The complex process of merging six spy agencies =20 has created more internal problems for the National =20 Intelligence Agency. Eddie Koch reports=20
South Africa’s chief spook threatens to blow away his =20 wife and kids in their Pretoria home. The mysterious =20 death of another top intelligence agent exposes =20 ideological differences that will tear the National =20 Intelligence Agency (NIA) apart. This week dramatic =20 media reports suggested the country’s new secret =20 service is beginning to disintegrate just 10 months =20 after it was established. =20
The truth about these matters is not easy to establish, =20 partly because “intelligence sources” appear to be =20 spreading large amounts of fictitious information at =20 the moment. Yes, the police were called to the home of =20 NIA director general Sizakhele Sigxashe in connection =20 with a domestic quarrel on Tuesday night but initial =20 reports that he wanted to shoot the family were wildly =20 exaggerated (see side story).=20
There has also been a cocktail of conspiracy theories =20 to explain the death last week of Mziwendoda Mdhluli, a =20 senior official recruited into the agency from the =20 ranks of the Azanian Peoples’ Liberation Army, in the =20 papers and on television. There is an almost complete =20 absence of evidence to back claims that he was a triple =20 agent whose death had to do with a spy-versus-spy =20 wrangle that has beset the NIA or that he had stumbled =20 across evidence of South African mercenaries fighting =20 in the recent Comoros coup.=20
But that there is something going wrong inside the =20 National Intelligence Agency — the new government’s =20 spy-shop that employs more than 3 000 agents at an =20 annual cost of R600-million — has been made clear by =20 evidence that the cumbersome bureaucracy has, at least =20 until the last few weeks, failed to provide cabinet and =20 the president’s office with credible information of =20 violence in KwaZulu-Natal and other volatile areas of =20 the country.=20
And while the Government of National Unity’s ability to =20 deal with spiralling strife in the country’s problem =20 province as well as in the black taxi industry is being =20 scuppered by a lack of credible intelligence — despite =20 the NIA’s massive machinery and budget — secret =20 reports from the agency have been leaked on more than =20 one occasion to Inkatha Freedom Party officials who =20 have been linked to to destabilisation operations. In =20 March this year, for example, IFP senator Phillip =20 Powell tabled a leaked NIA report in parliament in an =20 effort to prove the agency was biased against his =20
Senior NIA officials were recently hauled over the =20 coals by a frustrated President Nelson Mandela after =20 his advisers complained that incompetent intelligence =20 from the NIA was hampering their efforts to deal with =20 violence in KwaZulu-Natal, a province described as an =20 arena for one of the world’s most serious civil =20 conflicts. =20
Since the roasting was handed out to the agency in the =20 middle of this year, it has led to a major shake-up in =20 some of the NIA’s on-the-ground operations. Even Kobus =20 Jordaan, the Democratic Party spokesman on intelligence =20 matters and fierce critic of official incompetence, has =20 gone on record to say some of the problems that led to =20 the president’s tantrums about the quality of reports =20 reaching his office have now been corrected.=20
But a number of rank-and-file NIA agents operating in =20 the Transvaal and KwaZulu-Natal are still so =20 disillusioned by the way their reports are either =20 leaked or “soaked up in bureaucratic procedures” that =20 they have devised a variety of ways to bypass their =20 superiors and send intelligence straight into the =20 offices of Mandela and Deputy President Thabo Mbeki. =20
This, however, carries the danger of creating further =20 confusion by flooding the presidency’s already =20 overstretched staff with untested data and possible =20 misinformation about the country’s security situation. =20 ANC officials are also worried that the National =20 Intelligence Coordinating Committee (Nicoc) — the body =20 set up to merge reports from the police, the military =20 and the NIA and pass these on to the government — may =20 have been compromised in the presence of the Department =20 of Military Intelligence (DMI) which is still heavily =20 staffed with agents schooled in the military’s old =20 dirty tricks campaigns. =20
These are the real symptoms of a so-called =20 “intelligence crisis” and they relate — not to =20 untested theories about Mdhluli’s death and Sigxashe =20 family quarrels — but to the complex politics involved =20 in merging six spy agencies that were often at each =20 others’ throats in the aparthied era: the National =20 Party’s old National Intelligence Service (NIS); =20 parallel units that were run by the homeland =20 governments in Venda, Transkei and Bophutatswana; the =20 ANC’s Department of Intelligence Services (DIS); and a =20 similar agency that had been set up by the Pan =20 Africanist Congress’s guerrilla wing.=20
