Any thorough examination of the United Nations High-Level Panel report should take into account that reform of the UN system is a continuing process. The Secretary General, Kofi Annan, has himself reminded us that reform is a process and not an event. Indeed, since the establishment of the UN in 1945, the organisation has experienced an array of reform proposals, some of which have been adopted and implemented; many others have remained to gather dust on the drawing board.
The problem is that member states have often embarked only on reform measures that they like. For example, some of the Western powers, such as the United States, have only grudgingly accepted reforms promoted by developing countries, like the establishment of the UN Conference on Trade and Development and the UN Industrial Development Organisation.
It would be relevant to ask: Why the great drama about the report of the panel? It would appear that the urgency of this set of reform proposals is linked to the controversy in the Security Council prior to the intervention in Iraq without explicit Security Council authorisation.
Although this rationale is accepted, many member states do not agree with the secretary general that we have “come to a fork in the road”. Accordingly, they do not believe that it is imperative for decisions to be taken on the recommendations made by the panel at the historic 60th session to be held in mid-September of the General Assembly.
A coalition of more than 100 member states, together with China, has been insisting that more time is required to reach consensus on the panel’s recommendations.
How do African states react to these developments? At the moment, the posture of many African states is causing anguish within the non-aligned group of developing countries at the UN. While the non-aligned group, as a whole, has been explicit in its criticism of some of the key recommendations of the panel, the Africa group is increasingly perceived as at best ambivalent. The Latin American and Asian members of the non-aligned group are hinting that African states should set aside “sentiments” for “one of their own” — Kofi Annan — and examine the recommendations objectively and dispassionately. The mistake that African states seem to be making is in allowing the debate over UN reform to be controlled by Western governments, pundits and academics. Any quick perusal of the mainstream international media would reveal that the Western concept of acceptable UN reform has gained ground. One cannot blame them for articulating their point of view.
Africa needs to be more energetic in presenting its own case.
Anyone familiar with previous attempts at enlarging the Security Council may be puzzled by the panel’s recommendation on this sensitive issue. What was clear during the substantive discussions from 1996 to 1998 and thereafter was the divergence of views among member states. The African states, for their part, had joined other non-aligned members in supporting an enlargement of both the permanent and non-permanent seats. While the Africans supported the inclusion of Germany and Japan as new permanent members, they also called for permanent membership for representatives of Africa, Asia and Latin America.
At the 1997 Organisation of African Unity (OAU) — now the African Union — summit in Harare, governments had insisted on two permanent seats for the continent. They also rejected attempts to institutionalise two categories of permanent members — the original five permanent members (the US, the United Kingdom, China, Russia and France) exercising the right of veto, and the new permanent members having no right of veto. With this as background, it was puzzling that one of the models, put forward by the panel as Model A, endorsed the view of the current Western permanent members that new members should not have the right of veto. The panel, perhaps reflecting the deep division among member states, had no meeting of minds on this sensitive issue. Members of the panel themselves apparently held very strong opposing views on the problem of enlargement of the Security Council.
Africa is correct in rejecting two categories of permanent membership, since the UN Charter is supportive of their position. There is no reference in the Charter to the “right of veto”. What we now call the “right of veto” is intrinsically linked to permanent membership.
Article 27 of the Charter merely calls for the “concurring votes” of the permanent members when the council takes substantive decisions.
It is understandable that the panel would not wish to increase the number of permanent members that will exercise the veto. While it performs a useful role in the deliberation of the council and is, therefore, a worthwhile mechanism, it is the rampant use of the veto that has created difficulties.
During the early period of the UN, it was the former Soviet Union that, in a sense, abused the veto to protect its minority status within the council. In recent years, some Western powers are abusing the veto. It would have been more preferable for the panel to work out arrangements to limit the abuse, rather than create two categories of permanent membership, which Washington and London prefer.
In view of those considerations, it is more likely that the panel’s Model B would have had a better chance of gaining wide support among member states.
Model B makes no provision for new permanent seats but for eight new seats to serve renewable four-year terms and one additional seat on a two-year non-renewable term.
It seemed that a coalition of small and medium-sized states and China were not happy with Model A. Perhaps there should be agreement in future to limit the use of the veto only to matters relating to the use of force.
Even though Nigeria, South Africa, Egypt and Senegal indicated interest in permanent membership, Africa did not reach consensus. The notion of rotation has been mentioned, along with the possibility of Africa developing a common foreign policy, as is currently being attempted in the European Union.
UN Security Council reform will not occur at the next session owing to a lack of global consensus. Whatever transpires at the UN’s 60th session, African states should be vigilant to ensure that attempts to diminish the importance of the General Assembly are vigorously opposed and that its authority is maintained.
Dr James Jonah is a former UN under-secretary-general for political affairs