/ 15 January 2008

Survivor: African National Congress

There is more than a touch of Ronald Reagan — or even, dare one say it, George W Bush — in Jacob Zuma.

Apparently happily unencumbered by the need to demonstrate a towering intellectual faculty, he is an archetypal instinctive politician — streetwise, savvy and not to be underestimated. As his Polokwane victory speech showed, Zuma knows how to keep it simple while transmitting all the key messages that need to be heard.

In sharp contrast to Thabo Mbeki’s speech opening the ANC national conference — an obscure and rambling effort that utterly missed the moment and underlined the extent to which he had become disconnected from his own organisation — Zuma’s illustrated in one stroke all his political strengths. While the speech lacked finesse or rhetorical flourish, the straightforward themes of unification, stability and change were exactly what Zuma’s supporters and the markets wanted to hear.

Quite how long he will be able to sustain this delicate balance will be the fundamental question if and when he becomes head of state. In the meantime, his greatest political strength is simply this: he is not Thabo Mbeki.

On the road to Polokwane, Zuma attracted a notably diverse grab-bag of political allies, united in little but their profound dislike of the incumbent. Zuma is a beneficiary of this; he may be a symbol of change, but he is not the reason for change.

How extensive is the changing of the guard, and to what end? Senior ANC people have previously taken issue with the idea that two ANCs have emerged: one in government, the other on the outside. But those who complained tended to be people in government. And they would say that, wouldn’t they?

There is certainly a more obvious division now. The number of Cabinet ministers in the full national executive committee has been cut from 19 to 11. Those who managed to negotiate this first defining episode of Survivor: African National Congress have been seriously weakened.

That the ANC’s broad political church has become even broader in recent years is not necessarily a good thing, as it has gathered more waifs and strays, to say nothing of opportunists and crooks, while expansion has encouraged incoherence.

In short, there has been a political degeneration of the ANC. Reversing this trend will be the central task of the new leadership, particularly the six top officials.

The national chairperson, Baleka Mbete, faces an enormous challenge; she will have to succeed where Mosiuoa Lekota failed. But there is some room for optimism in the senior collective. Deputy secretary general Thandi Modise, for example, is an open, confident person who believes in Parliament and in parliamentary oversight. Or at least she did when she was chairperson of the defence committee.

Interestingly, while the election articulated a potent rejection of Mbeki’s leadership style, and the neurosis and paranoia of his exile traditions of secrecy and centralist control, the exiles themselves have not been banished. If anything, exiles now hold a greater number of the top jobs in the party.

What next? The struggle for executive power is far from over, and it may yet get nastier before things can get better. There are deep fault lines within the new NEC. Expect Mbeki, like a surgeon, to gradually prise them open. Some new NEC members are sure to lead a visceral charge against certain democratic institutions. It will not be pretty.

As this happens, can the new-look ANC establish the sense of a collective leadership that was lost during the Mbeki years? On this the ANC electoral college spoke clearly. It put five wily old troopers at the top of the NEC: Winnie Mandela, Jeff Radebe, Zola Skweyiya, Pallo Jordan and Jeremy Cronin. Applying the main lesson of Mbeki’s decisive defeat, are they strong enough to ensure that the next occupant of the Union Buildings does not disconnect with the party and its alliance partners?

Which brings us back to Reagan and Bush. Front men for powerful vested interests and knowing their limitations, they relied heavily on their advisers.

Similarly, the identity and pedigree of Zuma’s kitchen Cabinet is of critical importance. His association with the security establishment has been noted elsewhere, and there are myriad opportunists hoping to make a fast buck out of a Jacob Zuma regime.

So the job of the new leadership collective — if that is what it turns out to be — is to ensure that Zuma’s victory is not about change for change’s sake. Continuity has its place too. Zuma’s dodgier cronies need to be kept at bay, and the key institutions of constitutional democracy, such as Parliament, given a radical injection of fresh energy and ideas. Power needs to be spread, not channelled through any one man.