Worm’s Eye view
Steven Friedman
Is it possible that our representative democracy will one day allow people to be represented? The possibility was raised by an unexpected remark from President Thabo Mbeki in Parliament a few weeks ago. In response to a question, he suggested that the current system for choosing MPs and provincial legislators needs to be reassessed. An unpublished proposal from the home affairs department is under consideration and the president was hailed as “statesmanlike” by a commentator for his willingness to consider changing the system.
It is easy to understand this enthusiasm. We desperately need our democracy to become more representative of citizens. There is evidence that politicians and officials are mostly unaware of the priorities of the grassroots. To name but one example, “representatives” have still not worked out something as basic as why their voters do not pay for services. But the current system in which party leaderships can decide who gets elected suits leaders who want obedience. Since an alternative might lead to at least a short-term loss of control, the fact that change is being considered does indicate a refreshing willingness to look beyond immediate self-interest.
While a promise to re-examine the electoral system may give us some hope of a democracy in which people really have a voice, it would be as well to recognise there are important limitations to the government’s promise to look at a new system.
The first is that it is hardly a foregone conclusion that the system will be changed, despite the president’s comments. The obvious reason for scepticism is that the decision will need to be taken in Parliament and few parties there have an incentive for change. Mbeki is not the only party leader who can use control over the candidates’ list to induce loyalty. And why should smaller parties want to change a system in which a mere 0.17% of the vote can get you a seat in Parliament?
The second is that the arguments for the current system are not simply self-serving. It is important to allow smaller parties into Parliament and proportional representation does that: while there may seem no great advantage to minorities in having an MP or two, the knowledge that someone is speaking for you in Parliament, even if they are not going to make any decisions, may play an important role in binding people to the democratic system. Proportionality also allows party leadership freer rein to appoint historically excluded groups such as women and to ensure more racial diversity than a constituency system would deliver. There would almost certainly be fewer African National Congress MPs who are white or drawn from the black racial minorities, and fewer black Democratic Alliance lawmakers, if constituencies alone chose their representatives.
For these reasons and the Constitution’s insistence that any electoral system should broadly result in proportional representation a “pure” constituency system such as in Britain, France or the United States is not possible. There are only two sorts of alternative a mixed system as in Germany (or, for that matter, our local governments), in which members are elected both in constituencies and on a proportional list, or a multi-member constituency system in which proportionality is achieved by ensuring that each electoral district elects several MPs. The first option probably cannot guarantee constituencies smaller than about 100 000 voters; the second, if proportional enough to give smaller parties a chance, would produce far bigger voting units. In neither case are voters likely to enjoy a close relationship with those they elect.
Third, while it was fashionable a few years ago to argue that a constituency system would automatically produce representatives with a closer link to voters, we know better now. The only level of government which has such a system, the local, is the one least trusted by voters, according to several surveys.
One reason is that a constituency system is no guarantee against party leaderships imposing candidates on voters. Many of the candidates in local elections were not people with roots in their areas, but owed favours by party leaders.
On its own, a willingness by the president or any other party leader to give up the control the present system offers may not necessarily imply a willingness to allow party branches to elect who they wish. It could simply show a recognition that central control is possible under a different system.
That said, there are reasons why introducing some form of constituency voting into our proportional system would be good for democracy and for political leaders who might resist it. A change of system might not create a close relationship between voters and representatives, but could at least ensure that those who are elected felt they owed someone other than their party leaders their place in Parliament. That would introduce some diversity, making it more likely that parties represent the full range of people who vote for them.
If a change did provide voters with new forms of representation, it might more than compensate political leaders for any immediate loss of control. The trend of the past two years, in which the power to choose candidates has been increasingly centralised in the hands of party leaders, has given them more immediate control at the expense of plummeting public trust: recent surveys suggest that public confidence in our democratic institutions peaked in November 1998 and has been dropping since. The result is surely a widening gap between leadership and public which makes governing far more difficult, as citizens do not voluntarily cooperate with government plans.
The power centralisation seems to offer leaders is an illusion; it allows them to ensure that no alternative views are voiced, not to make things happen. Even the power to curb opposition may quickly dissipate when circumstances change unexpectedly.
It could be in the interests of political leaders to show some leadership by supporting a change to our electoral system and to acknowledge that public representatives with bases in society, rather than only among their party leaderships, may be not a threat but essential to the exercise of power.