MK party leader Jacob Zuma. (Delwyn Verasamy/M&G)
The MK party have reached the zenith of their political existence and are currently engaging in actions that will undermine and diminish their future electoral prospects. The political outfit, previously regarded as promising, is currently sustained primarily by the residual momentum of its electoral success in May 2024, while simultaneously engaging in conduct that is deleterious to its own long-term viability.
The party exhibits a reactive orientation toward unfolding events and current affairs, while simultaneously misusing its platform as it hops from one scandal to the next. The most recent and prominent of these controversies concerns the party’s former Member of Parliament, Duduzile Zuma-Sambudla, in connection with seventeen youths trapped on the frontlines of the Russia–Ukraine conflict.
The central question concerns the trajectory by which this political party has reached its current status within a relatively brief period.
Prior to the public endorsement issued on 16 December 2023 by the MK party incumbent president, Jacob Zuma, in favour of a political organisation founded by Jabulani Khumalo, not much was known about this party. A closer examination of Jacob Zuma and the current party’s senior leadership — indicates that most of these individuals assumed membership in the party only after the May 2024 election.
The party had mobilised and drawn support from predominantly rural and township constituencies, largely originating from the provinces of KwaZulu-Natal, Mpumalanga, and Gauteng. Legacy networks primarily from the ANC have consolidated their influence, to the deficit of ordinary party members.
Floyd Shivambu, the former secretary general of the party, derived political advantage from these entrenched networks during his relatively brief tenure within the party. Evidence is gradually emerging that the party lacks a substantive and internally coherent, forward-looking strategic vision.
In order to establish some ideational legitimacy, it drew upon conventional leftist and pan-Africanist ideas, as allegedly formulated by Shivambu in the party’s constitution. They demonstrate no discernible comprehension of the ways in which the political landscape has been reconfigured following the May 2024 elections and over the last three decades of democracy.
The MK party experienced a rapid and significant rise in prominence during the general elections held on 29 May 2024. They achieved a historically significant and previously unmatched level of electoral success, assuming the role of the official opposition in the National Assembly and thereby consolidating their status as the third-largest political party. The establishment of the Government of National Unity (GNU) — a coalition consisting of the ANC and nine additional political parties — marked the end of the ANC’s uninterrupted three-decade tenure in power and brought to a close its era of single-party dominance in the post-apartheid era.
Jacob Zuma and the senior leadership of the MK party have capitalized on a highly advantageous, previously under‑mobilized constituency that translated into a substantial and cohesive voting bloc. One key aspect that is often not recognized by the public is that the emergence of the MK party resulted from a fortuitous configuration of determining factors, among which the cultural dynamics originating in KwaZulu-Natal played a particularly significant role. This sociocultural phenomenon—grounded in Zulu historical consciousness and collective pride, rather than in tribalism, ethno-nationalism, or ethnic mobilisation — is localised to that specific region of the country and is not observed elsewhere.
For the purposes of this analysis, this dynamic will be called a Zulu ‘cultural force’. This cultural force is highly potent and may not be eradicated; rather, once people become discontented, it is likely to persist and transmute into a latent or subterranean form.
In the more remote historical period, this intergenerationally transmitted force manifested itself in at least three Zulu civil wars, each originating in conflicts between rival royal factions. In recent history, this force was manifested as apartheid state–sponsored, incidental political violence between the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and the United Democratic Front/African National Congress (UDF/ANC), predominantly within the former Natal province and the Witwatersrand region. Within the resulting configuration, Jacob Zuma’s status as a popular former president was decisive, as he emerged as the face of this convergence of factors.
The public persona of Zuma, among other factors, activated a latent historical-cultural force, as a substantial portion of the population perceived him as socially and culturally relatable. It was a proverbial perfect storm that came to sweep the May 2024 election, producing a highly consequential and disruptive political event. The cultural force associated with Zulu identity predates the establishment of South Africa as a modern nation-state and can be mobilized toward either constructive or destructive ends, dependent upon the institutional platforms that appropriate and deploy it. As already argued, this sociocultural force is historical and exhibits a recurrent tendency to seek modes of expression. In the present instance, it has manifested itself through, and been taken up by, the MK party.
As the MK party continues to accumulate blunders, this cultural force will gradually withdraw from this party platform, and eventually will move on and manifest through an alternative conduit in the future. It is plausible that, by the time of the 2029 general election, the MK party will have experienced a substantial decline in electoral support, potentially to the point of complete disappearance as a politically relevant actor. As of today their performance in parliament has been lacklustre.
Given these considerations, Jacob Zuma currently occupies a highly precarious position and is subject to substantial pressure to deliver extraordinary results and implement measures capable of producing far‑reaching systemic change. While the Zulu cultural force remains accessible to Zuma and his party, supporters of the MK party exhibit elevated expectations that the leader will undertake a strategically calibrated intervention capable of catalysing radical socio-economic change.
Zuma is undertaking international visits, including to countries such as Morocco, creating public and media controversy, as well as to Burkina Faso, meeting with Ibrahim Traoré. The party recently concluded an unsuccessful attempt to pass a motion of no confidence in the Premier of KwaZulu-Natal, Thami Ntuli. Meanwhile, they have issued formal statements indicating an intention to amalgamate with the African Transformation Movement (ATM) in preparation for the 2026 local government elections.
Apart from engaging with these routine events, the party has effectively met the limits of its conceptual capabilities. Zuma has reached a point of acute intellectual and emotional exhaustion and is unwilling to risk reputational damage by acknowledging that he lacks substantive ideas to offer either to his party or to the nation. While periodic changes in the senior leadership of the party may be relatively easy to execute, the formulation of macro-level strategies capable of fundamentally transforming the nation and its economy constitutes a highly complex and demanding undertaking.
Recycled Pan-Africanist and revolutionary leftist rhetoric have largely lost their previous mobilizing efficacy. And any reckless action or infringement of the rule of law, as in attempts to overthrow government, may result in criminal prosecution and incarceration.
The MK party, like Shivambu’s new party the Mayibuye Afrika Movement, is demonstrating characteristics consistent with another splinter outfit from the ANC and lacks a distinctive or substantive ideological contribution.
Dr Mabutho Shangase is a Senior Lecturer in Political Studies and International Relations at North-West University. @nativconscience