On January 1 the African Union Mission in Sudan (Amis) handed over to the ”hybrid” United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur, known as UNamid. The transfer marked the end of the African Union’s (AU) biggest, most challenging and, some say, most controversial and ambitious peace observation and peacekeeping operation.
To appreciate the significance of Amis one must think back to the moment of its birth, early in 2004. The AU had been constituted barely 18 months earlier and its first full chairperson, President Alpha Omer Konare, had been in office for just six months. Article 4 of the Constitutive Act of the AU, which mandates intervention in cases of humanitarian crisis or grave human rights abuses, was to herald a new era in which Africa would not hesitate to act decisively to solve African problems.
While the world debated what to do about Darfur and focused on humanitarian activities, Africa acted. The AU dispatched diplomats to N’djamena to negotiate a ceasefire and organised the troops necessary to monitor it. The first Amis troops arrived barely six weeks after the ceasefire was signed, surpassing the speed of any peacekeeping operation in recent years. While the UN has to follow complex, time-consuming procedures before sending peacekeepers, the AU won immediate commitments of troops from Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal and South Africa.
AU troops walked into a difficult situation. The N’djamena ceasefire was violated by both parties from day one and the agreement itself did not contain essential provisions, such as maps of the parties’ positions, vitally important for effective monitoring of the ceasefire. Nonetheless, in the first months of the Amis deployment, morale and energy were high and its influence was appreciable.
The first Amis force leadership was vigorous and creative, constantly bending the rules to warn the warring parties against military actions and flying across Darfur at a moment’s notice to show that the AU meant business. Within a few months the Amis mandate was revised to allow its troops to protect civilians — but only if, during the course of their regular monitoring activities, they encountered civilians under immediate threat. The mandate was still much too restrictive.
Other problems surfaced too. Amis lacked sufficient translators. It lacked sufficient civil affairs officers and sufficient political liaison officers. It was short of equipment and increasingly short of funds and the troops often didn’t get paid on time.
Darfur in 2004 was the world’s toughest peacekeeping assignment because it amounted to keeping the peace in the middle of a continuing war. Thrown on to the front line of this challenge, African soldiers responded with bravery and steadfastness. They operated in conditions of danger and lived in conditions of hardship. In the early months the level of atrocities in Darfur dropped and the humanitarian operations were ramped up.
By late 2005 Amis faced mounting problems and came under frequent attacks. The AU troops were easy game — insufficiently armed and unable to defend themselves effectively against the highly mobile, well-armed and determined groups operating in their own terrain. Troops that could not defend themselves were not able to protect the civilian population of Darfur. The small but effective activities undertaken by Amis in its early months, such as conducting patrols to protect women gathering firewood, were overshadowed by a general deterioration in the mission’s capacity.
But the real death knell for Amis was when the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) was signed. It contained provisions requiring the mission to help signatories to implement the ceasefire. This included the provision of non-military aid such as food, shelter and medical services to the rebel camps and logistical help to the representatives of the government and armed groups to allow them to travel freely. Although only the government and the Sudanese Liberation Movement (SLA), led by Minni Minawi, signed the DPA, Amis remained bound to provide this assistance. But, at the same time, it was supposed to maintain a neutral position towards those rebel groups that had not signed the agreement.
Unfortunately, this conflict of roles simply could not be resolved. Those groups that had not signed the DPA, and Darfurians at large, began to feel that Amis was cooperating only with the government and the SLA-Minawi to the exclusion of the other participants in the conflict.
Matters came to a head when the non-signatories abandoned the Ceasefire Commission set up in April 2004, jeopardising the entire mission. Amis subsequently became intimidated, both by the scale of the problem it faced and by day-to-day threats to its security. Many Amis units retreated behind their razor wire and sandbags and adopted a garrison-mode of peacekeeping with minimal interaction with the local population. Without good links to the local community, its ability to identify threats and protect itself were diminished.
More than 50 Amis peacekeepers have been killed since the mission was deployed. One was taken prisoner in December 2006 and has not been heard from since.
These soldiers deserve to be honoured for the sacrifice they made. Their comrades deserve to be honoured for continuing to remain in their posts, despite lack of equipment, an insufficient mandate, lack of good intelligence and, in many cases, mounting salary arrears.
As Amis’s time comes to an end we should reflect on the lessons learned and ensure the sobering experiences in Darfur will improve future Africa peacekeeping missions. We should also recognise that goodwill and determination are not enough to deal with complicated and intractable conflicts. But Africa should not short-change itself either: the continent made a sterling effort and paid a high price for its readiness to rush in.
Abdul Mohammed is head of Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation, a process designed to facilitate dialogue and consultation between the various ethnic groups in Darfur