There is little doubt that if Jacob Zuma had been a candidate for the presidency of the ruling African National Congress at the party’s national general council (NGC) in July, he would have won an overwhelming number of votes.
But like the constitutional referendum in Zimbabwe five years ago where the broad-ranging opposition to President Robert Mugabe’s Zanu-PF won a surprise majority of votes, it could have been the wrong vote to win. Besides, it was a policy conference and not one to choose office bearers.
Nevertheless, it was clearly demonstrated that Zuma had the support of the people — who toyi-toyied in his support and wore T-shirts declaring innocence until proven otherwise. These scenes were repeated more aggressively outside the Durban Magistrate’s Court recently where Zuma faced corruption charges.
The NGC was, in a sense, a not-so-silent referendum on the popularity of Zuma. He remained on — despite earlier indications — as deputy leader of the party, number two to the man who had ”released” him as the nation’s deputy president in June.
President Thabo Mbeki — never the subject of adoration from the ruling movement’s rank-and-file — found himself in a deeply uncomfortable position.
At the same time, recent events indicate that Zuma has learnt a thing or two about public relations. Even in the run-up to his dismissal in June, he criss-crossed the country, holding public rallies. He showed no indication of giving up office. Then, faced with the reality of losing office, he appeared at public rallies at various points to adulating crowds.
The actions of ANC supporters outside court indicate that Zuma has not lost touch with his core KwaZulu-Natal constituency — which elected him more than 10 years ago as provincial leader of the ANC over his rival, Jeff Radebe.
It is clear that his influence in his home province is great — even the opinion polls show that very few Zulu-language people think it was fair that he was fired.
Meanwhile, Mbeki has the constitutional power to determine the prevalent politics of the ruling movement — at least until 2007. The Zuma trial will be a long one and will only start in earnest in the middle of next year.
It is likely still to be in progress when the national conference is held at the end of the following year. It would be imprudent for the party to allow Zuma to run for the presidency at that point. But assuming that the trial is over and he is found not guilty of corruption, he will have been given a major fillip for seeking the highest office in the land.
Mbeki indicated in a South African Broadcasting Corporation television interview after the NGC that he would not rule out running for another term as president of the ruling party — but that there was a constitutional limit to being head of state, which was 2009.
However, Mbeki is not accustomed to opposition. He was not opposed as president of the ANC. He is unlikely to face up to his deputy personally in such a messy race. The loss of face of coming second would be too much for an incumbent president to swallow. An alternative candidate — someone like Cyril Ramaphosa, Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka or even Patrice Motsepe and Tokyo Sexwale — could then emerge for the party’s presidency against Zuma.
Split unlikely
One can be certain that the ANC will not split in any way during this period as has been speculated. There is no pull factor operating to induce a walkout by the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) from the ruling ANC-led movement. They would not constitute a majority, even together, to take power. Zuma does not want to be leader of the opposition.
Zuma has the backing from a number of old hands who did not make it to Cabinet or senior government posts under Mbeki — most significantly SACP general secretary Blade Nzimande and Cosatu secretary general Zwelinzima Vavi.
Ideologically, it is hard to see what else holds these elements together — other than an antagonism to — the real — political centralism as favoured by Mbeki.
Zuma has never backed the notions of socialism still held by the communists. It is too simple to see the fight as one between an autocratic nationalism of Mbeki and the anarchic popular socialism of Zuma.
But Zuma’s ability to glue together disparate elements could hold for a populist cause — the central facet being getting him parachuted into the nation’s number-one political job. His friends will also, of course, be seeking political patronage and there will be much paying back to do.
The focus will turn 18 months ahead to whether a Zuma camp would win a majority in 2007 outside of his home turf of KwaZulu-Natal. The party’s growth in other areas — including the Eastern Cape — will be key to who will win the battle. The nation is likely to see a lot of ”constituency work” by Mbeki supporters in the months ahead.
One can’t rule out a Zuma presidency.
Indeed, a senior ruling-party official likened his possible presidency to the Malaysian option. The country would not necessarily fail to do business with the outside world, but political rivals were unlikely to be free to operate in a climate of tolerance.
Political elites who fall out with a Zuma political mainstream will find themselves quickly marginalised. It will be an all-lose or all-win situation for either the Zuma camp or the opposing camp.
There is no doubt that it will be a bloody-nosed battle. — I-Net Bridge