A little-known struggle for independence continues in=20 West Africa — and South Africa has strange links to=20 it. Ann Eveleth reports
the presidential inauguration of Nelson Mandela on May=20 10 last year was heralded as the end of colonialism for=20 a beleaguered continent, but nobody seemed to notice=20 that one distinguished guest was celebrating a very=20 different anniversary that day: the 21st birthday of=20 the Front for the Liberation of Seguiet el-Hamra and=20 Rio de Oro marked the continued resistance of the=20 Sahrawi people to their status as Africa’s last colony.
Mohamed Abdelaziz, president of the Sahrawi Arab=20 Democratic Republic (SADR) and secretary general of the=20 Polisario Liberation Front, must have viewed the=20 coincidence as a coming of age for his government-in- exile. Now that apartheid was gone, world attention=20 could focus on freeing his tiny desert country from the=20 ravages of two decades of Moroccan occupation.
The emergence of a powerful new South Africa governed=20 by Polisario’s old ally — the African National=20 Congress — would shift the balance of power in the=20 United Nations toward the Sahrawis and bring an end to=20 Moroccan King Hassan’s dithering over the long-awaited=20 independence referendum.
Polisario has since turned 22, however, and neither the=20 referendum nor formal recognition by South Africa have=20 been forthcoming. Instead, there have been signs that=20 the old South African-Moroccan alliance which fuelled=20 the war of annexation is continuing.=20
Deputy President Thabo Mbeki made a mysterious visit to=20 Morocco last year — speculation was that he was fund- raising for the ANC — and Mandela this month postponed=20 a visit to the Sahara until he could arrange to visit=20 both sides of the conflict.
South Africa’s Foreign Affairs Department has come=20 under increasing criticism for this ambiguous stance –=20 which is all the more surprising given the parallels=20 between the two liberation struggles.
Forced into what could be described as the arid=20 interior bantustan of the western Saharan nation after=20 Morocco’s high-powered army annexed the 1 000km-long=20 coastal belt on the eve of Sahrawi independence from=20 colonial Spain in 1975, the Polisario fighters have=20 defended the “liberated zone” with 19th century weapons=20 and sheer pluck against a combined onslaught by up to=20 30 000 soldiers, aerial bombardments and napalm attacks=20 targeting fleeing civilians.
Housing the Sahrawi women and children in desolate=20 refugee camps in the southern Algerian military zone=20 around Tindouf, Polisario set up a government-in-exile=20 and declared the independent Sahrawi Arab Democratic=20 Republic in 1976. Its growing army was sent back into=20 the desert to repel the occupiers’ advance.
A nomadic people descended from a section of the 11th=20 century Almoravid Dynasty which abandoned northward=20 expansionism to return to the desert, the Sahrawi=20 delivered countless staggering military blows to the=20 well-endowed Moroccan army.
Still, the Polisario fighters could reach little more=20 than a stalemate with Hassan’s warriors, who were armed=20 to the teeth first by the French, and later by the=20 United States, Saudi Arabia and South Africa.=20
Hassan’s resolve strengthened as internal dissent=20 against his corrupt, autocratic regime grew. He=20 survived several assassination attempts from=20 dissidents, and strikes and demonstrations were=20
Although Amnesty International recorded thousands of=20 cases of detention without trial of Moroccan=20 dissidents, the monarch soon discovered he could divert=20 attention from the domestic pressures wrought by=20 massive income disparities through Morocco’s desert=20
Despite growing international pressure from the United=20 Nations and the International Court of Justice for a=20 referendum to determine the future of the Sahara,=20 Hassan increased his forces in the occupied territory.=20 By the time the two sides signed an uneasy ceasefire=20 agreement in 1991, he had accumulated about 130 000=20 troops in “Morocco’s 41st province”.
Morocco’s intransigence was bolstered annually by more=20 than US$200-million to $500-million in military aid=20 from Saudi Arabia, US$50-million from the US, and=20 unknown covert assistance from South Africa’s apartheid=20
Successive UN resolutions however, pointed increasingly=20 to the inevitability of a referendum, so Hassan adopted=20 a new strategy. Hoping to weight the referendum in his=20 favour, he began infiltrating thousands of Moroccan=20 settlers into the occupied territory, claiming they=20 were Saharan refugees.
Refusing to allow UN personnel or foreign journalists=20 to visit the occupied port city of El Aaiun, Hassan=20 alternately blocked and rejected the UN Mission for the=20 Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) — and=20 imprisoned genuine Sahrawis in the territory.=20
Hassan’s forces bombed a Sahrawi field hospital for=20 nomads on the eve of the ceasefire agreement, reducing=20 it to rubble. Refusing to grant passports to Sahrawis,=20 detention without trial, torture and pressure on=20 prisoners to renounce their claims to independence were=20 just some of the means employed to prevent=20
The formation of a plethora of pro-Morocco “Sahrawi”=20 political parties by Spain and Morocco failed to=20 convince UN missions to the territory. But in the face=20 of US foreign policy and divisions in the Organisation=20 of African Unity, the UN was too weak to prevent the=20 176 ceasefire violations documented during the first=20 year of the agreement.
Morocco received a windfall in international support in=20 1991 when it backed the US war against Iraq. The=20 international community remained largely silent after=20 the 1991 Amnesty International report stated that 800=20 Sahrawis had “disappeared”.
And as these kudos continued to grow in the aftermath=20 of the Gulf Oil War, Morocco grew bolder in its=20 violations of the agreement.