The gerrymandering of municipal boundaries will help=20 the ANC win control, but hinder redistribution, argues=20 Dr Mark Swilling
SOUTH Africa’s first non-racial local government=20 elections could be held up if the boundary disputes in=20 the Durban, Cape Town and Johannesburg metros are not=20
Unravelling the issues in the Johannesburg metro may=20 reveal what underlies the political disputes retarding=20 progress in our biggest metropolitan areas. On the=20 surface, it all looks rather harmless: a bunch of=20 statutory and non-statutory leaders from Johannesburg=20 spent a couple of years negotiating a framework for the=20 first metropolitan government on African soil in a=20 forum called the Metropolitan Chamber.=20
The framework provided for a strong metropolitan=20 government for greater Johannesburg, underpinned by=20 seven Metropolitan Sub Structures (MSSs) with=20 relatively minor powers. The theory was that you need a=20 metropolitan government with a single tax base to=20 ensure redistribution and the restructuring of the=20 apartheid city. The MSSs, on the other hand, were there=20 to ensure democratic accountability and local=20 governance at grassroots level.
Exercising its full statutory rights given it by the=20 Local Government Transition Act (LGTA) and the Interim=20 Constitution, the Gauteng Provincial Government adopted=20 a very different approach. To cut a long story short,=20 after comprehending the incredible complexity of the=20 ward demarcation procedures provided for in the LGTA,=20 Gauteng’s ANC leaders realised that if these procedures=20 were implemented within the framework of the seven=20 MSSs, the voting power of the large majority of black=20 voters would not be reflected in the final results.=20 Instead, they realised, white voters would have been=20 over-represented via traditionally white political=20 parties who stood to benefit from ward demarcations=20 within relatively small MSSs.
Not surprisingly, the ANC’s Gauteng leaders did what=20 politicians the world over do at every election: they=20 drew the boundaries in a way that best suits the=20 geographical distribution of their voters — this is=20 the ancient art of gerrymandering. They also have the=20 statutory power to make this happen. And so, out go the=20 negotiated boundaries, and in comes a new map with four=20 MSSs. Each of the four MSSs links former white and=20 former black areas together in a way that will, no=20 doubt, massively increase the weight of the large=20 majority of black voters who live in the southern part=20 of the Greater Johannesburg metro area.=20
Ian Davidson is wrong when he says this map popped out=20 of Dan Mofokeng’s bottom drawer. It is very well=20 thought out because it will ensure that wards are=20 demarcated in a way that massively increases the=20 representative power of the black majority in the south=20 and in so doing effectively eliminates the historically=20 white political parties from effective power in the=20 Greater Johannesburg area.
The irony is that the NP has been fighting for several=20 years now to divide Greater Johannesburg up into three=20 very strong MSSs, each with their own tax base. The=20 role of the metropolitan government was seen as a kind=20 of umbrella-level co-ordinator, rather than as a=20 genuine metropolitan government with the necessary=20 powers to promote redistribution. The NP, in other=20 words, wanted large MSSs to prevent redistribution. The=20 Gauteng ANC, however, wants four, rather than three,=20 large MSSs, but with boundaries that are designed to=20 rout the NP at the polls and in so doing dramatically=20 increase the political power of the majority party.
Unfortunately, however, what makes political sense when=20 it comes to enfranchising the black majority in a post- apartheid city does not make much sense when it comes=20 to large-scale redistribution. The great irony facing=20 the new governors of the city of gold is that there may=20 well be a trade-off between political majoritarianism=20 and redistribution. Or, if you like, the trade-off is=20 between the demands for political representation and=20 the demands for a single tax base that were both so=20 forcefully expressed by the leaders of the rent=20 boycotts of the 1980s who now hold the reigns of power=20 in local government.
Metropolitan government is based on the notion that=20 large and expanding cities must be planned as=20 integrated urban economies and that a single=20 metropolitan tax base is needed to generate resources=20 for redistribution. Redistribution, in this case, is=20 achieved primarily through cross-subsidised service=20 provision, progressive land-use planning and local=20 economic development strategies.=20
This cannot be achieved if a metropolitan area is=20 divided up between a handful of local government=20 structures, each with their own tax base, planning=20 powers, administrations and service standards. This,=20 unfortunately, is exactly what will happen if the=20 Gauteng Provincial Government has its way and four=20 rather than seven MSSs are created.
If MSSs are small, then it is possible to locate most=20 of the key local government powers (finance and=20 planning) at the metropolitan government level. If,=20 however, they are big, then the metropolitan government=20 will have to cede many of its redistributive powers to=20 the MSSs. No agreement on the allocation of powers=20 between the metropolitan and MSS level has been=20 achieved in the Greater Johannesburg area because this=20 agreement is dependent on the finalisation of the=20 boundaries. As soon as the four MSSs are finalised,=20 then there is little doubt that the future Greater=20 Johannesburg metropolitan government will be a weak=20 structure with very limited redistributive powers. For=20 one thing, it will not have access to a single tax base=20 despite the fact that this was the rallying cry of the=20 rent boycotts of the 1980s.
While the logic of increasing the electoral power of=20 the black majority via clever gerrymandering is easy to=20 understand (and politically defensible), not much is=20 said in the public debate about the consequences of=20 this for the urban economies and redistribution.=20 Redistribution within MSSs is unlikely because each MSS=20 will have to manipulate planning and rating mechanisms=20 to ensure that businesses do not relocate to=20 neighbouring MSSs. Nowhere in the world has this form=20 of competition between cities had a progressive=20 outcome. Nor will the metropolitan government have=20 control over the four MSS tax bases that will=20 eventually emerge as the metropolitan government cedes=20 its powers to the MSSs.
As the last chance for a strong, progressive,=20 redistributive, African model of metropolitan=20 government dies as the ink dries on the promulgations=20 that will set up a weak metropolitan government for=20 Greater Johannesburg, there is little doubt that many=20 in future will question the wisdom of this decision.=20 But these self-same future critics may well also be=20 challenged to say what they would have done under the=20 circumstances. I suspect that Dan Mofokeng has no other=20 choice, given the provisions of the LGTA and the=20 Interim Constitution. This raises the question as to=20 whether the final Constitution will provide a framework=20 that favours rather than undermines the vision of=20 progressive metropolitan governance. If it does, then=20 maybe there is still hope. The only question, then,=20 will be whether the political will still exists to=20 realise this vision.
Swilling is a Director at the Graduate School of Public=20 and Development Management, Wits University