If his record in Iraq and elsewhere is anything to go by, General David Petraeus is not accustomed to losing. Having signed up last week as replacement for the disgraced General Stanley McChrystal, he presumably believes the Afghan war is still winnable, as Barack Obama maintains. But this appears to be a minority view.
Petraeus has few real options. He can persevere with McChrystal’s twin-track counterinsurgency strategy, using military pressure to create time and space for Afghan civilian governance and reconstruction.
But his predecessor recently acknowledged that the strategy was not working well in key southern battlegrounds. McChrystal’s admission was amplified by CIA chief Leon Panetta at the weekend.
“It’s harder, it’s slower than I think anyone anticipated,” Panetta told ABC News. “Is the strategy the right strategy? We think so … This is going to be tough,” he said.
Petraeus may try to buy time by persuading Obama to fudge his July 2011 “deadline” for beginning American troop withdrawals. He implied this month that any drawdown would be determined by conditions on the ground but it would lead to a head-on collision with vice-president Joe Biden and Democrats worried about re-election.
Biden is adamant: “In July of 2011, you’re going to see a whole lot of people moving out. Bet on it,” he said.
However, defence secretary Robert Gates is more ambiguous — an indication of what a can of worms Afghan policy has become.
Petraeus may also try to reduce the political heat by de-emphasising the importance of a scheduled White House progress review and Nato’s Lisbon summit in November, when allies will seek firm exit timelines. He could throw his weight behind attempts to draw Taliban elements into talks, as Pakistan, the United Nations and others have attempted.
He could seek to replace Karl Eikenberry, the United States ambassador to Kabul, and Richard Holbrooke, the US envoy, who have arguably become part of the problem. Or he could chuck more money at the problem, buying off tribal leaders and potential foes.
But Petraeus, who made his name with the 2006-2007 surge that reputedly turned Iraq around, may be tempted to try to pull that trick again. Speaking before Congress this month, he said it was “absolutely” possible that if more troops were required in Afghanistan, more would be sent — in addition to the two tranches of 20 000 and 30 000 reinforcements dispatched by Obama.
To avoid losing a war many already believe lost, Petraeus could go for broke with a third Afghan surge.
Obama may oppose him. The president has sacked two commanding generals in Afghanistan in two years. He can’t afford to lose another. Nor can he afford to “lose” Afghanistan.
But for Petraeus, escalating an unpopular war may be as hazardous as not doing so. Either way, his goose could be cooked.
“The administration is hoping that Petraeus can replicate his Iraq miracle,” said US columnist Charles Krauthammer. “However, two major factors distinguish the Afghan from the Iraqi surge. The first is the alarming weakness and ineptness — to say nothing of the corruption — of the Afghan central government — [The second] is indecision in Washington.” —