Pressure: One of two South African Oryx helicopters are in Mozambique. (SAMIM)
The fearlessness of South African Special Forces together with their brothers-in-arms from Lesotho, Tanzania, Botswana and Mozambique, will not be enough to sustain the ongoing battle against extremist insurgents in Mozambique’s northern Cabo Delgado province indefinitely, according to security analysts.
They said it was critical that Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) leaders addressed a number of issues when they met on Tuesday and Wednesday in Lilongwe, Malawi, for an extraordinary summit of heads of state and government to review and re-assess the Southern African Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM).
These include critical questions on financial support, an extension of force numbers, and the urgent problem of insufficient air support. Better tactical intelligence to conduct more effective counterinsurgency operations should be top of the agenda, they said, especially as the insurgents seem to have gained momentum in the past few weeks.
Only two Oryx helicopters from the South African Air Force are serving the soldiers from all four countries in running skirmishes with well-armed and determined insurgents. A light Cessna Caravan assists with reconnaissance flights.
It was while one of the Oryx’s went to fetch reinforcements when Corporal Tebogo Radebe, 31, was killed five days before Christmas last year. The day before, two South Africans were wounded in another firefight, which prevented the militias from attacking another group of SADC soldiers.
South African operators pulled out the injured while under fire to have their wounds attended to. Apart from Radebe, the Mozambican forces suffered six casualties, with two fatalities, SAMIM said in a statement.
“The guys are fearless and doing extremely well considering the conditions that they operate in but they need the backup and suppressive firing capabilities from infantry and paratroopers to enable them to continue. The handful of South Africans have been constantly involved in the battles in Cabo Delgado since July last year,” a source close to the area of operations told Mail & Guardian.
Radebe was the first Special Forces operator to die in action since South Africa’s Border War in 1989. He was part of a joint contingent of Botswana, Tanzanian, Lesotho and Mozambican soldiers battling the insurgents east of the village Chai, about 250km north of Pemba. In two days, the South Africans were ambushed and attacked six times, fighting their way out of it and killing at least 14 insurgents in the process.
According to SAMIM, eight women, three children and two older men believed to have been abducted by the insurgents were also rescued.
The insurgents captured ammunition and a Harris hand radio from the South Africans when Radebe’s group was evacuated. Military sources said the loss of the radio was of particular concern in the hands of the opposing forces.
Al-Nabaa, the Islamic State’s online information platform, published images of the loot within days of the incident and claimed to have dealt victoriously with the SADC forces.
In turn, the SAMIM forces captured large quantities of the insurgents’ armaments and ammunition.
The M&G’s sources say the area in the hills outside Chai is inaccessible to any vehicles to provide ground fire support or resupplies. The soldiers have only the two Oryx’s to resupply ammunition or carry out an evacuation as was the case when Radebe was killed. The two helicopters also have to support Botswana, Lesotho and Tanzanian special forces, as well as ferry logistic support to the units in the field.
Even though the Oryx aircraft are equipped with machine guns, they are meant only for self-defence rather than getting involved in firefights.
Their fellow soldiers and medics have to provide basic “patch-ups” when any of the groups are injured in operations and, in many instances, while the assault is still ongoing.
In response to criticism about the shortage of air support after Radebe was killed, Brigadier Andries Mahapa, spokesperson for the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), denied that air support would have had any effect on the Chai operations. He said in a radio interview on Cape Talk that soldiers on patrol do not need air support and only when an ambush or attack happens do they call for assistance by air.
But soldiers on the ground are pleading for more air support.
Two Rooivalk attack helicopters were supposed to be part of the South African contribution to SAMIM but, with the demise of arms maker Denel and serious defence budgetary constraints, only four of the original 12 Rooivalks are usable.
Two are committed to the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s (DRC’s) operations and one to two are used in South Africa mainly for training. The M&G understands a few of the helicopters have been cannibalised for spare parts by Denel. In the DRC the Rooivalk has single-handedly dealt decisive blows to rebel groups in that country when first deployed there.
The air force has the budget to keep only 10 Oryx’s available for the whole of South Africa, with three to four in the DRC and two in Mozambique. The Oryx is also used to support the South African Police Service. The two in Mozambique have been hit by ground fire on a number of occasions, rendering the aircraft unusable until repaired. Flying crews have to be rotated between Mozambique and South Africa because only a fraction are qualified to fly at night.
The helicopters the Mozambique Armed Defence Forces have at their disposal are mostly operated by Ukrainian pilots and none of those have been close to the “red zone” of operations.
The SA Gripen fighter aircraft have been grounded since last year because of financial constraints to obtain spares. That leaves the South African Air Force’s Hawk light fighter planes.
Military analysts say the use of fighter aircraft would provide proper aerial reconnaissance and be a deterrent against insurgents.
Joe van der Walt, of the Focus Group providing security analyses of the situation in Mozambique, said the SADC governments need to assess why the battle to suppress the insurgency has not been a resounding success and instead is gathering momentum. “There is little evidence of a coherent and comprehensive SAMIM strategy that is aligned with the established principles of conducting counterinsurgency operations. SADC forces have to share and gather continuous tactical intelligence for commanders to get a holistic picture.”
The disruption of insurgents’ supplies by sea has not been successful. The only South African Navy patrol boat with a reaction force on board had to withdraw as a result of technical difficulties. And none of the four frigates are seaworthy.
“The operation is under-resourced with the special forces working like super-humans while politicians and generals are squabbling about money,” the M&G’s source in Mozambique said.
The Mozambican soldiers do not have adequate food and water supplies. Each soldier is issued with two magazines of 30 bullets for the AK-47s they use. They are forced to withdraw when their ammunition runs out.
The SANDF prepared an infantry brigade as part of the 1 495 soldiers President Cyril Ramaphosa committed to SAMIM, but 2 SA Infantry Battalion, based at Zeerust in the North West, remains in South Africa because of budgetary constraints.
Van der Walt said: “The best weapons for counterinsurgency do not fire bullets. Counterinsurgents achieve the most meaningful success by gaining popular support and legitimacy for the host government, not by killing insurgents. Security is important in setting the stage for other kinds of progress, but lasting victory will come from a vibrant economy, political participation, and restored hope.”
Willem Els, of the Institute for Security Studies, said none of the SADC countries have the financial resources for a protracted involvement in Mozambique without the government there also providing social upliftment and services to local residents.
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