Despite about 800 service delivery protests held across the country and an election boycott in Khutsong, the African National Congress has emerged from the municipal elections having consolidated its already firm hold on local government, with no stay-aways to speak of (other than Khutsong). Part of the party’s success can be attributed to its broad-based appeal and the resonance of its message to build a better life for all. In addition, ANC dominance of all spheres of government and control of state resources allowed it to campaign more effectively than other parties. But why did it do quite so well? We believe there are a number of further factors that contributed to the ANC’s success.
Success factors
The ANC is still viewed as the party that liberated South Africa and as such it enjoys a high degree of trust among the majority of South Africans, whether deservingly so or not. It will take many things going seriously wrong or, ironically, serious complacency because so much is going right, to break this trust. In addition, there is the ”good times” factor. American elections have taught us that when the economy is growing, it doesn’t really matter what government says — it must be doing something right. At a local level, this effect is not as profound with a large portion of the electorate marginalised from economic activity, but it is still important, especially as South Africa moves towards the previously fantastical 6% growth target.
Far more importantly, though, and contrary to what the Democratic Alliance argued in the run-up to elections, the ANC has performed well in delivering municipal services to most communities. There have, of course, been a problematically high number of instances of corruption at local level, lack of delivery in some municipalities, and indeed outright failure in a few councils, but it must be recognised that significant progress has been made.
Progress is reflected in vastly increased municipal expenditure. National Treasury records that between 1996 and 2003, municipal expenditure almost doubled from R45,8-billion in 1995/96 to R86-billion in 2003/04, while in 2004/05, municipalities budgeted a massive R101-billion for expenditure. This amount is set to increase again in the current financial year. Given the prioritisation of developmental needs by municipalities, this means that huge amounts of money are being spent on building and sustaining basic services. While poverty and job creation remain huge challenges, the opposition’s assertion that the ANC has failed at the local level is simply not true.
By comparison, the opposition lost because it holds no appeal to the majority of South Africans and was essentially not offering anything other than not being the ANC. An important point on strategy is that successful opposition can’t simply be an anti-ANC party — voters at odds with the ANC want to see a viable alternative, not just anti-ANC fervour. As for the relative newcomer, the Independent Democrats, it has made a significant showing as a niche party, centred around its maverick leader Patricia de Lille, but remains a new entrant with little track record and under-developed policies.
Protest action and voting patterns
But what of the fall-out from protests? An assessment of voter patterns in those municipalities in the Free State that experienced service-delivery protests over the last 18 months, comparing local elections results in 2000 to last week’s is instructive, notwithstanding that the methodology for this assessment has two limitations. Firstly, protests typically only occurred in a limited geographical area (usually a town) within a relatively larger municipality and therefore the overall result does not necessarily reflect community-related dissatisfaction. Secondly, trying to disaggregate and compare results to a ward level is not valid where ward boundaries have been adjusted between elections in 2000 and 2006, as they often are, in line with demographic shifts.
Nonetheless, some broad trends can be discerned. Most significantly, there has been a definite (although variable) drop in votes for the ANC in those wards in which protests were staged. For example, in Mmamahabane (Ward 1) in Mathjabeng local council, the ANC lost 19% of its 2000 electoral support, while in Thembalihle (Ward 4) in Phumelela local council, 5% of votes was lost, although only 2% was shed in Vrede (Ward 3) in the same council. Despite this drop in support for the ANC in some wards, the ruling party still swept to victory in these troubled municipalities.
It can be assumed that the branch machinery, aided by presidential visits, clearly differentiated the party from corrupt politicians and incompetent officials. The ANC was also saved by the absence of an appealing opposition as an alternative, as evident in Khutsong. In a few instances, some independent and community-based alternatives have arisen, Beaufort West being the most obvious with rogue Truman Prince’s civic-based party. Community-based opposition may yet emerge as a significant force over time, but again it will be hard to eclipse the ANC’s dominance.
In addition, those protesting may not consider or be able to access the ballot as a means of dissent. In many instances, schoolchildren below the voting age have formed the core of protests, while other protesters may simply be marginalised and not have the relevant papers and knowledge to register as voters. Apathy, however, can be ruled out for people who feel strongly enough to take to the streets and face rubber bullets.
Finally, some protests may in fact only have represented a small portion of municipal populations. This explanation has been inferred by politicians who have pointed to ”third-force” elements and mischievous, self-serving parties. But this view overlooks that local politics can be significantly influenced by vocal interest groups, even if they are not supported by the electorate; a case in point being anti-privatisation activist Trevor Ngwane’s Operation Khanyisa Movement, which secured only one seat in Johannesburg, but which remains a significant force.
Cape Town had to be different
Cape Town bucked the trend and while the ANC consolidated its position across the country, in the Mother City it lost its majority. Even if the ANC or, more likely, the DA can cobble together a majority, this will be razor-thin and the organisational instability associated with the last political term is set to continue or possibly worsen.
Broad participation by all members will be impossible under Cape Town’s outgoing executive mayoral system. The ID and other smaller parties could only be meaningfully served under an executive committee system. Critics of the executive mayoral system, opposed to the powerful, centralised model that places an executive mayor in charge of a local-level cabinet comprised of officials with portfolios such as finance, will welcome the reversion. The model has also been criticised for superseding the role of local legislatures. There are instances, however, where executive mayoral committees have been praised for decisively affecting a closer link between councils and administrations, especially where a majority mandate is unequivocal, as in Johannesburg.
Decision-making in Cape Town’s council will certainly be less predictable, starting with the choice of mayor. Councillors from all political parties will have to consider their mandates relating to each council matter carefully. Assuming a majority for critical motions will no longer be taken for granted and office bearers will have to work to ensure that policies and programmes are acceptable to the majority, every vote will count, a truly democratic outcome. If nothing else, Cape Town is set to become an interesting case about whether there is a trade-off between democracy, where a range of views are represented in a split council, and effective governance, under the executive mayoral system, where a majority mandate may overshadow minority concerns but result in more effective service delivery.
Kevin Allan is a local government consultant and previously special adviser to the minister for provincial and local government. Karen Heese is an independent economist