/ 18 December 2006

Gulf states go nuclear

A decision by the six- member Gulf Cooperation Council to launch an innocent-sounding joint nuclear energy development project is the clearest signal yet that Iran’s nuclear programmes, whether sinister or not, could hasten the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction across the Middle East.

But the activities of acknowledged nuclear weapons states such as the United States, Russia and Britain, and deepening frustrations among key non-nuclear, non-aligned players­ such as Indonesia and Argentina, are also stoking worries that the United Nations’s cornerstone non-proliferation treaty (NPT) is not long for this life.

The Gulf countries — Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and the UAE — made clear that, like Iran, they want nuclear know-how for ”peace purposes”. And it is not the first time the idea of an Arab bomb has come up. Egypt, Algeria, Morocco and Saudi Arabia have already declared an intention to develop civilian nuclear energy.

The council’s statement comes amid rising tension between Shia Iran and the Sunni-led Gulf states over political turmoil in Lebanon and anarchy in Iraq. But its timing will be seen as an unsubtle warning to the Bush administration to ignore the Iraq Study Group’s advice on softening US policy towards Iran.

The Gulf’s message may also be directed at Russia, which is still wrangling with Britain and France over the terms of a UN sanctions resolution on Iran. Diplomats say the resolution may finally pass this week, after first being mooted in July. But Moscow has weakened it. Even as a first step, it hardly amounts to the ringing, united anti-proliferation stand that the US and European Union sought.

The resolution’s main thrust will be to ban the sale or transfer to Tehran of nuclear and missile-related technology. Straight-faced Iranian diplomats say that is no problem since Iran is not building nuclear weapons and already has plenty of missiles. All the same, it is poised to retaliate. ”If there are UN sanctions, there will be trade sanctions on Britain, France and Germany. Our response will be swift and proportionate,” an Iranian official said.

Russia’s own NPT adherence is also in serious question. Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov, a possible successor to Vladimir Putin, last week proudly announced the commissioning of a new, mobile version of the Topol-M nuclear-tipped missile. Capable of vaporising targets 10 000km away, the Topol-M had previously been confined to fixed ground silos. It was specifically designed to penetrate new US ”Star Wars” missile defences, Ivanov said. It complements another new Russian ”deterrent” — the sea-based Bulava missile.

But the US and Britain are hardly in a position to wax sanctimonious over Moscow’s behaviour. President George W Bush’s plan to provide India with nuclear fuel, reactors and technology was approved by Congress at the weekend. Under the new law, India’s secret, destabilising 1990s development of nuclear weapons and its ongoing­ refusal to sign the NPT will be officially forgiven in return for a strategic (meaning anti-Chinese) partnership with Washington — and preferential trade opportunities for US businesses.

Far from gradually disarming, as required by the NPT, the US is also developing new ”low yield” nuclear weaponry that could, in theory, be more readily used on battlefields. Thanks to these and other factors, like Britain’s Trident replacement plan and bomb-happy North Korea’s so far unchecked defiance of international law and opinion, fears grow that countries such as Brazil and South Africa, which voluntarily eschewed nuclear arms, may feel obliged to reconsider.

American unilateralism makes for odd bedfellows. According to Jean du Preez of California’s Monterey Institute, writing in Arms Control Today magazine, Washington recently joined North Korea at the UN General Assembly ”in voting against a rather innocuous resolution put forward by Japan on a ‘renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons”’.

It also blocked a range of other disarmament measures. Such double standards risked rendering the NPT irrelevant, he suggested. ”The nuclear non-proliferation regime is in deep trouble.” — Â