The president’s tendency to avoid confrontation with his own party means we must maintain public outrage to ensure an end to state capture(Photo by Papi Morake/Gallo Images via Getty Images)
Reacting to Judge Raymond Zondo’s final report on state capture, President Cyril Ramaphosa wrote in his recent newsletter: “We must ensure that there is redress, justice and accountability.” How we get to realise all these promises, the president noted elsewhere, will be outlined in a plan he’ll present four months later. This begs the questions: Does the president have the disposition to deliver on these promises; and what exactly can he do?
One is uncertain about the extent to which Ramaphosa can actually achieve this. My doubts stem from his guarded style of leadership, with which we’ve become accustomed in the last few years. It is this cautious decision-making process, especially in the face of pressing challenges, that is even more worrisome given the range of issues and the risks at play as he considers his course of action now. This guardedness initially showed somewhat when he was deputy president, but was masked by tactical considerations. That was when initial signs of state capture, from 2010, began to surface. Rather than acquiesce, resign or confront then-president Jacob Zuma, Ramaphosa explains that he chose to “remain and resist” from within the cabinet.
Ramaphosa justifies the “remain and resist” option as a tactical move. It spared him from being fired by Zuma. His dismissal, which would have happened had he confronted Zuma, wouldn’t have stopped state capture, Ramaphosa asserted. Conversely, remaining as deputy president enabled him to mount some form of resistance. Zondo disagrees, and proceeds to note that state capture continued despite Ramaphosa’s “resistance” in the cabinet.
Zondo was hard-pressed to find any signs of Ramaphosa’s resistance in the subsequent five years. It took Nhlanhla Nene’s removal as finance minister in 2015 and the proposal to institute a judicial enquiry into banks to push Ramaphosa into expressing disapproval at Zuma’s misuse of office for personal gain. Quitting the cabinet, Zondo contends, would have been a more effective option. It would have created a crisis — mass resignations from cabinet — which would, in turn, have attracted even more attention to the predatory activities within government. With the full scale of the plunder exposed, Zondo believes public mobilisation would have been energised, which could have possibly brought state capture to a halt.
Zondo’s supposition is sound from the standpoint of an outsider. For someone like Ramaphosa, who had been harbouring presidential ambitions for years, exiting the cabinet was understandably not an option. Because Zuma had handed him the deputy presidency of the party in 2012, Ramaphosa still hoped that Zuma would support his presidential bid. He didn’t want to eliminate that possibility by snubbing Zuma, especially because he didn’t have a power-base of his own.
An even bigger hindrance to resigning was the power of incumbency and financial vulnerability of most ANC cadres. Being a career politician, with limited options of employment outside the public office, makes most ANC politicians dependent on state employment. And, the party, headed by Zuma, determined whether one was employed. The pervasiveness of patronage politics made it even more comfortable inside, as they could easily fleece the public purse of additional income.
This is where it becomes critical to appreciate self-aggrandisement beyond the personality that is Zuma. It was institutionalised and endemic within the state. Zuma simply allowed patronage politics to flourish, akin to a monarch in a mediaeval state where vassals were paid in-kind in return for their loyalty.
It is unrealistic, therefore, to have expected Ramaphosa to snub Zuma in the hope of triggering an exodus from cabinet. And, because they were similarly ensconced in patronage politics, ANC branches were, too, unlikely to have embraced Ramaphosa’s principled stance. Today the ANC in the Free State, for instance, is battling to reconstitute branches because there are no financial inducements for members to attend meetings. In other words, one is willing to forgive Ramaphosa’s explanation for what was effectively silent resistance.
Once he became president, with the full authority to make decisions, however, Ramaphosa showed extreme tentativeness. At times his decisions were even inexplicable. Consider, for instance, his retention of Arthur Fraser in the public service and appointment of David Mahlobo as deputy minister of human settlements. He did so, as Zondo points out, knowing that both men had been implicated in abuse of power and plunder of resources at the intelligence agency. Sydney Mufamadi, whom Ramaphosa appointed to head a panel to investigate, had handed him all the evidence of their malfeasance in December 2018.
When Zondo probed Ramaphosa to explain this odd decision, his response was fudgy, if not entirely bizarre. Zondo can’t quite make out what his remarks were on Fraser, but notes that he deferred Mahlobo’s fate to the findings of his commission. Zondo wasn’t happy with the response and pressed Ramaphosa on whether, in light of Mufamadi’s findings, he thought Mahlobo was suitable for appointment.
The president simply had no response. This is what makes one doubt whether Ramaphosa will take the lead in ensuring “redress, justice and accountability”. What could have possibly made him retain Fraser? And, in his new position as head of correctional services, Fraser simply continued doing what he does best — abusing authority to provide favours to allies. He ignored the parole board and released Zuma from prison.
In the case of Mahlobo, it may well be that Ramaphosa feared that overlooking him for appointment would alienate critical allies he needed to sustain his presidency. This shows a worrisome penchant to please individuals, however flawed they are, simply for the sake of maintaining power. Part of implementing Zondo’s recommendations will entail dismissing some of his critical allies from positions of influence. And, Ramaphosa has to announce his implementation plan just a month before the party’s national conference where he hopes to get re-elected president of the party. For now he doesn’t appear to have a challenger. Will that give him confidence that he’ll be re-elected, thereby emboldening him to ensure “redress, justice and accountability”? I don’t know.
What I do know is that Ramaphosa has never taken the lead before on difficult matters that require confrontation with his party. He only acts when there’s public outrage. Rather than expect him to lead, the public should continue to mobilise. Only a vigilant and vocal citizenry can guarantee that plunderers of state resources get their punishment.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Mail & Guardian.
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