Sowing the seeds: The deal between the two countries calls for the creation of a 5 000 hectare agricultural industrial park but key details remain unclear. Photo: Adrian K/Christopher Mitchell
In a year marked by hunger, drought and economic strain, Malawi’s government signed one of the largest agricultural investment agreements in the country’s recent history.
The $50 million (about R813m) deal with a Chinese agri-technology company will build a sprawling industrial farming and processing hub in the central district of Salima.
To supporters, the project represents a rare opportunity for a struggling economy desperate for capital, jobs and agricultural modernisation.
To critics, it raises familiar questions about land rights, foreign influence and whether large-scale development projects benefit Africans.
The agreement, signed in June 2025 at the Fourth China-Africa Economic and Trade Expo in Changsha, China, calls for the creation of a 5 000 hectare China-Malawi Agricultural Industrial Park by Huaihua Yongcheng Agricultural Technology Development Co Ltd.
The complex is expected to include commercial farming operations, agro-processing facilities, fertiliser production, logistics infrastructure and technical training centres.
It arrives at a moment of vulnerability for Malawi.
More than 5.7 million people — over a quarter of the population — faced crisis or emergency levels of food insecurity between late 2024 and early 2025, after an El Niño-driven drought devastated maize harvests across the country.
Maize, Malawi’s staple food, became increasingly unaffordable as shortages intensified. By December 2024, the nominal average price of maize reached a record high, driven by shrinking domestic supply, a weakening currency and rising import costs.
Inflation surpassed 30%, public debt reached 88% of GDP and the country’s International Monetary Fund lending programme lapsed in May 2025 after no review was completed during its 18-month lifespan, with only $35m of a promised $175m disbursed.
Against that backdrop, former president Peter Mutharika returned to power in the 16 September 2025 elections after campaigning on promises of economic recovery, agricultural expansion and infrastructure investment. He won with 56.8% of the vote.
Although the Salima agreement was negotiated under outgoing president Lazarus Chakwera, responsibility for implementing it now rests with Mutharika’s administration.
How the government manages the project could shape Malawi’s agricultural future and its broader economic relationship with China.
Officials say the industrial park will operate as a Special Economic Zone under Malawi’s Special Economic Zones Act, enacted in February 2024, giving investors tax incentives and streamlined administrative processes intended to attract foreign capital.
The Malawian government will hold a 30% equity stake in the project through a Special Purpose Vehicle.
Kruger Phiri, the director general of the Malawi Investment and Trade Centre, described the arrangement as a way to ensure “Malawians will reap lasting benefits from this transformative project”.
But key details remain unclear. The project’s governance agreements, including how profits will be distributed, how decisions will be made and what protections exist for communities, have not been publicly released.
Huaihua Yongcheng and the Malawian government had not responded to requests for comment at the time of going to print.
Economists and development analysts say lack of transparency could become a source of tension in a country where previous large-scale investment projects have generated controversy over accountability and public benefit.
One of the project’s most ambitious elements is a proposed fertiliser manufacturing plant. Under the deal, the plant will have an annual production capacity of up to two million metric tons, a figure several times larger than Malawi’s annual fertiliser demand, which the
Fertiliser Association of Malawi estimates at about 475 000 metric tons.
The scale suggests the plant will probably target export markets across southern Africa rather than supplying Malawi alone.
The proposal has drawn attention because fertiliser shortages have become one of the country’s most severe agricultural constraints. Industry officials have attributed chronic shortfalls to foreign-currency shortages, which have limited the government’s and private sector’s ability to import agricultural inputs.
By late 2025, Agriculture Minister Roza Fatch Mbilizi, appointed to the full portfolio of agriculture, irrigation and water development by Mutharika in October 2025, told parliament that only a fraction of the fertiliser needed for the upcoming planting season had been delivered.
In theory, domestic production could reduce dependence on imports and ease pressure on Malawi’s fragile foreign-exchange reserves.
But analysts say the project documents that were released do not explain whether fertiliser produced at the plant will be affordable for Malawi’s millions of smallholder farmers or whether production will depend on imported raw materials.
The project’s most politically sensitive issue, however, is land.
Securing 5 000ha in a densely populated agricultural country where land disputes are common will probably prove difficult. In Salima and much of central Malawi, land ownership is governed largely through customary systems tied to matrilineal traditions, where women often inherit family land and communities maintain authority over allocation and use.
Although Malawi passed the Customary Land Act in 2016 to formalise and register customary land rights, implementation has been slow, leaving many rural households without legal documentation.
The government has not publicly detailed how land for the industrial park will be acquired or whether affected communities have been fully consulted. Community representatives and smallholder farmers in Salima could not be reached for comment at the time of going to print.
The uncertainty has heightened concerns among land-rights advocates and researchers who warn that poorly managed acquisition processes could fuel resentment.
A 2024 research report by King’s College London’s Lau China Institute, which mapped and analysed 50 China-associated economic zones across Africa, found that such zones are rarely transformative. It identified recurring problems, including land expropriation, labour abuses and limited technology transfer to communities.
The Salima project is also part of a broader expansion of Chinese economic engagement in Malawi. At the trade expo where the industrial-park agreement was signed, Malawi secured additional export deals worth an estimated $120m, involving soybeans, groundnuts, dried chillies, macadamia nuts and minerals.
The sectors have become increasingly important as Malawi attempts to reduce its long-standing dependence on tobacco exports, which account for roughly half of total merchandise exports but face declining global demand.
For policymakers, diversification has become urgent. But economists caution that signing export agreements is easier than building competitive export industries. Malawi struggles with poor transport infrastructure, limited access to global markets, currency instability and weak regulatory oversight.
The Mutharika administration faces difficult political and economic choices. The first is whether to prioritise speed or safeguards. Under pressure to attract investment and stabilise the economy, the government has strong incentives to move quickly. But accelerating implementation without transparent consultation or land protections could provoke opposition that delays the project or undermines its legitimacy.
The second challenge is whether Malawi’s 30% ownership stake will translate into meaningful influence. Without strong governance structures and public accountability, analysts say state participation risks becoming symbolic rather than substantive.
The final question is whether the project will reduce Malawi’s economic vulnerabilities or deepen them. If successful, the industrial park could generate exports, strengthen agro-processing capacity and ease fertiliser shortages in a country heavily dependent on rain-fed subsistence farming.
If it fails to deliver broad benefits or creates new financial obligations and social tension, it could reinforce the same structural weaknesses it was designed to solve.
For now, the project stands as an emblem of Malawi’s economic vulnerability and a test of China’s expanding development model in Africa. Its future will depend not on promises made in conference halls abroad but on decisions made in Malawi, about transparency, accountability, land and who ultimately benefits from development.
Collins Mtika is a veteran journalist and the Mail & Guardian’s special correspondent in Mzuzu, Malawi. This article was produced in partnership with the Centre for Investigative Journalism Malawi — www.investigative-malawi.org.