State capture represents a particularly pernicious form of corruption, wherein private actors exert undue influence over public policy and state mechanisms to serve their own interests, thereby severely undermining democratic governance. (Delwyn Verasamy, M&G)
On day nine, in the third week of the Madlanga Commission of Inquiry, a crucial phase was reached in the ongoing investigation into state capture in South Africa. This inquiry extends beyond allegations connected solely to the KwaZulu-Natal police commissioner, revealing a deeper maturity and entrenched nature of capture in the country’s political and economic landscape.
This facet of capture closely mirrors the findings of the previous Zondo state capture commission. Although the concept of state capture has become increasingly familiar to South Africans, its full complexity remains difficult to fully grasp. To understand this phenomenon, three essential components need to be analysed: time, institutions and the key actors involved. It is now clear that the president himself must be held accountable, marking him as the second among five democratically elected presidents to appear before a commission with potential implications related to state capture. This article explores these elements, beginning with a milestone in 2016 — the release of former public protector Thuli Madonsela’s official State of Capture report, which compelled the then president, Jacob Zuma, to establish a commission of inquiry.
Madonsela’s 2016 report painted a sobering picture of South Africa grappling with the insidious problem of state capture. It exposed the systematic erosion of public institutions by private interests seeking to manipulate government decisions for personal gain. Evidence presented at the Madlanga commission now demonstrates that this complex web of criminality has persisted long beyond 2011. The 2016 report marked a landmark moment in naming and identifying the problem, raising critical questions regarding the definition and dynamics of state capture both globally and in South Africa’s unique context, as Madonsela noted.
State capture represents a particularly pernicious form of corruption, wherein private actors exert undue influence over public policy and state mechanisms to serve their own interests, thereby severely undermining democratic governance. Despite the Zondo commission’s efforts and its recommendations, state capture continues to destabilise South African governance.
Globally, understanding state capture necessitates a clear and precise definition alongside an appreciation of how it operates within different national contexts. Such clarity is crucial to evaluate whether Madonsela’s initial 2016 characterisation captured the ongoing nature of state capture or whether it unintentionally framed it as a finite issue. This analysis also facilitates a critical assessment of subsequent inquiries, such as the Zondo commission, to ascertain if their approaches adequately addressed entrenched capture or inadvertently overlooked systemic, structural issues (Zondo 2022). This reflection is vital to understanding why the Madlanga commission was convened despite previous recommendations, signaling persistent gaps in implementation and accountability.
The key question thus arises: has state capture ended, or has it merely evolved? The evidence suggests South Africa is confronting a deeply entrenched condition with evolving characteristics. This perpetual capture demands not only comprehensive legal and institutional reforms but also sustained political will and active civic engagement to dismantle enduring networks of influence.
Further underscoring this, South Africa recognises that capture significantly contributed to the unrest in July 2021. Various reports, including one by the South African Human Rights Commission, document how leadership vacuums, delayed instructions and neglected protocols played a role in exacerbating the crisis. These concerns were further elaborated upon by Major General Petronella van Rooyen during day six of the Madlanga commission. These findings invite broader reflection: does capture undermine government hiring practices, thereby contributing to the persistently high unemployment rate among qualified individuals? Does it explain the notoriously poor public service delivery?
Although many questions remain unanswered, the limited answers suggest a dire portrait of compromised governance. South Africa also faces a surge in gun violence, raising critical questions about arms sources and the government’s capacity to combat crime, prompting the essential inquiry, “quo bono?” (Who benefits?) from this state of affairs.
While Mkhwanazi’s recent three-day testimony was explosive and groundbreaking, the notion that powerful government officials and business elites manipulate government agencies for personal gain is neither new nor exclusive to the Madlanga commission. This reality reveals a troubling pattern: commissions of inquiry themselves appear absorbed into the cycle of capture. Every investigation, from Madonsela’s 2016 report to Zondo, and now Madlanga, has exposed not only the mechanisms of capture but also the state’s incapacity and the absence of genuine political will by the presidency to translate findings into meaningful institutional reform. This paradox means South Africa simultaneously documents capture and reproduces it, exposing corruption while normalizing its permanence.
This paradox compels us to differentiate between “state capture” as a condition and a “state of capture” as a moment. State capture is the chronic control and exploitation of public resources, government agencies, and state apparatus by private interests. In contrast, a state of capture is a temporary unveiling, when the veil of secrecy is lifted, reports are released, citizens confront the stark reality of a vast network of self-serving political relationships, and commissions are convened. South Africa thus toggles between these fleeting moments without truly addressing or dismantling the underlying condition. The country’s fundamental institutional fragility, although repeatedly exposed, remains unaddressed.
The Madlanga commission should therefore be understood not as merely another investigation but as a mirror reflecting the failures of all previous interventions. While the Zondo commission furnished South Africans with a legal and moral framework to articulate the problem of state capture, Madlanga confronts the disquieting truth that capture persists; it has evolved and adapted. Indeed, the burgeoning number of commissions of inquiry may signify a deeper problem: outsourcing accountability to processes that often defer justice rather than achieve it.
The key lesson is striking: if capture is perpetual, if state capture is indeed perpetual, then the most overlooked dimensions of its endurance is the gradual erosion of public trust and the emergence of civic fatigue. South Africa is not unique in this regard. Comparative cases reveal how protracted corruption and weak accountability mechanisms often generate a tipping point where citizens, especially the youth, shift from passive disillusionment to active contestation.
The recent events in Nepal serve as a stark illustration as thousands of youth-led protesters flooded the streets to challenge corruption. The protests escalated rapidly with government buildings, the parliament, and elite residences being reduced to ashes. This resulted in the resignation of Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli and an interim installation of the former chief justice, Judge Sushila Karki. This is a cautionary lesson for corrupt elites globally, including South Africa. When capture is allowed to fester, civic patience wears thin. And when formal institutions repeatedly fail to translate public outrage into structural change, citizens may come to view reform as futile and turn to the last straw.
Public trust in democratic institutions has declined significantly, with surveys by the South African Social Attitudes Survey (2022) indicating that less than half of South Africans trust parliament, the presidency and political parties. This pattern of disillusionment mirrors patterns observed in states where corruption fatigue eventually catalysed broader demands for political transformation. In this sense, the perpetuation of state capture is not only a governance challenge but also a thin line to the repetition of the 2021 July unrest.
From this perspective, the Madlanga commission is a barometer of how much longer South African society will tolerate commissions that expose capture without dismantling it. If such inquiries continue to recycle revelations without producing reform, they may inadvertently set the stage for an oppositional civic politics that no longer seeks reform within the system but rather seeks to replace the system altogether.
Dimakatso Manthosi is an independent political analyst and researcher.
Keletso Gaborone is an independent political analyst and researcher with academic training in Philosophy, Politics and Economics, and International Relations.
Nonhlanhla Ndimande is an International Relations graduate and a youth advocate working to amplify youth voices in democratic processes and policy spaces.