Kuseni Dlamini, Greg Mills and Neuma Grobbelaar
a second look
Robert Mugabe confirmed last week, during Zimbabwe’s 21st birthday celebrations, what many have long presumed: that he intends standing in the 2002 presidential election.
This and Zimbabwe’s deteriorating economic and political circumstances raise concerns about the policies pursued by South Africa and the options Pretoria has left.
Pretoria’s pursuit of quiet diplomacy on Zimbabwe is based on a number of debatable presumptions. The first is that diplomacy can only work if it, by definition, is quiet. The second is that the crisis in Zimbabwe can be managed by preventing the economy from collapsing. The third is that the root cause of the crisis lies in the unfair redistribution of land between black and white Zimbabweans and that, once this is addressed, the problem will be solved. The fourth is that more interventionist or public diplomatic options to the current South Africa approach would only worsen the situation.
The following is now clear on Zimbabwe. First, the economic meltdown cannot be prevented it is already occurring. The country, potentially a breadbasket of Southern Africa, faces a maize and wheat shortage by July; key businesses are finding it impossible to continue with the current foreign-exchange regime. With an inflation rate touching 60%, fuel and foreign-exchange shortages, last year’s 23,6% fiscal deficit and more than 50% unemployment, some economists are predicting a gross domestic product shrinkage of -8% this year. The International Monetary Fund no longer provides the country with any balance of payments or other support. Foreign direct investment declined by 90% last year.
Second, contrary to the belief that Pretoria is managing the most severe effects of the situation through quiet diplomacy, it is difficult to imagine that any change in South African policy would abrade an already catastrophic situation. In fact current South African policy may simply sustain a mirage of economic viability and could inadvertently underpin increasing violence and intimidation of opposition to the ruling Zanu-PF.
Third, land redistribution is a problem in Zimbabwe, but the abuse of the issue reflects Zimbabwe and Mugabe’s perilous political state. Mugabe is clearly no longer listening to rational economic advice. Instead, his attitude and focus on maintaining his grip on power clearly illustrates the primacy of political power over economics a recipe for disaster in a globalising world economy.
In considering the policy options available, it is important to recognise a number of important policy provisos.
The first of these is that South Africa’s relative size and its values threatens its neighbours. Pretoria has few friends in the Southern African Development Community (SADC). As a United States analyst put it recently: “The world’s expectation is that South Africa will solve the problems of the Southern African region [but] the fact is that this is not always a role that other countries in the region are willing to let it play.”
Then Pretoria has little if any influence in Zimbabwe. Historically, the relationship between the African National Congress and Zanu-PF was competitive rather than collaborative. This has worsened with the worldwide acceptance of South Africa into the international fold. This has been exacerbated, too, by strained relations between the leadership and by the gulf in economic and political values between the two states.
Mugabe’s commitment to standing again next year has also apparently ruled out the possibility of a negotiated exit option one that could guarantee the septuagenarian president a comfortable retirement.
Quiet diplomacy is predicated on both the limited influence South Africa possesses and the need to maintain what is increasingly becoming a faade of regional unity. Yet South Africa and the region will bear, and is bearing, the brunt of the Zimbabwean economic collapse with little apparent gain for going softly on Harare.
It is estimated that $3-billion in potential investment to South Africa has been lost as a result of the shenanigans to the north. By the 2002 presidential election it could be much more.
All these issues raise the simple question: what are Pretoria’s options? In the absence of Mugabe retiring or listening to sound advice, essentially there is only one damage control with a number of tactical permutations.
This will involve the need to publicly challenge Zimbabwe over the issue of the rule of law, thereby ring-fencing the political and economic cost to South Africa in terms, especially, of its credibility internationally. Targeted or “smart” financial sanctions on a coterie of Zanu-PF members might produce some results in this regard, yet avoid collateral damage to the economy.
Damage control will also inevitably involve liaising more publicly and closely with the opposition Movement for Democratic Change and with those in Zanu-PF who oppose or at least provide alternatives to Mugabe’s rule.
Pretoria thus needs to reassess the efficacy of the quiet diplomacy that has informed its approach and response to Harare’s crises and that is interpreted by many in the international community as support for Mugabe’s actions. In doing so it has to insist on the imperative for rule of law, democratic governance and human rights to be adhered to as values that are indispensable if the Southern Africa region is to be held in high esteem by the rest of the world.
On the basis of this Pretoria should rally the rest of the SADC and the Organisation of African Unity to put pressure on Harare to come into line. To simply do more of the same would undermine the values South Africa ascribes to.
At the current rate the best Pretoria can hope for with quiet diplomacy is that the elections go ahead with a minimum of violence and intimidation and then try to pick up the economic pieces. The worst we can do is pretend that the situation will resolve itself. Indeed, Mugabe’s track record suggests that the worst might still be coming.
Kuseni Dlamini, Greg Mills and Neuma Grobbelaar are attached to the South African Institute of International Affairs