For senior staffers on the east Asia desk of the US national security council, gathered in the inner sanctum of Barack Obama’s White House, the news, when it came, could hardly have been worse. North Korea was about to detonate another, bigger, nuclear device in defiance of American-led worldwide opposition. And there was nothing the US could do about it.
In strategic terms, the implications of their atomic demarche are substantial. By demonstrating that it has, beyond any lingering doubt, joined the nuclear ”club”, North Korea has directly challenged the international authority not only of the US but also of its regionally more influential neighbours, China and Russia. By also firing off three short-range missiles, following April’s alleged ballistic missile test, the North has seriously compromised the security of Japan and South Korea.
In political terms, Pyongyang’s second bomb exploded directly under the United Nations, given that the security council’s resolution 1718 explicitly forbade such a repeat action after the first test in 2006. The debris from the blast includes the half-hearted sanctions, and the carrots of aid and fuel that the international community has brandished alternately in vain efforts to change the North’s behaviour.
In immediate terms, the detonation appears to have destroyed what remained of the six-party talks — the process whereby the US, South Korea, Japan, Russia and China had sought jointly to induce Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear programme. It has heightened proliferation concerns, given the North’s alleged record of nuclear trade with Syria and Iran. And in passing, the test heaped symbolic scorn on Obama’s aspirations for a nuclear-free world.
May 25’s events revived long-standing differences of opinion about what is driving North Korea’s behaviour, and how best to respond. Daniel Pinkston, senior analyst at the International Crisis Group, suggested North Korea’s eccentric ”dear leader”, Kim Jong-il, was trying primarily to secure his family dynasty against its enemies. ”They are trying to achieve security and leadership — taking steps to enhance national security and the likelihood of regime survival.”
The test was worthy of condemnation, Pinkston said, but added: ”The international community must keep the door open on diplomacy and should not abandon it, though the situation is bleak.”
Glyn Ford, author of North Korea on the Brink, described the test as ”a message to Obama”. Like other commentators, he said Kim was demanding Washington’s attention, and hoping for concessions.
But Aidan Foster-Carter, a leading British academic, said the most likely reason for the regime’s behaviour was an intensifying fight over succession.
”North Korea is snarling more. That suggests an internal power struggle,” Foster-Carter told the Chatham House thinktank in London last week.
”The dog barks loudest when it’s feeling vulnerable. And maybe it’s safer to be a hard liner than a softliner when there’s a power struggle going on.”
What analysts can agree on is that the situation has deteriorated sharply in the last year or so. In February 2007 the North agreed to abandon its nuclear ambitions in return for Western aid, including a gradual end to its isolation. In October that year the two Koreas held a summit, only the second of its kind, at which a raft of agreements was unveiled. As an earnest of its goodwill Pyongyang began to dismantle its main nuclear facility at Yongbyon.
But then things began to go wrong. The Bush administration insisted on intrusive verification measures. Pyongyang complained that the US was slow to remove it from its list of states sponsoring terrorism. Hawks on both sides tried to undermine the deal. US aid was delayed. Then came this year’s six-party talks walkout over new missile testing, with the North saying it would never return.
In the past few months the North’s actions have become disproportionately aggressive. ”Both sides failed to keep to the step-by-step approach, both missed deadlines,” said Jim Hoare, a former British ambassador to Pyongyang. ”[The North’s] actions have made it very difficult to be positive. It’s not possible to contemplate some grand initiative because the invitation is not on the table.”
Kim (67) returned to public view after apparently suffering a stroke last year, but his authority may not have been fully restored. Signs of rising internal tensions include a cabinet reshuffle in which about one-third of ministers lost their jobs or were reassigned. A similar shake-up is said to have taken place in the military.
The downward spiral seems to have been reinforced by the advent in Seoul of a more hawkish presidency, disinclined to pursue the ”sunshine policy” of engagement advocated by the late Roh Moo-hyun, who, in an apparent coincidence, killed himself at the weekend. The North’s dire economic problems have further exacerbated the strains.
Speculation about a shift in power at the top focuses on Kim’s sons — and on his apparent wish to secure a third-generation dynastic succession. Rumours that the country’s military, including influential figures such as General O Kuk-ryol, oppose a continuation of Kim’s line are persistent but impossible to verify.
If reports are to be believed Kim has faced a host of parental problems. South Korean media claimed this year that the dear leader had chosen his third son as his successor because he was temperamentally ”just like his dad”, with a strong will, firm ideas and a fierce temper.
If past performance is any guide, the emergency UN security council meeting convened yesterday will be strong on bluster but short on meaningful action. Only one country, China, could apply serious leverage – because it is North Korea’s major supplier of oil and food and main trading partner, Hoare said. But while it joined yesterday’s chorus of condemnation, Beijing was thought unlikely to back tougher sanctions. For the east Asia region that presages a period of continuing, possibly deepening, instability. And for the harassed NSC staffers in the White House, that is more bad news.
Testing timeline
1979: North Korea starts to build nuclear reactor at Yongbyon.
1986: Yongbyon begins operation.
1993: Pyongyang pulls out of nuclear non-proliferation treaty.
1994: US and North Korea make first nuclear deal. Pyongyang freezes its nuclear programme in return for Western help and cash to build light-water reactors.
1998: Pyongyang fires long-range ballistic missile over Japan.
2002: Bush names North Korea as part of his ”axis of evil”.
2006: Carries out first nuclear test.
2007: North Korea agrees to shut down Yongbyon reactor.
April 2009: Launches multistage rocket and says Yongbyon will restart.
May 2009: Says it has successfully conducted a second nuclear test–