/ 4 June 2024

South African election exposes the pitfalls of neoliberalism

Umkhonto Wesizwe Manifesto / Rally Orlando Stadium Photo Delwyn Verasamy
Jacob Zuma's MK party were the big winners in this year's elections. (Delwyn Verasamy/M&G)

American economist Joseph Stiglitz last month wrote about the rise of populist nationalism in the midst of this “super election year”, during which more than 50 countries will head to the polls.

Neoliberal orthodoxy was supposed to strengthen democracy. So what went wrong? he asks.

Given the outcome of South Africa’s election, which saw gains by political parties fuelling xenophobia or other forms of violence, it is worth asking this very question.

As the results of last week’s elections trickled in, it became clear that the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) was not as strong as many, myself included, thought it was. After consecutive gains in the 2014 and 2019 elections, the party — which has styled itself as the left’s answer to the ANC’s neoliberalism — won only 9.52% of the national vote, down from 10.8%.

In trying to understand the EFF’s diminished support, some have pointed to the party’s immigration policies, which go against calls by a number of its rivals to strengthen borders.

EFF leader Julius Malema dismissed this view, noting during a press briefing that ActionSA — which has been accused of stoking xenophobia in the past — had also failed to ratchet up the support some expected it would. Instead, Malema attributed the slide to the rise of Jacob Zuma’s uMkhonto weSizwe (MK) party, which trounced the EFF in claiming the third-highest number of seats in parliament.

“We are not going to retreat on a scam of fear mongering. If you don’t believe me, ask [ActionSA leader Herman] Mashaba. This thing of being xenophobic and thinking you are going to win is a lie,” Malema added.

Although this may be true, ActionSA has toned down some of its anti-immigration rhetoric — which had become central to South Africa’s political debate in the lead-up to the 2021 local government elections, during which Mashaba’s party initially gained a foothold. 

Growing xenophobic sentiment seemed to culminate in the formation of Operation Dudula, which also contested the elections, but failed to rally any considerable support.

But another party, Gayton McKenzie’s Patriotic Alliance, has seemingly managed to turn its condemnation of “illegal foreigners” — who it has promised to send to mass detention camps before deporting them — into votes.

After experiencing a decline in support between the 2014 and 2019 elections, the Patriotic Alliance has grown its national voter share from only 0.04% to 2.06%, making it one of the four parties in the top 10 to grow its base. After the MK party, the Patriotic Alliance is arguably the biggest winner of this year’s elections.

On top of securing nine seats in the National Assembly, the party has made significant headway in some of the provinces such as Gauteng and the Western Cape, where it won the third-highest number of votes.

While the MK party has avoided being explicitly xenophobic — only going as far as to advocate for stronger border control, which it would assign to the military — it has found populist expression in other ways.

Zuma has voiced his intention to criminalise pregnant teenagers, bring back the death penalty and has suggested that the law permitting same-sex marriage should be reviewed. Contrary to what some believe, the MK party is far from being leftist.

In response to his question — “What went wrong?” — Stiglitz has this to say: “Part of the answer is economic: neoliberalism simply did not deliver what it promised.”

Last week, South Africans cast their ballots against a backdrop of huge economic strife, which has caused the country’s yawning inequalities to widen. The ANC, which has guided economic policy for the better part of 30 years, has paid dearly for this.

South Africa’s economic decline has been accompanied by tighter fiscal policy, which, instead of bringing about promised macroeconomic stability and investment, has seemingly triggered higher socio-economic volatility. This volatility was on full display during the unrest in July 2021, which coincided with Zuma’s arrest for contempt of court.

In 1999, South African economist Sampie Terreblanche noted that the free market, minimal state approach adopted by the ANC disregarded socio-economic stability as an important element of growth. 

As socio-economic conditions have become more precarious, fear has been planted at the centre of South Africa’s political economy — as was evidenced in the political campaigns of certain parties in the lead-up to the elections.

In his May article, Stiglitz makes this observation, referring to the upcoming US presidential contest: “Our economic system reflects and shapes who we are and what we can become. If we publicly endorse a selfish, misogynistic grifter — or dismiss these attributes as minor blemishes — our young people will absorb that message, and we will end up with even more scoundrels and opportunists in office. We will become a society without trust, and thus without a well-functioning economy.”

In the next five years, South Africa’s government will need to rebuild trust — to show that, when you fall, the state will catch you. Failing to do so will only create more chaos for populism to blossom in.