All African roads lead to Beijing

For centuries, Europe’s relationship with Africa has been defined by domination rather than partnership. 

Colonial rule formalised the extraction of African labour and resources and while political independence was achieved, European control did not vanish. Instead, it adapted and evolved. 

Economic dependency —maintained through trade asymmetries, conditional aid and strategic alliances —ensured that African states remained tethered to European interests, even after formal decolonisation. 

Today, this legacy sits uneasily alongside Europe’s increasingly vocal criticism of China’s growing presence in Africa. Accusations of neo-colonialism, debt-trap diplomacy and political manipulation directed at Beijing are deeply ironic, given that the same European powers that continue to treat Africa as a colonial appendage now project their own historical framework onto China’s engagement with the continent. 

This contradiction highlights a deeper tension in European foreign policy: between professed concern for African sovereignty and a persistent desire to exploit Africa’s resources and political landscape in a shifting global order.

Former colonial powers have maintained leverage over their former African colonies through political patronage, military cooperation and economic arrangements designed to secure access to resources and markets. 

Their engagement with Africa is often framed in terms of governance, reform and development, yet it remains shaped by asymmetric power relations. Trade agreements favour European industries, aid is often conditional and political alignment continues to shape access to international credit markets and favourable borrowing terms.

This influence is most apparent in the way Europe continues to maintain economic dominance. The European Union remains Africa’s largest investor, with investments totalling roughly $315 billion in recent years (EU: $257 billion, UK: $58 billion), compared to China’s FDI stock of about $42 billion. While these investments are often framed as development-oriented, they reinforce patterns of engagement centred on extraction rather than construction, perpetuating dynamics established during the colonial era.

Against this backdrop, the European criticism of China’s growing role in Africa takes on a different light. When European leaders accuse Beijing of neo-colonialism, they invoke a concept forged by their own historical behaviour. This accusation presupposes that large-scale investment by an external power inevitably replicates colonial hierarchies. 

What it overlooks, however, is that China’s policymakers, shaped by their own historical experiences in the 19th and early 20th centuries, are acutely conscious of the political risks of reproducing the insensitivity and hubris associated with Europe’s colonial past.

China’s presence in Africa has grown rapidly over the past two decades, driven by trade, infrastructure investment and long-term commercial partnerships. 

Roads, railways, ports, power plants and industrial zones have become the visible markers of Beijing’s engagement. This model is strategic and transactional but it differs from Europe’s historical approach in key ways.

Unlike European powers, China has largely avoided direct political interference. It does not condition loans on governance reforms, electoral outcomes or ideological alignment. 

African governments negotiate financing for specific projects, with repayment terms tied to economic performance rather than political compliance. 

This formula is more akin to the Japanese model of development assistance in East Asia from the 1960s onwards, emphasising investments, trade and aid— what the Japanese development economist Yasunari Shimomura calls the ‘trinity’ of Japanese development assistance.

This approach complicates the claim that China’s presence in Africa is inherently neo-colonial. It is transactional but also less politically intrusive than the European model.

While Chinese engagement is not without risks, it reflects a different form of external involvement from Europe’s contemporary engagement with Africa. 

Much of Europe’s criticism of China centres on the idea of ‘debt-trap diplomacy’— the claim that China deliberately burdens African countries with unsustainable debt to gain leverage. 

Debt is indeed a legitimate concern but the way it is framed often positions Europe as a benevolent actor, standing ready to save Africa from the dangers of Chinese economic influence. This narrative is misleading. 

African states seek external financing because they face severe infrastructure deficits rooted in colonial extraction and decades of post-independence underinvestment. 

Western institutions have historically been reluctant to fund large-scale infrastructure projects in an African country without imposing political conditions —such as privatisation, structural adjustment policies or strategic alignment with Western interests. 

Chinese lending, in contrast, follows a different logic. Projects are negotiated commercially, repayment is tied to revenues or long-term growth and political systems are left formally untouched.

While this model may have its own risks, it challenges the longstanding European narrative that Africa cannot make sovereign economic decisions without external supervision, a belief rooted in Europe’s colonial past. Europe’s framing of the ‘debt trap’ reveals as much about Western assumptions as about African realities.

In recent years, African leaders have increasingly rejected the framing of their relationships with external powers through a colonial lens. 

In 2023, Namibian President Hage Geingob publicly dismissed criticism from German politician Norbert Lammert over China’s growing role in Namibia, bluntly asserting that Africa’s relationships are sovereign decisions, not matters requiring European moral approval.

This moment reflects a broader shift across the continent. African governments are asserting their right to diversify partnerships, pursue infrastructure-led development and reduce dependence on any single external power. 

For many, China represents not a replacement for the West but a counterbalance —an option that expands their negotiating space. 

This growing assertiveness helps explain the unease in European capitals. 

The tension in Europe’s position becomes even more glaring when its rhetoric on Africa is compared with its own dealings with China. 

While condemning Beijing’s role in Africa, European governments are simultaneously deepening their economic engagement with China.

This reflects a pragmatic recognition of China’s growing role in the global economy. 

French President Emmanuel Macron, UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer and German Chancellor Merz are all deepening ties with China, with Merz set to visit Beijing this week (February 24–27, 2026). These visits underscore the importance of Chinese markets, supply chains and investment to Europe’s economic health.

The same European governments that warn Africa about Chinese influence privately acknowledge that disengagement from China is neither realistic nor desirable. 

Yet when African states pursue similar engagement, it is often framed as dangerous or illegitimate. This inconsistency exposes the weakness of Europe’s moral argument.

What is at stake is not simply Africa’s well-being but Europe’s relative influence. 

This recalls an incident in 2017, when the ambassador of a European country in Accra reportedly reacted angrily to the establishment of the Centre of Asian Studies at the University of Ghana, allegedly asking, ‘What do they want that for?’

The fellow was apparently apoplectic with rage —a colonialist reaction, no doubt— particularly in response to the Centre’s emphasis on China and developments in East Asia.

This episode highlights how Europe continues to view its relationship with Africa through a colonial lens, unwilling to acknowledge that African institutions are asserting their own agency and diversifying their partnerships beyond Europe and the West as a whole.

Even as Europe continues to frame Chinese engagement with Africa through the lens of neo-colonialism, African economic policymakers may recognise that the global economic centre has shifted decisively toward East Asia. 

Europe has already acknowledged this shift through its own expanding ties with Beijing. 

Framing China as a neo-colonial threat to Africa is better understood as a retroactive justification: a trope used to defend Europe’s position, even as it deepens its own engagement with Beijing.

Kweku Ampiah is a professor in Japanese Studies in the Department of East Asian Studies at the University of Leeds, UK.