Mercedes Sayagues
This is Joao de Mattos’s hour of glory. His views are vindicated. In 1994, De Mattos, chief of staff of the Angolan army, pushed for the definitive battle with Unita. Buoyed by victories in N’dalatando, Kuito, Cafunfo, Huambo and Uige, De Mattos wanted to conquer Negage and Andulo, Unita’s headquarters. In disarray, its leaders in flight, Unita would have taken a final blow.
But negotiations prevailed. Weary after walking two weeks in the bush, Unita’s Eugenio Manuvakola and Jorge Valentim arrived in Lusaka before De Mattos got to Negage. On November 20, the Lusaka Peace Agreement was signed.
In September 1995, at a donor’s meeting in Brussels, Jonas Savimbi said: “I’m saying this in French so that there will be no misunderstanding: Jonas Savimbi will not go back to war.”
The United Nations and its 7 000 peacekeepers presided over a mock demobilisation, certified in April 1998 as full and complete. Some joke. Unita emerged better equipped than ever, with 30 000 soldiers and a leader in fighting spirit.
De Mattos was proved right.
Last December, President Jos Eduardo dos Santos got rid of the moderates in the MPLA, sacked the defence minister and vested more powers in himself. He gave De Mattos the green light “to destroy for once and forever Unita’s war machinery”.
That is easier said than done. True, government troops repelled the assault on Kuito in early January and retook M’banza Congo in February. Troops are inching their way along the mined roads and destroyed bridges of Bie province towards Andulo.
On Valentine’s Day, Kuito’s airport was very busy. Military planes unloaded men and matriel until dusk. Andulo is well defended, although Savimbi is not there.
The fall of Andulo is not the final blow to Unita’s military capacity. They can retreat to the Lundas and wage war from there. As long as there is oil and diamonds, both sides can go on.
Addressing his troops in M’banza Congo two weeks ago, De Mattos was honest: “This is only the first battle of many.” But he appeared relaxed, confident and smiling, predicting victory in a TV interview that same day. He denied the presence of foreign troops with either warring side. Rwandan Hutus fought with Unita but are gone, he said.
In1993/94, Unita conquered more than half of Angola and set up its own administration with its capital in Huambo.This time, Unita prefers surprise attacks and flash occupations of municipios and cities, followed by strategic retreats.
This keeps the army on its toes, disrupts economic life and isolates provincial capitals. Today, as in 1993, provincial capitals are reachable only by air. Trade, rebuilding, de-mining and humanitarian aid are severely curtailed, while Unita avoids the hassle of managing territory and people.
The government military campaign is matched by a media blitz depicting Savimbi as a terrorist and war criminal. Angolan TV broadcasts crude adverts: Savimbi reaching for his holster. “Savimbi is a terrorist; he will be expelled from Angolan life.” It reminds one of the “Wanted” posters the United States put up for warlord Aideed in Somalia.
What can the demonisation of Savimbi achieve? Savimbi has been called a terrorist since colonial times – it doesn’t bother him.
Even with a military defeat, the questions that Unita raises will not fade away. Can the MPLA continue with its politics of exclusion and its practices of corruption?
The splinter group Unita Renovada reveals too much of the government’s hand and money behind it to have any credibility.
But there is a third faction within Unita, one that does not want war but does not want to be an MPLA puppet either. It is biding its time, and its time will come.