There is a voice missing, or at least muffled, in the hubbub of claim and counter-claim that marks the first anniversary of the Glen-eagles anti-poverty initiative.
One year after the G8 leaders promised to tackle Africa’s deepening crisis, there is no shortage of assessment of the gaps between what leaders of the world’s richest countries pledged and their subsequent performance. And as the St Petersburg G8 summit gets under way, the analysts have one overriding theme in common: ”What is the West doing for Africa?”
Few commentators, however, have put the question: ”What is Africa doing for Africa?”
Even if it had been asked, an answer would have been elusive. Either the question would be ducked, or the usual suspects would fudge the response: United Nations agencies, NGOs, self-appointed spokespeople who, as often as not, are pursuing a self-interested agenda.
Where is the independent and robust evaluation of Africa’s post-Gleneagles record in implementing its pledged reforms? It certainly does not come from Africa itself. The much-vaunted African peer review mechanism is limited to a handful of countries and cannot possibly form the continental appraisal that is urgently needed to inform debate.
What seems to have been forgotten is that the outcome in Gleneagles was never intended to be a unilateral attempt by the West to kick-start an African recovery by doubling aid. Rather, it was the first stage in implementing a contract between two sides — the rich countries represented by G8 on the one hand, and the nations of sub-Saharan Africa on the other — a partnership, if you like, of consenting adults.
The terms of this deal were spelt out in Our Common Interest, the 450-page report of the Commission for Africa, drawn up on the initiative of British Prime Minister Tony Blair.
”The starting point,” wrote the commissioners (who included South African Finance Minister Trevor Manuel) is ”the recognition that Africa must drive its own development.” And this was followed by a blunt warning: ”If Africa does not create the right conditions for development, then any amount of outside support will fail.”
The region, the commission urged, ”must accelerate reform. And the developed world must increase and improve its aid … we are partners working together”.
”Africa, at last, looks set to deliver.”
Maybe, maybe …
If Africa is really set to deliver, the rest of the world needs to see the evidence — and evidence that is presented by Africa, in Africa’s collective name, with Africa’s approval, drawing on reports from the front line of the battle to make poverty history.
You can be sure that the G8 will be ready to answer its critics in St Petersburg. Oxfam and other aid agencies will present their critique; the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) will have their say, as will the official development agencies.
But missing from the line-up is Africa: there is no formal, authoritative and comprehensive African-driven review of how the region is measuring up to its side of that bargain struck in Gleneagles: better governance in return for more aid.
What is needed is an ”Africa performance indicator” to set alongside the claims of both the critics and supporters of the Gleneagles plan. Such an indicator would be compiled and coordinated by the Economic Commission for Africa, drawing on the information already available at the World Bank, the IMF, the UN Development Programme, and the leading government and NGO aid agencies.
There are a host of questions that cry out for answers which, when put together, form a profile of the continent. Is the rate of infant mortality falling? Is defence spending dropping? Is life expectancy rising? Is foreign direct investment recovering? Is school enrolment improving? Are sales of beer and soft drinks picking up? Is the size of detergent packets shrinking? Is electricity output improving? Is debt relief working? Is the money that once serviced debt really being spent on education and health?
Of course, some areas of governance are easier to measure than others.
Corruption by its nature is hard to quantify. But the circumstances in which sleaze can flourish can be identified. The World Bank already does an annual, country-by-country analysis of the business climate — such as the number of days needed to register a company: six days in Hong Kong, six weeks in Kenya. The more roadblocks on the route to establishing a new company, the more opportunities there are for abuse.
Let all this information be compiled by the Economic Commission for Africa, under the auspices of the Africa Commission. Keep the result readable, make it accessible, update it regularly, publicise it widely.
An Africa performance indicator would not in itself be the answer to the missing voice in Moscow — but at least when the continent’s performance is being assessed, we would all be referring to the same hymn sheet.
Michael Holman is former Africa Editor of the Financial Times