THE most important documents in the collection, presented to back the allegation that the accused were involved in a conspiracy to commit murder, are:
Minutes of a meeting on November 25 1985 between Buthelezi and General Tienie Groenewald, then Chief of Military Intelligence. Buthelezi is recorded as saying he needs a paramilitary force to protect himself against UDF attacks as well as an intelligence unit to counter advances being made by the UDF/ANC alliance in Natal.
December 19 1985: Groenewald presents Buthelezi’s requirements in a letter addressed to Defence Minister Magnus Malan and recommends that the SADF train a defensive unit of 50 to 100 men and an offensive unit of 10 to 20 men on a covert basis for Buthelezi and Inkatha.
December 20 1985: Minutes of an extraordinary meeting of the State Security Council make no mention of the offensive unit but do indicate that Chris Heunis, then minister of constitutional development and planning, and Louis Le Grange, then minister of law and order, were to help Buthelezi in setting up a security force for the KwaZulu homeland. An interdepartmental head committee of the State Security Council was set up to oversee this task which, in turn, created a subcommittee to help it.
January 14 1986: The State Security Council’s sub- committee meets on this date and compiles a report for the interdepartmental head committee. It says provision must be made for Buthelezi’s personal protection, the protection of other KwaZulu officials, an offensive paramilitary unit, expansion of the KwaZulu Police Force, a ceremonial military unit, and an intelligence unit for KwaZulu. This report recommends that the impression be created these forces were established according to the law governing homeland activities — a point which is disputed by McNally.
January 16 1986: The report is presented to the interdepartmental head committee and accepted subject to a few changes. However the record of this meeting, dated January 17 1986, notes that Neil Barnard, then head of the National Intelligence Service, was strongly opposed to aspects of the plan especially the plot to establish an offensive unit for Buthelezi. “Problems were encountered with the paramilitary element,” says this report. “Dr Barnard from the National Intelligence Service made major objections to the creation of such a force and indicated that the political risks associated with it were so great that he could not support it.”
February 3 1986: The State Security Council meets and decides that Malan and Heunis should meet Buthelezi to discuss his requirements.
February 12 1986: Groenewald has preparatory discussions with Buthelezi. It is agreed in this meeting that the SADF provide the chief minister with an offensive paramilitary force (described as an element capable of resisting attacks by ANC and UDF members) and an intelligence capability. It was provisionally agreed that Buthelezi would personally select 200 candidates for the force.
February 17 1986: Groenewald meets Malan in Cape Town and a progress report on the conspiracy is handed to the latter. Malan orders the establishment of a task group to prepare detailed plans for the paramilitary aid to Inkatha. This task group is made up of General Kat Liebenberg, Groenewald and a number of other military officers. The task group completes a document — referred to as the Liebenberg Report — which contains most of the details about the alleged conspiracy.
April 7 1986: Malan sends a letter to Chris Heunis summarising the Liebenberg Report. However Malan omits details about the offensive unit and the letter explains that certain clandestine plans have been left out because of their highly sensitive nature — probably also because the State Security Council operated on a need- to-know basis.
April 8 1986: Malan requests Chief of Staff Intelligence Admiral Andries Putter to sell the covert programme in its entirety to Buthelezi. At about this time the project is code-named Operation Marion, while the documents state repeatedly that Buthelezi should never be perceived as a “marionette” because of his links to the SADF.
April 16 1986: Putter informs Geldenhuys by letter that the SADF was, by verbal authority, proceeding urgently with the recruitment of Inkatha paramilitary trainees and the creation of a base for them in the Caprivi Strip. This letter suggets that MZ Khumalo be the liaison officer between the SADF and Inkatha. This letter also states Buthelezi had given Khumalo instructions about the paramilitary force and notes that Buthelezi was aware of the offensive unit and wanted it to be trained and deployed with the rest of the force.
October 16 1986: Colonel Cor van Niekerk and Brigadier John More visit Buthelezi in Ulundi and report that the first 200 graduates had been trained and were back in KwaZulu ready to be deployed and that money had been deposited into the Inkatha account via Armscor channels to pay for their salaries.
l The funding of the entire operation came from a secret military intelligence fund called Comfort. The Liebenberg Report notes that the Department of Military Intelligence had R3.5-million available for the project. Putter’s letter of April 16 1986 to Geldenhuys suggests R2 050 000 be paid through Armscor into an Inkatha account and made to appear as if it came from an overseas donor. This transfer was duly carried out and confirmed in a letter from More to Colonel Van Tonder dated October 26 1986.
Armscor’s public relations head Abba Omar this week declined to comment on evidence that the armaments corporation was used to launder clandestine military funds. Omar claimed his office was unable to provide these details because the case is sub judice.