/ 25 September 2025

After Doha the Middle East’s security architecture might be anchored in Ankara

Graphic Qatar2 Website 1000px
Graphic: John McCann/M&G

News of the 9 September Israeli attack on Qatar’s capital Doha left even the most seasoned analysts in shock. 

Over the course of two years, the daily bombing of civilians in Gaza and dozens of strikes on four of Israel’s neighbours, Egypt, Yemen, Syria and Lebanon, made it clear that international law is no constraint on the belligerent Israeli regime. 

But bombing a country that has worked to provide diplomatic back channels to the Palestinian resistance, the key to securing the release of Israeli hostages, and holding discussions with Western partners was a step no one could have predicted. Least of all the Qatari’s themselves. Since 1996, Doha took succour as the host of the largest US base in the Middle East, built with $1 billion from Qatar’s own coffers. 

But the events of 9 September have crystallised a pre-existing shift — the region no longer assumes US security guarantees will always buffer allies — and is increasingly proving to be a liability against Israeli aggression. 

With the special “non-Nato ally” status offering little more than patronising “wanna be” status, the one country that offers the potential to reshape the region is ironically a Nato member. As the only Muslim-majority Nato power with sovereign control over its airspace and increasingly indigenous defence base, Türkiye is positioning itself as a linchpin for Muslim-world security architecture. 

When Türkiye joined Nato in 1952, it did so during the Cold War under a government that believed the security of the country lay with the West. This was despite the Allied war against the Ottoman Empire that caused the breakup of the region into nation-states and the creation of the Turkish Republic.  Speaking in Ottawa, Canada, after the ratification of Turkish ascension into Nato, then prime minister Adnan Menderes said Türkiye entered as “… as an equal member … the Atlantic Pact … a new and important step for the security of the democratic world…”

Seventy-three years later, as that “democratic world” proves to be paralysed by the lack of political will to deal Israeli impunity, Türkiye is leveraging its Nato membership to reconstruct the meaning of collective security in the Middle East, forcing capitals to reassess reliance on Washington.  

But it is not Nato’s security framework alone that makes Türkiye a valuable Muslim nation in the region. Rather, it is its domestic military manufacturing industry, which continues to grow in leaps. The latest evidence of its substantial military footprint is the recent agreement between Turkish Aerospace Industries and Airbus on the delivery of an estimated 30 Turkish Hurjet Trainers to Spain. Delivery of the jets is planned for 2028 and at present comes with a price tag of around $1.6 billion. 

The agreement signed in July this year indicates EU confidence and industrial partnership potential that could be the greatest challenge to Washington’s relations with the bloc. Importantly, the Turkish system doesn’t just offer an alternative to Western security systems, but Nato standards combine with local ones to create a credible, interoperable but independent, Middle East security core. 

The plan to create a Turkish-manufactured heavy industry precedes President Tayyip Erdogan’s tenure and was initiated by his political mentor, Necmettin Erbakan. Erbakan had plans to implement a vision of a homegrown military industry that would not only see Turkish manufacturing grow but also export its knowledge to the Muslim world. 

But Erbakan’s plan was stymied by the then dominant secular establishment. Under Erdogan, policies that addressed municipal-level economic frustrations, such as access to water, healthcare and housing, helped to mainstream Islamist politics and strengthened the idea of a self-sufficient Türkiye, independent of its Western allies. 

Proof of Türkiye’s export credibility can be seen in its revenue figures. According to the Presidency of Defence Industries and the Turkish Exporters’ Assembly, as of May 2025, Turkey’s defence exports totalled $2.98 billion, a 28.9% increase from the same period in 2024. Earlier partial data for January-April 2025 showed $2.2 billion (up 67% year-on-year). Exports now reach 185 countries, with more than 230 product types, and the sector accounts for about 3% of Turkey’s total exports.

Perhaps most interesting is the fact that Nato allies make up more than 50% of its consumer base. 

With Spain’ s selection of Hurjet Trainers, Pakistan’s induction of Turkish unmanned combat aerial vehicles, frequent joint air and naval drills in an exercise-tested partnership and Somalia’s hosting of Türkiye’s largest overseas training base, that includes a 10-year maritime defence pact, there is potential for Turkish defence capabilities to span from the Mediterranean to the Arabian Sea.  But, as with all technologies, military capabilities can only be an effective deterrent when partnered with collective political will. 

Herein lies the greatest test for the new Middle Eastern security framework. While the Doha attacks have galvanised the region to condemn Israeli actions, reflected in the rare unity at the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation conference on 15 September, its statements will remain hollow without concrete political measures. 

There are two levers of influence that can be applied on Israel, only one of which is the military coalition of Arab-Muslim states under a Nato-standard hub. The other is the crucial pressure that the Gulf states can apply using their energy, liquefied natural gas, finance and trade networks to pressure Israel and its supply chains. 

As Türkiye and Qatar both have access to, and goodwill from, the Hamas leadership, it will be necessary for them to formalise their security pact with early-warning and air-defence layers. 

Türkiye could also invite the Gulf Cooperation Council to participate in the Türkiye-Pakistan exercises to give substantive weight to a regional military force. With Iran’s influence significantly curtailed after the fall of Bashar al-Assad, it has no choice but to choose co-operation with its Arab neighbours. The involvement of proxy actors, while possibly effective at certain times, does not replace the need for coordinated and concrete state policy among Arab and Muslim nations.  

By leading such a grouping, Türkiye and Qatar can show that being pro-sovereignty has a greater chance of bringing stability to the region that has for too long been shaped by foreign interests. 

Mariam Bibi Jooma Çarikci is an independent writer-researcher specialising in international political economy with 20+ years’ experience on the Horn of Africa, Türkiye and Zionism in Africa.