Stephanie Wolters speaks to Richard Cornwell, senior research fellow of the African Security Analysis Programme at the Institute for Security Studies, about the evolving crisis in Somalia.
Would Ethiopia have gone into Somalia if it had not had United States support?
It would have been possible, but the provision of satellite intelligence [by the Americans] is a massive force multiplier — drones, real-time intelligence … they’ve had them flying over Mogadishu, everything.
Why now?
I think it was decided at least a month before they went … But interestingly, we’re picking up distinct signs of discord between [the department of] state and the Pentagon … I think that the state department is secretly upset. I think that there must have been a lot of people in state saying, ‘Look, we’ve got to get these guys talking, that’s the only way forward.’ And now the military, having put its size 11 boots in there, is turning around saying, ‘Well now, we’ve got to have a peace and stabilisation mission’ and state are turning around and saying, ‘How are we going to do that? What sort of political and diplomatic hook do we have?’
The securocrats in the administration [supported the warlords]. Then they burnt their fingers, so they handed it back to the diplomats to see what they could sort out. Then the Islamic Courts over-reached themselves and the hardliners started to get more and more of a say and they started to besiege the Transitional Federal Government [TFG] and started to think about knocking it over instead of talking to it, so they put Ethiopia up against a wall: what do we do? Do we come in and say, ‘No you don’t’ or do we take them out? And they decided, let’s take them out.
What if Ethiopia did withdraw in the coming weeks? Is that likely?
Yes it is likely, especially if its people start getting sniped and shot at. Yes, it will have to leave some forces in to back up the TFG because it hasn’t got anything of its own … There is no reason why Ethiopia should continue to stay. It can keep in a training unit, and advising unit, but basically it’s done what it wanted to do and it can go back and do it again any time.
What should happen next?
Some people are saying that there is consensus now in the international community that we need a stabilised Somalia — I am not sure I believe that.
There are two things here. Are we taking about a stabilised Somalia for the Somalis’ sake, or are we talking about denying a base to al-Qaeda? These are two entirely different things. And in my view, Ethiopia and the Americans, though they have to pay lip service to the creation of a stable Somali state, would be quite happy to have a fairly weak state capable of policing its borders or its territory with a bit of international help. Ethiopia either needs Somalia as a protectorate or as a zone into which it can go and do the necessary from time to time and that is not going to harbour Ethiopia’s enemies, domestic or foreign … And if you’ve got to weigh up as an international diplomat … if you’ve got a choice to make … if you’re stuck with a decision, do we push on Darfur or do we push on Somalia? Darfur is the one.
What would it take to stabilise Somalia?
First you have to get Abdullahi Yusuf [President of the Somali TFG] and his people to talk to elements within the Islamic Courts and the Hawiye clan. The fact that they’ve now got the old prime minister, Abdul Kassim Salaad, who was the head of the Transitional National Government [TNG], saying that the Mogadishu people must come in behind the TFG now, that’s a step in the right direction … There are also some Islamic Courts’ leaders who have gone off to Yemen, who are willing to talk. But with the American action one has to ask: what now? Does this not make it rather difficult to act as honest broker? I’d have thought it makes it impossible. Abdullahi Yusuf doesn’t really see why he should negotiate away power. He can use the al-Qaeda card, as he’s used it rather successfully in the past, and can walk away with goodies — or at least he doesn’t lose them.
What is the state of the Union of Islamic Courts?
They’re dispersed … I don’t know to what extent they were an operational threat. I don’t think anybody does — it’s like the weapons of mass destruction. When the American military starts talking about credible intelligence the only sensible thing to do is roll your eyes. And the fact that the intelligence [about the location of the al-Qaeda operatives] was provided by Ethiopians on the ground should have made them do a double take, especially before using weapons that would turn anything into a a pulpy mess that won’t be identifiable except through DNA.
What should happen now to stabilise the situation?
You’ve got to get a force in there quickly, they say, but under what conditions? We know that the political situation on the ground is likely to defy analysis by outsiders. It’s a rapidly shifting kaleidoscope of alliances of convenience. It’s not just clan versus clan, it’s clan versus sub-clan, and not to forget the business interests.
Everybody looks at religion and clan, but everybody forgets that the Islamic Courts were set up by certain business interests in Mogadishu and these business interests were at odds with the business interests of the Mogadishu warlords. Now the Mogadishu warlords are back in their mansions.
The real urgency of the situation is to make sure that there is sufficient stability and safety for humanitarian agencies to get to the people on the ground. It’s not happening and it’s not featuring very prominently in the debate.
The European Union is taking the most sensible stance. They are saying, ‘Yes we need a force, but as a precondition for assistance to the TFG, it has to broaden its base by talking to everybody.’ The Americans, of course, have said no such thing and [British Prime Minister Tony] Blair has been notably stuck in mid-Atlantic.
But even with the best will in the world, how quickly can you get a force into Mogadishu?
Months. By that time the situation has changed again. The worst thing that we’re doing is constantly looking at this through the al-Qaeda lens, through the terrorism lens. We are not going to make sense of what’s happening on the ground if we do that. We are not going to make sense of that if we say that Ethiopia intervened and prevented the formation of a Taliban state.