Adapt or die: South Africa, represented here by President Cyril Ramaphosa, addressing the BRICS Business
Forum, has to strike a balance between idealogy and economics. Photo: GCIS
South Africa’s post-1994 foreign policy has long been both distinctive and contentious.
Shaped by the African National Congress’s (ANC) liberation history, it has consistently emphasised solidarity with states and movements that supported the anti-apartheid struggle during the Cold War.
This historical orientation explains South Africa’s enduring relationships with countries such as Cuba, Iran and Venezuela. South Africa has also established strong diplomatic alignment with the Palestinian cause.
For decades, this posture coexisted often uneasily with South Africa’s deep economic integration into a Western-led global system dominated by the United States and its allies. The arrangement held because geopolitical tensions rarely translated into direct economic consequences.
Today, however, that equilibrium is increasingly strained. South Africa’s foreign policy appears to be approaching a crossroads where historical loyalties, contemporary geopolitics and economic realities can no longer be neatly separated.
The ANC’s liberation experience remains central to how South Africa interprets international politics.
During the Cold War the movement found material and political support largely from the Soviet bloc and from states positioned outside the Western alliance system.
These relationships were not merely tactical; they shaped a worldview rooted in anti-imperialism, non-alignment and solidarity among the Global South.
After 1994, this worldview translated into a foreign policy that often prioritised moral positioning and historical consistency over strategic alignment with dominant global powers.
This helps explain why South Africa has maintained relations with states viewed unfavourably by Washington, including Cuba, Iran, Palestine and Venezuela. In isolation, these positions are not unusual for a middle power that seeks to act as a moral voice in international affairs.
The challenge arises when such positions intersect with a global order still structured around American economic and financial dominance.
The United States remains the world’s largest economy, the issuer of the dominant global reserve currency and a central node in international finance and trade.
While South Africa has diversified its economic partnerships, particularly through China and other emerging markets, it remains deeply embedded in Western-dominated financial systems.
Access to markets, investment flows, development finance and even credit ratings are still heavily influenced by Western institutions and political perceptions.
For many years South Africa managed this duality by effectively decoupling its foreign policy from its economic strategy.
Diplomatic positions critical of Western powers did not translate into economic retaliation and Western governments largely tolerated South Africa’s stance as symbolic rather than threatening.
That tolerance now appears to be diminishing.
South Africa’s decision to take Israel to the International Court of Justice on charges of genocide has significantly heightened tensions with the United States, Israel’s closest ally.
While the case has been framed by South African officials as a principled defence of international law, it has also placed South Africa squarely at odds with powerful Western interests. This has drawn unprecedented scrutiny of South Africa’s broader foreign policy orientation.
Compounding these tensions is South Africa’s vocal response to recent developments involving Venezuela.
The South African government has publicly criticised what it views as America’s violation of international law and has called for multilateral engagement through the United Nations.
The appearance of Venezuela’s ambassador at a South African Communist Party rally commemorating Joe Slovo and South Africa’s open expressions of solidarity have further reinforced perceptions of ideological alignment with governments adversarial to Washington.
These developments have occurred alongside increasingly hostile rhetoric from American political figures.
Recent accusations by a sitting US president that South Africa is committing genocide against white Afrikaners – claims widely dismissed by experts – have nonetheless damaged diplomatic relations and highlighted how foreign policy disputes can spill into reputational and economic risk.
What makes this moment particularly consequential is that the global context has changed. The world is no longer structured by Cold War binaries. The moral clarity of anti-apartheid solidarity does not map neatly onto contemporary geopolitical conflicts.
The ANC’s historical alliances, while understandable, were forged in a radically different international environment, one in which ideological camps were clear and economic interdependence was limited.
Today’s world is more fragmented, transactional and unforgiving. Sanctions regimes are more expansive, financial systems more weaponised and great-power competition more overt. In this environment, foreign policy choices carry sharper economic consequences, especially for middle powers that lack the insulation enjoyed by major economies.
South Africa’s participation in groupings such as BRICS reflects an attempt to navigate this shifting landscape by aligning with other emerging powers.
Yet even within BRICS, asymmetries are evident. China and Russia possess economic and military leverage that South Africa does not. While diversification away from Western dependence is a long-term objective, it remains incomplete. South Africa cannot yet afford to treat its Western economic ties as expendable.
This creates a growing tension between the ANC’s identity-driven foreign policy and the material needs of the South African state. What benefits the ANC as a liberation-movement-turned-governing-party does not always align with what benefits South Africa as a diverse, pluralistic and economically vulnerable country.
Foreign policy crafted primarily through the lens of party history risks conflating moral symbolism with national interest.
None of this suggests that South Africa should abandon its commitment to international law, human rights or Global South solidarity. Rather, it raises the question of balance and strategic clarity.
Moral positioning carries weight only when backed by sustainable state capacity and economic resilience. A foreign policy that consistently antagonises dominant economic actors without securing viable alternatives risks undermining the very developmental goals it seeks to advance.
South Africa now faces a choice. It can continue to rely on historical narratives and hope that economic consequences remain manageable or it can undertake a sober reassessment of how its foreign policy aligns with its economic realities and long-term national interests.
This does not require abandoning old allies but it does require recognising that the world has moved on from the ideological certainties of the past.
As global power becomes more diffuse and competition more intense, middle powers like South Africa must navigate carefully. The country’s moral authority, earned through its own struggle, remains an asset but it is not inexhaustible.
To remain effective, South Africa’s foreign policy must evolve from one rooted primarily in historical loyalty to one grounded in strategic pragmatism.
The current moment may prove to be a turning point.
Whether South Africa adapts or persists along its existing path will shape not only its international standing but its economic trajectory and domestic stability in the years ahead.
The crossroads is no longer theoretical; it is now unmistakably real.
Lungisani Mngadi is an independent political analyst and researcher based in Johannesburg, with a focus on African foreign policy, global power shifts and post-liberation governance.