THE cruise missiles have flown again, with even greater accuracy, it is said, than before. They have certainly had a devastating effect on what remains of the alliance which mustered against Saddam Hussein in the Gulf War. United States President Bill Clinton has described the operation as in defence of US national interest and as justified punishment for Iraq’s “reckless acts”.
John Major has supported the US, but in more cautious terms. The deafening silence within the region has continued, with Saudi Arabia remaining the most conspicuous case. There are few other backers for the American action around the world — – it is opposed by three out of five of the United Nations Security Council permanent members.
Saddam claims to be undeterred — but his officials say that the Iraqi withdrawal from the north is almost complete. Bob Dole is obliged to approve the presidential decision but calls for more “decisive action”. Everyone, in short, is behaving in precisely the manner to be expected in this set- piece confrontation.
The real winners are Clinton and Saddam, both of whom have played resolute roles in front of their domestic audiences. The real losers, as before, are ordinary Iraqis — in this case Kurdish Iraqis who have suffered from the factional struggles of their own leaders, the equivocal support of the West and the careless brutality of Saddam’s forces.
The White House claims that the operation was necessary and justified to ensure that Saddam would lose more than he gained. It is hard to see just how the balance sheet is struck. Extending the no-fly zone will not diminish Saddam’s despotism over his own people.
What the crisis really proclaims is the final end of long-faded illusions about the consequences of the Gulf War. The alliance on which it was based, both within the region and internationally, has been shredded away. Saddam’s grip on power has hardly weakened. The boost which the war gave to the authority of the UN was ephemeral and false.
The cruise missiles were a predictable response, forecast from the first hours of the crisis — no doubt by Saddam as well as everyone else. He would have regarded a failure to launch them as a sign of weakness.
The irony is that the act of launching them reveals a deeper weakness in the ability of the international community to do anything positive for the long term. A constructive approach would require developing a new relationship with Iran, and promoting overdue democratic reform almost everywhere in the region. Missiles or no missiles, that is the only way forward.