the EU’s second-largest ore supplier. Niger’s geopolitical significance fuels two key trends in the escalating crisis. First, it could evolve into a broader West African conflict, even deemed “Africa’s world war.” Second, Niger’s Sahel location holds pivotal relevance, not just for regional extremism but also within a continent now a global hotspot for terrorism and religious extremism.
Bazoum’s gambit to defuse the Tchiani threat included plans to remove him and slash the presidential guard’s budget. Simultaneously, Bazoum boosted overall military spending, aiming to counter Niger’s pressing terrorism challenges and to garner military support elsewhere.
Despite this move, the military aligned with the coup plotters. Echoing a familiar West African junta playbook, the putschists justified their action, planning to prosecute Bazoum for treason.
Many countries including France, the US and regional bodies such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the AU, exhibited stern responses towards the coup’s orchestrators. France and ECOWAS called for the prompt release of Bazoum and a swift return to constitutional norms, cautioning against potential military intervention.
The coup’s underpinnings reveal a complex interplay of domestic and international factors, adding to the intricate tapestry of this unfolding drama.
Indubitably, Bazoum’s counter-terrorism strategy and close collaboration with the West was bringing relative stability to Niger. Initially, the junta seemed less fixated on opposing the West, even though Bazoum enjoyed Western backing.
Swiftly, the Western response toughened, eschewing normalcy with the junta and pushing for Bazoum’s return. ECOWAS also amplified its opposition. Consequently, the junta’s anti-Western sentiment intensified, encompassing anti-French, anti-ECOWAS demonstrations, a strike at the French embassy, and showcasing pro-Russia emblems.
Spearheaded by Nigeria, ECOWAS propelled itself into the spotlight with a theatrical threat of military intervention, designed to oust the junta if it clung to power beyond 6 August. But this deadline passed without a whiff of battle and a shift occurred, as ECOWAS treaded cautiously, labelling intervention as a final recourse.
Only Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire and Benin committed troops for a Nigeria-led anti-junta endeavour. However, Nigeria’s senate withheld authorisation for deploying its own forces.
Mali, Burkina Faso and Guinea — all junta-led ECOWAS members — rallied behind Niger’s junta, even vowing to treat any action against it as a war on themselves. This was a major setback to Nigeria and ECOWAS.
In a face-saving effort, ECOWAS slapped tough economic sanctions on Niger. Nigeria cut off electricity supply to Niger. Amidst this, France and the EU halted economic aid, totaling $554 million. France also paused military operations. But uranium extraction is continuing, operated by French firm Orano.
In response, the Biden administration also decried Niger’s power seizure, threatened US aid withdrawal if constitutional order was not reinstated, and demanded Bazoum’s immediate release.
Yet, the White House has tactfully avoided the term “coup”, allowing room to stave off sanctions that could jeopardise counter-terrorism efforts. The problem with the US is that, besides combating ISIS and al-Qaeda-linked groups through its 1 000 troops there, the US is running a vital counter-terrorism drone hub in Niger.
Washington is seeking a diplomatic resolution to evade extensive sanctions and troop withdrawal.
Navigating the intricate riddle of Western priorities in Niger — reconciling democratic values, security and strategic concerns — grows ever more intricate. The prospect of deferring crucial choices lingers. Despite the looming spectre of severe humanitarian and economic fallout, the junta is unlikely to yield to sanctions in the near future.
As ECOWAS readies its standby forces for potential intervention, the coup leaders have threatened that any invasion targeting the junta will seal the ex-president’s fate. Yet, Nigeria and Ghana’s mobilisation of ECOWAS appears ever more doubtful over time. In a conceivable twist, Niger’s junta could forge a deeper tie with Wagner mercenaries, providing lasting support amid potential military action.
This has gained relevance as ECOWAS’ 6 August deadline for Bazoum’s return lapsed without compliance. The junta’s quest to sustain authority and legitimise its rule teeters on uncertainty, amid a volatile phase marked by both domestic unrest and fickle international sentiment.
This scenario is synonymous with instability, revealing the junta’s struggle to firmly secure control. A conceivable scenario, irrespective of the junta’s persistence, involves the fertile ground for insurgencies such as al-Qaeda, Boko Haram and other armed factions. They could exploit the turmoil, leading to heightened violence that might extend beyond Niger’s borders, compounding the challenges in neighbouring regions.
But the junta’s resilience against sanctions is likely to persist. A range of pathways could be possible. The Nigerien junta might navigate intricate internal talks with civilian figures, possibly involving Issoufou or Bazoum’s rivals. Deliberations could easily stall, with the junta manipulating local politicians to stave off relinquishing power, reminiscent of Sudan’s convoluted political dynamics.
The second option is the establishment of a collaborative transition government could materialise, uniting the junta with a civilian leader other than Bazoum, such as Issoufou. Promising upcoming elections, the government might later prolong its rule when the voting timeline nears, mirroring the strategies seen in Mali, Chad and Sudan.
As a third scenario, the junta could opt for a straightforward approach, pledging elections within a year without forming an interim civilian coalition. In this intricate political chess match, the junta’s tactics will shape Niger’s future, echoing regional precedents while navigating domestic complexities.
In a complex web interlinking a coup’s backdrop with potential regional conflict, burgeoning proxy strife and foreign powers’ neocolonial ambitions, diverse repercussions unfold. Plausible outcomes encompass democratic erosion across the region, accentuated by ECOWAS’ internal rifts and Nigerien dissent toward West African unity, as visible in Niamey.
Central Sahel’s neighbouring governments might sway towards military juntas or succumb to state collapse. The’ socioeconomic aftermath of sanctions, reminiscent of the Western playbook post-Putin’s Ukrainian incursion, threatens Nigeriens’ well-being.
The juncture nurtures a dichotomy — a populace yearning for change, juxtaposed with those favouring the prevailing junta, potentially sparking military interventions with external actors like Wagner mercenaries and foreign forces.
Amid a tenuous military regime, Niger could evolve into an extremism hub. This could arise from Western powers pursuing neo-colonialist agendas or, inversely, the absence of Western troops creating a void exploited by entities seeking to establish operational bases.
The tapestry of possibilities weaves an intricate narrative for Niger’s future.
Dr Imran Khalid is a freelance columnist on international affairs based in Karachi, Pakistan.