President Donald J. Trump Speaking to supporters in Allentown, Pennsylvania. Photo: Trump Facebook Page
As the question swirls – is the MAGA movement dying or merely shapeshifting? It is tempting to treat the debate as exclusively domestic. But to do so is to miss the half of the story: whether MAGA declines or endures, its foreign-policy legacy will continue to reverberate across capitals from Brussels to Beijing.
Donald Trump’s rise struck US foreign policy as a form of political trauma. His populism challenged the liberal internationalist consensus in ways that foreign-policy elites deeply felt, framing him as irresponsible, immature, and a destabilising force. These critiques are not just about policy – they were emotional judgments about the legitimacy of a populist who questioned the very structures that undergird the post-World War II global order.
In response, parts of the foreign-policy establishment is rallying around a “normalisation” project: to restore the United States as a reliable hegemon. This made MAGA look like a temporary rupture. But framing populism purely as a glitch overlooks deeper structural transformations. MAGA’s foreign policy is not merely erratic – it has followed a coherent logic rooted in nationalism. The “America First” doctrine embodied a broader rejection of multilateralism.
Trump has questioned NATO’s relevance, demanded that allies increase their defense spending, and frequently framed global alliances as drains on American sovereignty. Across different geographies, Trump’s approach to diplomacy has been deeply personalistic. He frequently bypasses bureaucracies, couching bilateral relations as interpersonal relationships, and occasionally undermining institutional continuity. That style – call it ‘champion diplomacy’ – weakened intra-alliance coordination and signaled to adversaries that America’s commitments could shift dramatically with each new administration.
These are not just stylistic quirks. They have had long-term geopolitical effects. In Europe, MAGA’s pressure on NATO spending has strained transatlantic trust, prompting allies to reassess how much they can rely on US leadership. In Asia, Trump’s re-focus on national interest and transactional engagement has fueled speculation about the future of US influence in the Indo-Pacific. And in Latin America, protectionist US policies have both curtailed American soft power and paved the way for other powers – notably China – to deepen their regional footprint.
Nowhere is this shift felt more acutely than in the Indo-Pacific. Canberra, Tokyo, Seoul and other regional capitals have spent the past eight years stress-testing every American commitment – from AUKUS and the Quad to broader extended deterrence – against the possibility of sudden US transactionalism or retrenchment. Even if a post-Trump administration restores rhetorical warmth, the knowledge that alliances can be reframed as “burdens” rather than assets has already accelerated hedging strategies and calls for greater strategic self-reliance across the region.
MAGA did not emerge in a vacuum; it is part of a larger wave of populism reshaping global governance. Recent academic work highlights how this worldwide surge is weakening multilateral frameworks, recalibrating alliances, and injecting volatility into the norms of international cooperation.
Furthermore, populist leaders often centre foreign policy on a sovereign “people versus elite” narrative, which undermines traditional diplomatic institutions. Their direct, highly personalised modes of diplomacy sideline institutions that were once the bedrock of global interaction.
Looking forward, the evolution of MAGA-style populism could take several paths – each with serious global implications. One, even if Trump recedes, his brand of populism may be inherited by others, in either a more disciplined or more ideologically expansive form. In this case, the underlying commitment to national interest over multilateralism could remain firm, shaping US foreign policy for years to come – especially on trade, security, and alliance burdens.
Two, alternatively, foreign-policy elites may succeed in re-anchoring US engagement in traditional alliances, but with a caveat: a reformed, more conditional version of multilateralism. Rather than a full rollback to pre-populist norms, Washington might demand more from allies, tie cooperation more clearly to national interests, and trade stability for flexibility. And three, the most consequential scenario lies beyond the United States. MAGA’s model – populist nationalism, personalist leadership, transactional diplomacy – could become more deeply embedded in global governance as other countries adopt similar styles. This would pose serious risks to global cooperation, from climate change to collective security.
The question – “Is this the end of MAGA?” – is important, but incomplete. Even if the MAGA movement fades in US domestic politics, the ideology it popularised has already reshaped how nations negotiate, ally, and drift apart. That means the real debate should not be whether MAGA ends, but how its legacy will define international power dynamics for years to come.
In an era of global volatility, the most consequential outcome isn’t the fate of a US political brand – it’s the persistence of a worldview. And if that worldview endures, the post-MAGA world may be less about retrenchment and more about reordering.