Two-and-a-half years ago a humble paragraph in the Mail & Guardian set in motion a train of events that led the Scorpions to focus on Jacob Zuma’s role in the arms deal.
That was the genesis of an investigation that has culminated in the deputy president fighting for his political life, implicated in corruption alongside his comradely financial adviser, Schabir Shaik.
A reconstruction of events shows that Shaik probably has himself to blame, as much as anyone else, for his and Zuma’s current predicament. Shaik’s recklessness in matters of fact and of interpersonal relations, some would say, is what cooked their goose.
In January 2001, with allegations about corruption in the arms acquisition swirling, the M&G turned its focus on Shaik and his Nkobi group of companies, empowerment partners to French arms firm Thomson CSF (now called Thales).
Under the headline “New evidence of ANC arms deal link” the M&G raised questions about the apparent proximity of the Nkobi group to the African National Congress and individual ANC politicians.
Among other things, that article contained a paragraph containing a list of supposed Nkobi Holdings shareholders as confirmed by Shaik. Well, Shaik’s list was not accurate, and that set the cat among the pigeons.
Among those listed by Shaik were the Workers’ College (a union training facility) and the family of late ANC treasurer general Thomas Nkobi (after whom Shaik’s group was named). Their “shareholding” was news to both.
A week later the M&G carried the outraged reaction of Workers’ College representatives, one of whom said he smelt “a very big and very dirty rat”, and of the Nkobi family, which was “distressed”.
The Nkobis retained Johannesburg lawyer Ian Jordaan to pursue Shaik’s apparent abuse of the family name. Jordaan and the Nkobis went as high as President Thabo Mbeki to get clarification, with little success. During the course of this, luminaries such as late defence minister Joe Modise popped up on the Shaik side of negotiations. Zuma’s looming presence alongside Shaik became increasingly apparent.
It is understood that a member of National Director of Public Prosecutions Bulelani Ngcuka’s staff, after conversations with Jordaan, took a special interest in Zuma’s role.
There were other factors that spurred the interest of Ngcuka’s investigator, such as a trip or trips by Zuma and Shaik to Malaysia, but the information unlocked from the Jordaan conversations was the “main thing” that led the Scorpions to train their sights on Zuma.
Which is not to say that it would not have happened anyway, for by that time another set of events was unfolding that would soon reach the investigators’ attention. And, again, Shaik had himself as much as anyone else to blame.
A few months earlier, in November 2000, Shaik had allegedly convened a meeting with Thomson/Thales representatives in Mauritius, where, among other things, discussions turned to “damage control” in relation to media allegations of arms deal corruption.
There, a Shaik employee was privy to some of the talk. That female employee, and others, soon left Shaik’s employ because of what may be termed “interpersonal” problems. They were ripe for the picking as witnesses.
But not necessarily keen. An earlier affidavit by William Downer, one of Ngcuka’s investigators, speaks of evidence being obtained under oath from “two very scared and reluctant witnesses. Both indicated their wish not to get involved in the matter and had to be summonsed and compelled to testify.”
One had been paid a R40 000 settlement by the Nkobi group when she left its employ, but she also had to sign confidentiality agreements presented to her by Shaik’s attorney who, according to Downer’s affidavit, told her this was because she “knew too much about the relationship” between Shaik and Zuma.
At least two of these witnesses did eventually cooperate with investigators. They may even have had “insurance” that became useful documentary evidence.
And so the Scorpions learnt of the March 2000 encrypted fax in which a Thomson/Thales representative told his colleagues about Zuma’s “confirmation” of an alleged request for a R500 000 annual bribe.
This information led investigators, some time before or during August 2001, to the Thomson offices in Midrand, where they seized documents that seemed to corroborate the request.
In October that year Ngcuka’s investigators raided Nkobi, Shaik and Thomson/Thales premises in South Africa and, with judicial assistance, abroad. The documentation obtained seemed to indicate a prima facie corruption case against Shaik, Thomson/Thales or some of its employees, and Zuma.
The investigation was pursued in secret, to the extent that Downer’s affidavit (made to obtain the October search warrants) referred to Zuma as “Mr X”.
But the M&G saw through that. Last November we headlined: “Arms ‘bribe’: Scorpions investigate Jacob Zuma”.
The rest is history.