Gregory Mills
French President Jacques Chirac’s visit to South Africa this week occurs at a moment of transformation in France’s relationship with Africa.
It also comes at a particularly bad time for Africa, with a number of states moving in status from “transition” to “upheaval”.
Just four years ago, Paris’s compulsion to remain engaged with Francophone Africa was explained as the single attribute that set France apart from other powers. A member of the Big Five in the United Nations Security Council and a nuclear power, it had one “edge” over its rivals: when it said “yes”, more than 20 African countries also said “yes”.
This attitude was reflected in the pseudo- colonialism that followed the granting of independence in 1960 to the original 12 French African colonies, along with the undiminished presence and influence of French administrators, technicians, businesses and even the military.
This cosy relationship started to shift with the 1990 announcement by president Franois Mitterand that future French aid would be conditional upon democratic reforms.
This move to disengagement was hastened by the devaluation of the Francophone West African regional currency, the CFA franc, in 1994, which dismayed those Africans whose consumer imports were no longer heavily subsidised.
Upon his election in 1995, Chirac initially attempted to reinforce France’s Africanist stance, reflecting his Gaullist roots. However, Paris soon had to adapt to new continental realities.
As the French ambassador to South Africa, Tristan d’Albis, has pointed out, France’s policy today is based on the following principles: fewer unilateral actions, greater co-ordination, modern bilateral co- operation activities and new interests in East and Southern Africa.
South Africa has become France’s largest market in sub-Saharan Africa, with two-way trade worth R6,6-billion in 1997, up 20% on the previous year.
France is South Africa’s 16th-largest export market (worth R1,9-billion in 1997), and seventh-largest import provider (R4,7- billion). It is the sixth-largest foreign investor in South Africa, totalling more than R6-billion.
This change partly reflects France’s realistic post-colonial situation, where it has largely abandoned unrealistic visions of great power status.
But Paris’s desire for a new understanding with Africa also illustrates the nature of the global economy.
In the past, influence was secured through close military and economic ties, and a very personal understanding between leaders. While elements of this remain, today the chief conduit for influence is business, particularly the oil industry.
Rich oil finds off the west coast of Africa and the involvement of French business have demanded fresh styles of diplomacy in new areas of the continent.
Protection of these interests largely explained the absence of overt French military support for Mobutu Sese Seko in the former Zaire when his rule was threatened by Laurent Kabila at the start of 1997. Support for Kabila from Angola, where French oil company Elf Aquitaine has vital installations, hamstrung the French government’s response.
This shift, along with more active United States diplomatic and trade efforts in Africa, has been interpreted in some quarters as signalling a retreat (and defeat) for France’s interests on the continent.
While French officials are keen to downplay the notion of an Anglophone-Francophone divide in Africa, there is little doubt that this exists and is exacerbated by competition over oil.
But this alteration in the Elysee’s African policy has come at a time of upheaval all over the continent, with a number of states moving from “transition” to “upheaval”. Perhaps of most concern, the situation in the Great Lakes is far from settled.
Kabila’s overthrow of Mobutu was supposedly the signal event in an “African renaissance”.
His poor performance since not only poses questions about the future of his Democratic Republic of Congo, but asks them about the wisdom and motives of the men who installed him – Paul Kagame of Rwanda and Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni. Kabila, one observer has noted, is little more than Mobutu without the leopard hat.
Aside from rumours of his excessive drinking, Kabila apparently doubts the personal loyalty of his subordinates in Kinshasa, feeling much safer in his home province of Katanga and spending half the week in Lubumbashi. It is felt that if he were to base himself there permanently, the prospect of a Katangan secession would increase sharply.
Moreover, there is now evidence of various Great Lakes opposition groupings working closely to co-ordinate a joint strategy. This group has reportedly established arms smuggling and training networks throughout the region.
The use of South African, Zambian and Tanzanian territory is key in the co- ordination of their activities.
Some would argue the present troubles are partly the result of the power vacuum created by the French pullout, stressing the lack of institutional prerequisites necessary for Francophone African states to go it alone.
While this argument has its merits, it ignores the fact that the transition from oligarchies to democratic and free-market governance necessitates the depersonalisation of leadership and the addressing of larger state and national concerns. This is not encouraged by an environment where institutions – let alone credible ones – scarcely exist.
Too often there remains a reliance on individuals in leadership, which runs the risk of personalising interests, both sovereign and business. With egos to the fore, too often differences escalate to be settled by military rather than diplomatic means. France, like the US and others, still relies on Africa’s big men rather than its institutions to deliver its interests.
South Africa clearly cannot ignore France when it comes to co-ordinating policies aimed at improving African governance, management and accountability. With about 200 French companies and banks along with an estimated 5 000 troops in Africa, Paris still has influence in many of its former colonies.
But if Chirac wants to lead a new, genuine start to a partnership with Africa, his government will have to be prepared to lend assistance to institutions, and give up its reliance on personalities as the principal means of securing its interests.
France will also have to be prepared to take up Africa’s concerns per se. The cause of South Africa’s interests in the European Union Free Trade Agreement negotiations could be a litmus test of its new relationship with Southern Africa. South Africa should stress this to Chirac.
Dr Gregory Mills is the National Director of the South African Institute of International Affairs