It appears that most of the NIA’s energies have gone =20 into an internal reorganisation of these widely varying =20 bodies and that only in the last few months, since =20 Mandela cracked the whip, has more determined effort =20 been given to serious intelligence gathering. Deputy =20 Intelligence Minister Joe Nhlanhla made the valid =20 point, in his May budget speech to parliament, that =20 much of his staff’s energy and money had been used to =20 amalgamate half-a-dozen organisations with widely =20 different styles of operating, create parity in salary =20 and service conditions and to run “training and =20 reorientation programmes”. =20
Lindiwe Sisulu, an ANC parliamentarian who sits on =20 portfolio committees that oversee the police, the =20 military and the intelligence services, told the Mail =20 and Guardian the NIA had managed the transformation =20 process in a professional way and was getting to the =20 stage where it could carry out its intelligence-=20 gathering duties efficiently. =20
“The NIA merger has worked better than similar =20 processes in the police and military. The delicacy of =20 the work could easily have forced agents from different =20 backgrounds onto opposing sides and created an aura of =20 suspicion. Despite recent reports, it appears an =20 efficient organisation has been put in place,” she =20
Genuine efforts to streamline the agency have, however, =20 been bedevilled by political factors. Mass =20 retrenchments will force many trained agents onto the =20 street and into possible covert or criminal actions. =20 And there was an agreement during the run-up to =20 elections that contending intelligence agencies which =20 had infiltrated each other would avoid embarrassing =20 each other by revealing who the double agents were. =20 Retrenchment of surplus personnel could create the kind =20 of bitterness that would result in this kind of =20 explosive information being leaked to the media.=20
These problems have caused serious soul-searching in =20 the ANC and have led to behind-the-scenes suggestions -=20 – some of which were made public when the organisation =20 last week released its analysis of the Government of =20 National Unity — that small, mobile and professional =20 intelligence units be set up to detour deficiencies =20 within the official ranks of the NIA and the =20 information flow that runs through Nicoc to government. =20
“If the National Party and Inkatha Freedom Party were =20 to claim any clout beyond their numbers in elected =20 bodies, it should be expected that they will seek to =20 mobilise these (security and intelligence institutions) =20 behind them,” says the analysis document. “Given all =20 these factors, to what extent can we claim the loyalty =20 of these forces? The SA Police Union strike; =20 difficulties in obtaining required information from =20 intelligence structures; mind-set problems in the SANDF =20 — all these raise some doubts. A systematic programme =20 is needed.”=20
The NIA’s internal problems have also led to vociferous =20 complaints by some opposition parties about the large =20 amounts of money being spent on the intelligence =20 services without much immediate return in the form of =20 hard and vital information. One commentator has =20 described the agency as a “mongrel watchdog that is the =20 product of ideologically-bent spies from the National =20 Party jumping into bed with incompetent spies from the =20
This brand of cynicism is likely to receive increasing =20 play with the appointment three weeks ago of a new =20 committee in Parliament — the intelligence services =20 oversight committee headed by Lindiwe Sisulu — that =20 was appointed to help ensure civilian control of the =20 agency. The parliamentary body is designed to prevent =20 covert and politically partisan operations by the =20 country’s intelligence units — the NIA; its foreign =20 wing, the South African Secret Service (SASS); the =20 Department of Military Intelligence; and the police’s =20 National Crime Investigation Service.=20
While parliamentary control is a potentially powerful =20 lever for downscaling and improving the efficiency of =20 the NIA, it raises another potential problem in the =20 strange world of South Africa’s spying business. The =20 Freedom Front and the IFP — both parties whose =20 officials have been linked to court cases and official =20 commissions of inquiry and to clandestine efforts at =20 derailing South Africa’s transition to democracy — are =20 represented on the committee and will have access to =20 sensitive security reports.=20
This danger is revealed in the fact that Deputy =20 Minister of Safety and Security Joe Mathews is the IFP =20 representative on the committee — even though recent =20 reports indicate that Powell and Mathews, both closely =20 linked to the IFP’s hardline national leadership, have =20 been involved in covert efforts to build a new =20 intelligence structure that can be used to bolster the =20 Zulu nationalist movement’s drive for seccession in =20
“It is possible that the oversight will become the =20 source of security leaks,” said Sisulu. “We have not =20 yet worked out the rules that will provide maximum =20 transparency (on a non-party basis) while protecting =20 the security of classified information. One of our =20 committee’s most urgent tasks will be to conduct a =20 study of countries that have a similar situation and we =20 will be looking at the system that applies in the =20 United States which allows for different levels of =20 clearance of intelligence reports.”=20