The ANC’s Code of Conduct is a step in the right direction, but it does not go far enough, argues Anton
THE ANC’s Code of Conduct is strong in some aspects, weak in others.
The Code should end the old National Party system in which ruling party MPs were handed directorships by major Afrikaans companies seeking to look after their
The Code is firm on directorships, other profit-making work and consultancies. MPs have to declare such work; ministers have to give it up altogether.
One of the strengths of the Code is that it avoids the pitfall many other such codes have fallen into by allowing politicians to pursue conflicting interests through their spouses. The Code is clear that elected representatives will have to declare their family interests as well, with family defined as a spouse, a long-standing partner, or dependent children.
The Code creates a distinction between MPs and ministers, who have additional restrictions. Ministers must surrender directorships, play no role at all in profit-making institutions, and place any shares they own in “blind trusts”. This would mean that during his or her term of office, these shares would be controlled by a neutral party whose only consideration is good management of those shares; the minister may have no influence on the buying or selling of these shares, or the rights that accrue from them.
The weakness of the Code lies in the fact that the register of MP’s interests is not open to public scrutiny. It is only available to members of the ANC’s national executive committee, so there is no way the public or the media can see if a particular MP has a conflicting, undeclared interest or has received a large gift.
It also does not deal with free services, as opposed to gifts. It does not make it clear if, for example, a free room at the Palace Hotel at the Lost City would constitute a “gift” to an MP and therefore need to be
Its greatest weakness is that it applies only to ANC MPs. The Nats, for example, can continue to accept directorships or consultancies from lobby groups without restriction or monitoring.
This is because such codes are normally imposed by law through parliament, applying to all MPs and ministers in perpetuity, and not through a party, applying only to its members.
But the Code does not deal only with corruption. Hidden in it is also the mechanism by which secretary general Cyril Ramaphosa will impose his party discipline on MPs from outside parliament.
For example, it makes it clear that MPs are answerable in the final instance to the highest organs of the ANC. This gives party structures ascendancy over the parliamentary caucus.
Action against a dissident MP would be taken, in terms of the Code, by the ANC’s national working committee rather than the caucus.
The Code also stipulates that MPs have tomake themselves available for ANC work and it places no qualification on this — they must accept whatever tasks are given them by the organsation. They must also accept their allocation to constituencies.