Isabel Hilton
Jiang Zemin, president of the People’s Republic of China, can look back on 1999 with some satisfaction: it was the year in which he began to make his bid for immortality, his place in the pantheon of Chinese leaders, alongside Mao and Deng. So far, he could say to himself, so good.
Some of his increased stature though was just a lucky break. It was an accident of history that cast him as president when China celebrated its 50th anniversary in October, and earlier this month for the return of Macao to Chinese rule after more than 400 years as a Portuguese colony.
Both events were good for aspirations to the status of superhero and Jiang’s use of them to bolster his campaign was hardly subtle: the birthday parades, like the commemorative posters of the event, were heavy with his images, looking as much like a beloved leader as circumstances will allow. The Macao handover, similarly, bore the imprimatur – Jiang wearing his statesmanlike face, calling for the third act in the trilogy (the return of Taiwan) to complete the set.
That, though, would demand a degree of statesmanship that Jiang has managed to conceal from us so far. Neither Hong Kong nor Macao were major tests of Jiang’s statesmanship: the treaty governing the return of Hong Kong was negotiated under Deng Xiaoping. All Jiang had to manage was the relationship between Hong Kong, Britain and China in the few years before the handover. Likewise Macao’s return was a case of willing buyer, willing seller: Portugal had been anxious to return Macao and to divest itself of its colonial past ever since the Portuguese revolution in 1974.
If Beijing really regards Hong Kong and Macao as warm-up acts for the return of Taiwan, it might have been wise to offer Taiwan the reassurance of a strong constitution for Macao with full protection for civil liberties.
According to Amnesty International, Macao’s legal system and guarantees are weak, and its safeguards are flawed. Beijing has kept “emergency powers” that could override Macao’s laws. A statesmanlike Jiang might have thought it a good opportunity to show Taiwan that Beijing is capable of providing an exemplary constitution.
He might have noted, too, that Taiwan has big investments in Macao, and that more than 1 000 Taiwanese firms have a base in Macao. With economic and business ties thriving, rocking the political boat by comparing the return of the two former colonies to the more difficult question of Taiwan looks less than imaginative.
Jiang is the first Chinese premier to face the challenge of defining a reputation in terms of the present and the future. Building a personality cult in China is more complicated than it was: China has become a more open society, the old strings are getting weaker and the people rather less responsive. It is still, though, de rigueur for a Chinese leader in pursuit of a personality cult to produce his thoughts between hard covers. Jiang is no exception. His forthcoming collected thoughts, according to previews, will stress his role as a great diplomat, the architect of the return of lost territories and the leader who gave China international profile.
It’s not easy to see which mythological elements can be invoked in support of this thesis. The biggest step that China will take under Jiang’s leadership is membership of the World Trade Organisation. That is certainly historic, but may be unpopular in China and therefore best left where it really belongs, to the credit of Zhu Rongji.
Jiang undertakes foreign tours that are covered with the usual sycophancy on national TV, which credits him with the admiration of all who cross his path. But the reality is they are occasions on which China’s political practices are rudely challenged.
There is, as Jiang well knows, one major policy triumph waiting to adorn the historic reputation of any Chinese leader who can pull it off – the “return” of Taiwan.
But though Jiang might invoke the return of Taiwan rhetorically, the island is not a colony but a democracy in which most of the population considers Taiwan independent of Beijing.
The Taiwanese are even harder to impress than the mainlanders with stories of Jiang’s great diplomacy. They are looking for precisely what Jiang is shirking – political progress, clean government and guaranteed civil liberties. Until they see that, they are unlikely to wish to sing any of the parts in Jiang’s supporting chorus.