University capture: A decades-long problem

For years, concerns have been raised about governance failures at the University of Fort Hare. These concerns did not begin with the recent suspension of the vice-chancellor.

They were flagged by the parliamentary portfolio committee on higher education and training in November 2024 and by the National Tertiary Education Union (NTEU) as far back as 2018.

This article outlines seldom-reported failures to adhere to basic governance practices, and how this historic institution reached its current state. A disturbing pattern emerges: policies are ignored and accountability is delayed. A single thread runs through many of these cases.

I conclude with proposals to restore Fort Hare as an institution focused on developing future leaders — one that people from all walks of life can again take pride in.

During a portfolio committee meeting in November 2024, Sakhela Buhlungu, the vice-chancellor, was questioned about the university’s failure to follow proper appointment processes.

This followed revelations that Isaac Plaatjies, director of vetting and investigations in the vice-chancellor’s office, had been employed on multiple short-term contracts before being appointed to a senior position without a formal interview process.

The NTEU had written to Buhlungu in 2018 raising concerns about Plaatjies’s appointment, noting that no vetting, recruitment or interview process had taken place in line with policy. The letter went unanswered.

At the same meeting, it also emerged that the chief financial officer’s wife had been appointed to a human resources role without due process.

In response, Buhlungu said he had been “poorly advised” by individuals who have since been arrested and are no longer at the university. Even if this is true, it raises a further question: how are ongoing irregular appointments justified if those advisers are no longer present?

The issues extend beyond irregular appointments.

Another case involves the vice-chancellor’s former office manager, who was also employed on successive short-term contracts. On 30 January 2023, she requested a salary increase. It was approved the same day. Within days, her salary rose to R1.47 million a year, with R531 000 in back pay.

There was no formal process, no job evaluation and no benchmarking. Instead, figures appear to have been reverse-engineered to justify the increase. Evidence also suggested that a payslip used to support the adjustment may have been falsified. Even then, action was delayed.

The supply chain manager — a former Prasa employee whose name surfaced at the Zondo commission — was also appointed on short-term contracts approved by the vice-chancellor and chief financial officer. He was later arrested on corruption charges.

A separation agreement seen by the NTEU shows that the vice-chancellor signed off on a R1.59 million package in the employee’s favour one month after his arrest on murder and corruption-related charges.

A GroundUp article published on 17 October 2025 reported that an employee allegedly involved in siphoning about R17 million for undelivered work was appointed ICT director in 2025.

Despite reportedly being warned by the Special Investigating Unit (SIU) about serious findings against this employee, the vice-chancellor proceeded with the appointment.

The university dismissed the report as “doctored” or inaccurate, saying the final report was still on the vice-chancellor’s desk. However, an update later noted that the SIU confirmed the document was a draft affidavit prepared by one of its investigators, albeit an earlier version.

These are not isolated incidents. They point to deeper problems: weak oversight, delayed accountability and the protection of insiders.

The pattern is consistent — and the common denominator is Buhlungu.

The real question is not how serious the current allegations are, but how the situation was allowed to deteriorate to this extent.

Previous councils failed to act and hold the vice-chancellor accountable. They bear significant responsibility for many of the challenges now facing Fort Hare. Critical questions about decisions taken outside formal processes — often through “deviations” signed by the vice-chancellor — were neither asked nor answered.

Financial controls were bypassed, favoured insiders were protected and leadership appeared to operate above institutional rules.

Simply put, governance systems were sidelined.

Would the institution be in its current turmoil had proper recruitment and vetting processes been followed in the cases above? These systems exist to ensure accountability. Why were they ignored?

The new council has inherited a crisis. This moment is bigger than a single suspension. It is a test.

Will the new leadership confront the full extent of these governance failures, or will the pattern continue?

This situation did not arise overnight. It was enabled — either through deliberate wrongdoing or gross incompetence.

Buhlungu has received extensive media coverage portraying him as a corruption fighter. This appears to be a carefully managed narrative that has obscured a more difficult possibility: that he may himself be implicated in the very practices he claims to oppose.

Intentions, even if initially good, do not excuse outcomes. Corruption cannot be eradicated by perpetuating it.

Serious questions remain:

How were more than 20 employees and service providers appointed under Buhlungu’s leadership? Almost all those arrested in the ongoing corruption and murder trial entered the Fort Hare system after his appointment.

If those who “poorly advised” him have left, why do irregular appointments persist?

How was a R1 million salary increase approved in a single day?

Why would the vice-chancellor appoint an ICT director allegedly linked to serious irregularities?

Why has he not met stakeholders as directed by the minister in June 2023?

The central question remains: who is the common denominator? The answer is Buhlungu.

His suspension and disciplinary process are necessary to establish accountability and allow an impartial assessment of his conduct over the past eight years.

Transparency and accountability are critical.

The 1997 White Paper on Transformation in Higher Education sets out clear principles for public accountability. One of the most significant failures at Fort Hare — and elsewhere — has been the erosion of meaningful stakeholder consultation.

Public universities are funded by taxpayers. Students, staff and the broader public have a right to know how these institutions are governed.

Yet institutional autonomy — intended to protect academic freedom — is increasingly used to avoid accountability.

The NTEU coined the term “university capture” to describe how executive management and councils sidestep fiduciary duties, manufacture crises and approve “deviations” that benefit connected service providers.

Millions are spent on private security without proper tender processes. This is enabled by placing compliant individuals in key positions to serve the interests of senior leadership.

Fort Hare is a case study in governance failure. But it can also become a model for reform.

There is no need to reinvent the wheel. The 1997 White Paper provides a clear framework. The task is to return to it.

A five-point plan could include:

• Establishing a multi-stakeholder consultative forum reporting to council, allowing unions, student bodies, alumni and others to raise concerns and propose solutions;
• Initiating a transparent process to recruit a new vice-chancellor, with independent experts involved in shortlisting and interviews;
• Appointing an independent firm to investigate all current suspension cases involving staff and students;
• Conducting a full inspection of university buildings, beginning with student residences, to address urgent maintenance needs; and
• Reviewing all academic programmes to prevent failures such as the recent speech therapy qualification debacle.

Across the sector, the powers of vice-chancellors must be curtailed and councils must be held accountable by Parliament when they fail in their oversight duties.

The problem is complex. The solution is not. It lies in adhering to policy, strengthening governance and restoring meaningful stakeholder engagement.

Grant Abbott is general secretary of the National Tertiary Education Union.

© Higher Education Media Services. This was published on ednews.africa.