Non-governmental organisations are more important now than before liberation, argues Paul van Zyl
A FORTNIGHT ago, President Nelson Mandela signed into law the Bill which will establish the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. A study of the process which led to the formation of the truth commission provides a fascinating insight into the functioning of the Government of National Unity and the role that non- governmental organisations are playing in this new era.
The process of drafting the truth commission Bill was driven by Dullah Omar. It was decided at an early stage to draw NGOs into the process because of both their long-standing commitment to human rights and their close relationship with survivors of human rights abuse. The involvement of civil society right from the outset of the drafting and conceptualisation process had a decisive impact on the nature of the final
The first version of the Bill presented to Cabinet ran into a storm of protest from the National Party. This was a Bill drafted by human rights activists with a human rights content, not something with which even the “new” National Party was entirely comfortable. So the political horse-trading which had characterised issues relating to amnesty and gross violations of human rights since the beginnings of the negotiations, began again …
A cabinet committee was appointed, in which the Nats presented several fundamental objections to the Bill. Despite the fact that these objections were of dubious merit, the African National Congress representatives felt they couldn’t reject all of them out of hand. After all, the GNU is a creature born of compromise, which becomes unruly and unmanageable if one party has it all its own way. The structure of the GNU put enormous pressure on the participants to “meet each other half way”, and it was in this context that the ANC conceded to a demand that ran the risk of undermining the entire endeavour: all proceedings of the amnesty committee in the truth commission would be behind closed doors.
NGOs were galvanised into action. Almost every submission made to the select committee specifically condemned the secrecy compromise. Some organisations threatened to take the matter to the Constitutional Court, while survivors of human rights abuse warned that they, together with other representatives of civil society, would not co-operate with a commission shrouded in secrecy.
It was clear from the process of public hearings that the ANC itself was in two minds about the secrecy deal. The chair of the select committee stated that he would not simply “rubber-stamp” Cabinet’s decision, but it was clear that to overturn a deal made by top politicians would not be easy.
So NGOs took the battle to the media. A major press conference was held in February 1995 in which a coalition of NGOs expressed its dismay at the cabinet deal and reiterated the threat of rejecting the truth commission altogether. Editorials in all the major newspapers condemned the secrecy deal and called into question the government’s commitment to openness and transparency. This public pressure strengthened the hand of those in Cabinet who had always felt uneasy about the compromise. They were able to push for the decision to be re-evaluated and ultimately overturned.
What this episode illustrates is that the greatest strength of the GNU, the tendency to produce political compromises, is also its fundamental weakness. Our divided and conflict-ridden society necessitates a structure of government which ensures that the resources and influence of government are divided between those with political power — in a mutually acceptable manner. However, because the major percentage of political power is located within Cabinet, once these deals are struck it is difficult to undo them. This means that if poor, unprincipled or self-serving decisions are made, very few governmental checks and balances exist in order to force reconsideration. However, certain parliamentary standing committees are beginning to flex their muscles and this will serve as an important restraint on the power of cabinet.
NGOs are playing a crucial role in monitoring and exposing the horse-trading which the GNU is at times inclined to produce. In a sense, they are the New Opposition, emerging to fill the “opposition vacuum” produced by the GNU.
This presents NGOs with a number of challenges. Because of their skills and commitment, they are ideally suited to enter into co-operative partnerships with government. They can assist with policy formation and can help to ensure the efficient delivery of services. On the other hand, they have to be critical watchdogs who seek to limit the extent to which the GNU sacrifices principle on the altar of either politics or
This is a tension which is not easily reconciled and produces in NGOs a form of “structural schizophrenia”. In the morning you can help a minister draft a white paper and the same afternoon you can hold a press conference condemning some other aspect of his/her
This is further complicated by the fact that most (but by no means all) ANC ministers welcome NGO interface with their departments, but ministers from the NP and the Inkatha Freedom Party are, in general, less sympathetic. This means that not only do NGOs have to be simultaneously critical and co-operative but, in acting out this paradox, they must develop increasingly sophisticated ways of interacting with different ministries and regional governments.
To make matters worse, NGOs are required to fulfill these vital roles in an increasingly difficult environment. Top staff members are regularly poached by both government and the private sector, and funding is drying up at an alarming rate.
For the sake of our emerging democracy, we need to recognise that NGOs are more, not less crucial, after liberation and, on this basis, we must devise effective strategies to preserve and strengthen them.
Van Zyl works for The Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation in Johannesburg