The European Union is keen to trumpet its latest role in easing the Iran nuclear crisis, but strains and institutional limbo are clouding the bloc’s efforts to punch its diplomatic weight, officials admitted on Thursday.
EU foreign policy head Javier Solana stands ready to return to Tehran, which he visited last weekend, to negotiate with the Islamic republic over a package of trade and political incentives to curb its atomic plans.
But even as he basked in the diplomatic spotlight, officials in Brussels were on Thursday presenting proposals to help the 25-nation bloc speak with one voice, conceding openly that the current situation is far from satisfactory.
“Coordination is far from perfect between the council [of EU governments, of which Solana is the representative] and the [European] commission,” said Jose Manuel Barroso, head of the EU’s executive arm.
“If the EU is to punch its weight we must better harness … synergies between us,” EU external relations commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner told reporters.
The problem is not new: the EU famously almost fell apart over the 2003 United States-led invasion on Iraq, split between pro-Washington countries led by Britain and the anti-war group spearheaded by France and Germany.
No one is claiming there is a similar risk of polarisation over Iran — everyone is against a military option this time — but more generally there is admission that the EU’s diplomatic muscle has been weakened.
Specifically, the bloc has been left institutionally hobbled by last year’s rejection by French and Dutch voters of its first-ever Constitution.
In general, the Constitution was designed to prevent decision-making gridlock in the expanding bloc, which underwent a “big bang” enlargement from 15 to 25 members in 2004. A handful of other countries are now waiting to join.
But more specifically, it was due to have turned Solana into the EU’s first fully fledged EU foreign minister, supported by his own diplomatic corps, while also making him a vice-president of the European Commission.
Some might say the issue of his title matters little. But the fact is that without the Constitution Solana remains outside the commission and cut off from direct access to its funding power, including a vast aid budget.
And in political terms it leaves unresolved the long-standing rivalry between the council and commission, embodied respectively in Solana and External Relations Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner.
Relations between the two may be courteous on the surface, but there is little hiding the “turf wars” constantly being fought by their respective teams for influence in particular issues.
The 10-page proposals presented by the commission on Thursday admitted that poor cooperation was costing the EU in terms of diplomatic muscle.
“Unsatisfactory coordination between different actors and policies means that the EU loses potential leverage internationally, both politically and economically,” it said.
“Despite progress … there is considerable scope to bring together different instruments and assets,” it added.
Solana will no doubt read the commission’s proposals closely. He has every interest in pushing for his role to be strengthened, even if there appears little chance of him becoming EU foreign minister any time soon.
Indeed, his trip to Tehran last weekend surprised many in Brussels. The EU’s negotiations with Iran have long been spearheaded by the so-called EU-3, consisting of the foreign ministers of Britain, France and Germany.
Solana’s visit was the first time he had represented the EU on his own in Tehran, fuelling speculation of a change of diplomatic tack.
If the new Iran drive is successful — if, that is, Solana is invited back to Tehran and makes real progress in persuading it to suspend uranium enrichment — it will be good news for the EU’s diplomatic profile.
If not, the foreign policy wrangling in Brussels and EU capitals is sure to continue apace. — AFP