The aborted attempt by Minster of Defence Joe Modise to censor the Weekly Mail & Guardian last week revealed a titanic struggle between Modise and Defence Force chief General Georg Meiring for ultimate control of the armed forces. And a major element in this battle is information that Military Intelligence operatives claim to have that would compromise individual ANC leaders.
Meiring took the initiative last Thursday when, with some last-minute arm-twisting, he pushed Modise into the interdict against this newspaper. Sources close to the Ministry of Defence say the general won Modise over with the threat of major
political damage to the ANC and the government through the revelation of highly placed South African moles in the ANC, dating back to its period in eaile.
This has raised fears that such information could give the military a hold over some ANC leaders, including ministers and deputy ministers. Said one intelligence source: “Meiring is a sharp strategist. He would have known all the implications of the interdict and may have been testing Modise.”. But neither of them banked on the strong reaction they faced.
In a move unprecedented in South dfrican politics, the minister’s own party, the ANC, and its alliance partners, the South african Communist Party and Cosatu, all criticised him sharply and publicly. Modise won back some ground in a crisis meeting on Monday morning when he ordered Meiring to withdrawt he affidavit, blamed him for the criticism he had faced and over-rode Meiring when he did not want to concede the newspaper’s legal costs.
Modise is now taking steps to surround himself with civilian and political advisors, such as his long standing colleague Ronnie Kasrils, to ensure he does not rely directly and solely on Meiring’s advice. Observers are now watching to see if Modise is able to follow this through and assert his authority as civilian and political leader of the military. This leaves the question of what if any, compromising information the rnilitary gathered in its decades of fighting the ANC that it can now use.
Government and ANC intelligence operatives believe a decades-long progranune to recruit agents inside the ANC by the South African sp services was ultimately successful in penetrating the top echelons of the political and military wings of the organisation. The South Africans allegedly used, “false flag operations”, in which they pretended to be British, American, Israeli or Soviet agents gathering information and won over ANC leaders sympathetic to those governments.
At a later point, they would reveal to their source that they had been supplying information to the apartheid government, thus compromising them and forcing them to continue supplying material. The South African intelligence operation was allegedly so successful that at least one cabinet minister and one deputy in the present government are alleged to have been South African informants.
This newspaper is aware of the alleged identities of the two, but will not publish their names without conclusive proof of any collusion with the apartheid authorities. Intelligence analysts are sceptical about claims from the MI operatives interdicted along with WM&G last week. “They are too junior to have run or even had knowledge of really senior ANC figures working as agents for the other side,” said one.
Modise appears to have acted with little reference to his advisors, instead trusting Meiring’s advice. Contacted by this newspaper on receipt of the interdict last Thursday, the minister’s political advisor asked somewhat sheepishly to have a copy of the court papers faxed to the ministry. The debacle, commented Institute for Defence Policy director Jakkie Cilliers, “illustrates the need for the Defence Ministry to seek policy advice from outside, from a parliamentary defence committee, from civil society, and other advisors.
The minister should not depend solely on the generals for guidance.” The interdict debacle was a prime argument for the rapid establishment of the truth commission, argued several government sources. “It will create an ordered framework for dealing with the past and reduce the risk of blackmail to the government or leading political figures,” said one.
It is understood that President Nelson Mandela received an extensive counter-intelligence briefing by the ANC’s security department prior to choosing his cabinet. Sources refused to divulge what the president was told, but said “he is a lawyer. You must be careful not to come to him with circumstantial evidence, he demands proof”.
And one cabinet insider said: “Craig Williams left a network behind inside the ANC (when his cover was blown). Some might now be in politics and and positions of influence.The way out for poor Modise is to recommend to the president the publication of the Steyn report” into the DCC’s activities. Mandela angrily told viewers during his televised pre-election debate with FW de Klerk that the then president had refused to show him the Steyn report.
Repeated requests to the President’s Office this week failed to produce clarity on whether Mandela had seen the report since coming to power. Modise has been criticised for going into overdrive in implementing Mandela’s reconciliation policies within the Defence Force at the expense of senior Umkhonto weSizwe cadres waiting to be
appointed to the Defence Force.
He is known to have built a close relationship with Meiring and other senior staff members through months of integration talks. Besides spending hours together at the negotiating table, the former adversaries visited sumarines and soldiers had braairs and beers together. Some angry MK cadres this week pointed to Modise’s failure to get a single senior ANC military officer appointed to the top echolons of the SANDF since taking office.
Among those waiting in the wings is MK chief of staff Siphiwe Nyanda, tipped to take Lieutenant General Pierre Steyn’s old job as chief of staff. Expected during Modise’s first week in office, it is understood Nyanda’s appointment has been delayed by resistance from Meiring and his colleagues, who say the MK man is not qualified.
Modise’s critics counter that he should nevertheless have shown swufficient resolve to appoint Nyanda, even if only to send him for advanced staff officer training. They believe Modise is reluctant to ruffle the general’s feathers not least because he has been seduced by the status and privileges available to the minister of defence.