On July 12 2006, Hezbollah guerrillas launched a cross-border attack on Israeli soldiers patrolling the United Nations-recognised “Blue Line” separating Lebanon and Israel. In that attack, Hezbollah gunmen killed eight Israel Defence Forces (IDF) soldiers and kidnapped two more. Several hours later, Israel launched a counter-offensive to retrieve its kidnapped soldiers and change the status quo in southern Lebanon.
One month has passed since then and much blood has been spilled on both sides, but at the time of this writing, the balance of forces along the south Lebanon/north Israel border, as well as the internal Lebanese balance of forces, has not changed dramatically. Despite statements to the contrary, it seems that the Israeli military campaign has thus far failed to achieve a significant degradation of Hezbollah’s military capabilities — in terms of medium- and long-range rockets and fighting men.
Also, Hezbollah’s popular stock in the Arab world seems to be rising, pointing to another failure on the part of Israel to weaken the group politically. Moderate Arab regimes that initially blasted Hezbollah for its “reckless adventurism” now find themselves in a position in which they have to pander to their populations’ adulation of Hezbollah (for standing up to Israel) or face increasing pressure on their legitimacy.
Israel’s initial strategy was to “convince” the Lebanese government, headed by Fouad Siniora, that Hezbollah was out of control (or in the control of Iran) and was an element that Lebanon “had to vomit out”. Israeli government officials constantly say that Israel’s fight is not with Lebanon, but with Hezbollah. The Lebanese government’s dilemma is that if it confronts the militant Shi’ite group, it risks restarting a civil war in Lebanon, a civil war that tore the country apart for almost two decades, not so long ago.
At this stage, Beirut has said it will deploy a force of 15 000 Lebanese army troops to the south, the first time Beirut has shown readiness to exert its authority over its entire country. It remains to be seen how effective this force is in creating the political climate in Lebanon and Israel for Hezbollah to stop firing rockets at Israel, and an end to Israeli efforts to decapitate the guerrilla group.
Meanwhile, the IDF and Hezbollah continue to trade blows, with both sides suffering mounting casualties in fighting men. On the home front, the casualties continue to mount as Hezbollah fires rockets at Israeli towns, and Israeli jets drop bombs on Hezbollah positions deeply enmeshed within a sympathetic civilian population.
So far for the picture on the local, tactical and micro situation. This summer’s localised war between Israel and Hezbollah is being played out within a larger context of international relations all pointing in the direction of a military confrontation between the United States, Israel and perhaps some other allies on the one side, and Iran on the other side, possibly within the next two years.
Israeli and US officials believe Iran is intent on attaining a nuclear weapons capability, something which, left to its own devices, Tehran could attain within 18 months. Now, with Iran’s president openly calling for the destruction of Israel, officials in Jerusalem have made it clear the Jewish state finds the idea of a nuclear-armed Iran totally unacceptable. The current fighting may be the opening shot in that larger conflict, leading ultimately to a frontal confrontation between Jerusalem and Tehran — something neither side wants but, as long as Iran persists in obtaining a nuclear weapon, seems inevitable.
Some in Israel may be thinking that it would be better to precipitate a coming war with Iran now, rather than later, when Iran may already have a nuclear option. A war between a nuclear-armed Israel and a nuclear-armed Iran is a nightmare scenario that Israeli officials, as well as much of the world, are desperate to avoid. The official line in Israel is that a nuclear-armed Iran is a global, and not just an Israeli, problem — and thus Israel is not at the forefront of efforts to thwart Tehran’s nuclear drive. But make no mistake: Israel will do everything necessary to make sure Iran, under its current regime, does not get nuclear weapons.
The mullahs in Iran know this all to well, and are trying to play for time by keeping the Jewish state militarily busy fighting its proxy in Lebanon — Hezbollah. Tehran would like nothing more than for this conflict to turn into a prolonged war of attrition, with the world’s attention focused on southern Lebanon, and not on nuclear research facilities at Natanz and Bushehr in Iran. Eventually, Iran drops its nuclear ambition in exchange for diplomatic incentives, or the international community disarms Iran’s nuclear programme — or Israel does it.
Iran wants nuclear weapons because it has seen what the US is capable of with the removal of Saddam Hussein in Iraq. Tehran also wants to project its power outwards in the Middle East due to the vacuum created by the troubles in Iraq (troubles it is fanning). At its most fundamental foreign-policy level, Iran wants to become what Samuel P Huntington called “Islam’s core state” so that it can justify the existence and continued rule of ageing religious autocrats in a country overflowing with youngsters wanting to engage with the world.
Syria, for its part, wants no part of this wider war, and is the key element in ending the local war. Hezbollah is resupplied by Syria and Iran through Syrian territory into Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley in north-east and southern Lebanon. In exchange for a resumption of substantive talks with the US and Israel on the fate of the Golan Heights (captured by Israel in the 1967 war), Syria may be diplomatically engaged sufficiently to move away from its only real friend in the world at this stage: Iran.
If Syria gets what it wants (the Golan), it could in return stop supplying Hezbollah with weapons, a move that would isolate Hezbollah and make it either more vulnerable to destruction by the IDF or more amenable to a diplomatic solution.
Don’t expect a solution to the current Middle East crisis until a resolution is found for the next one.
Amir Mizroch, born in Israel and raised in South Africa, is currently the news editor of the Jerusalem Post