Recent events in Zimbabwe have shown how politics has become militarised and how the military has become politicised. At policy level, the Joint Operational Command, comprising the police, intelligence and military, has found that the internal security situation was unstable and imposed a three-month ban on all political activity.
It is not surprising that the ruling party has welcomed this restriction, while the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) has challenged it in court.
Simultaneously, at the implementation level, the state has enforced its provisions, leading to the fatal shooting of National Constitutional Assembly youth organiser Gift Tandare by the police during a political gathering.
And, at the operational/tactical level, the Central Intelligence Organisation, operating through shadowy “hit squads”, was among those involved in the snatching of Gift’s body, which was quickly interred without his wife’s knowledge. The move stopped what was clearly becoming the celebration of a martyr.
The participation of the security forces in politics is a deliberate strategy by Zanu-PF in response to dwindling popular support and its tendency to cast the crisis in war terminology. The question now arises of what role the military will play in the transition that is now inevitable.
It has become inevitable for several reasons. Firstly, the impact of violence against the opposition has fractured the ruling party and seen the emergence of elements critical of the hard-line faction. The severe economic downturn is also precipitating change, while deteriorating and demoralising pay and conditions that affect all sectors, including the civil service and security forces, is another factor.
There has been little attention paid to the role of the security forces in a transitional government. Announcements made by the military, reflecting on what it understands its role in politics, need to be noted.
Just before the June 2000 elections, army spokesperson Chancellor Diye announced that the army was an apolitical institution and would not be involved in politics. Two years later, on January 9 2002, commanders from intelligence, the air force, military, police and the prison service supported the view of the commander of the defence forces (CDF), General Vitalis Zvinavashe, that it would not recognise a president without liberation credentials. This clearly referred to the opposition candidate of the MDC, Morgan Tsvangirai.
Later, in December 2006, the then CDF, general Constantine Chiwenga, called on the governor of the Reserve Bank and the government to find a political and economic solution to the crisis and warned that the defence force would not turn its guns on Zimbabweans. There were also military-backed efforts to arrange inter-party talks — a process that was stymied by Mugabe.
Thus there are contradictory statements and actions by very senior commanders that cast a different view of what has been perceived as a partisan security force.
But before the transitional role of the security forces is considered, the impact of the crisis on the military needs to be examined. Select units, ranging from intelligence to police units and to the national service, have constituted the violent component of the ruling party strategy. This has degraded the rest of the conventional and professional forces. The crisis has had an impact on the police, leading to more than 3 500 members leaving by March this year. There have also been unconfirmed reports of desertions and resignations in large numbers from other uniformed services.
If a transition is to occur, it is likely that the competing factions within the ruling party are already canvassing key elements within the ranks. In addition, the nature of the structure of the ruling party and the military is such that there is a cross-representation of both in each of the structures.
The scenario most likely to emerge is that a faction of the ruling party — one that is able to sideline the now discredited hard-line element around the presidency — will assume power within the constitutional framework. This faction will then invite the political opposition into a transitional arrangement, while continuing to “control” the military.
Based on this reformed legitimacy framework, the new transitional arrangement would then call for support from the region and the relaxation of international sanctions. It is very likely that the military will continue to support such a process.
In a transition, security-sector reform must be part of the post-conflict and reconstruction process. Vengeful and petty politics that will seek to deconstruct the security forces and leave the country bare must, however, be guarded against. In Iraq, the summary disbandment of Saddam’s forces has come back to haunt that country.
For the way forward, and once the current political elite has departed, the military must again be urged to abandon politics and return to the barracks.
Dr Martin Rupiya is a military historian and retired colonel of the Zimbabwe armed forces. He works for the Institute for Security Studies in South Africa