process
Gregory Mthembu-Salter The surprise summit in Maputo on October 16 of all the heads of state whose countries are at war in the Democratic Republic of Congo, barring Angolan President Eduardo dos Santos, marked the start of South Africa’s best opportunity yet to end the two-year conflict.
Presidential advisers hope a positive outcome will vindicate President Thabo Mbeki’s concentration on regional diplomacy, which is often criticised in South Africa as a distraction from more pressing domestic affairs. But South Africa’s hand in Congo, though well played thus far by Mbeki, is limited. Important political and economic factors in this war are outside South Africa’s control, and it will take good fortune as well as good judgement before Mbeki can reap any real reward from his peace efforts. Mbeki chaired the one-day summit in Maputo, with the assistance of Mozambican President Joachim Chissano, at short notice, following a request from Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe. Mbeki’s representative afterwards stressed that the summit did not undermine Zambian President Frederick Chiluba, who has overall charge of the peace process. However, the summit clearly heralds Mbeki’s most direct attempt yet to end a war which has given the region its worst international reputation in years. Mbeki used the Maputo summit to press South Africa’s long-standing position that the only way out of the conflict is for everyone to stick to and be accountable for agreements signed in Lusaka last year, when a comprehensive peace deal was reached, and during later follow-up meetings. The commitment made by the warring parties at a summit in Kampala in March this year to pull their troops back 15km from the front line was specifically revisited, with those present in Maputo solemnly pledging to do so this time. Mbeki reckons this can be done very quickly if the parties are serious about it, and has called a summit for two weeks’ time to review progress on the matter.
Meanwhile, the Congolese rebel Rassemblement Congolais pour la dSmocratie, which was not invited to Maputo, claims Congolese President Laurent DesirS Kabila’s forces attacked “on all fronts” during the summit, though this has been denied by the Congolese government. The Rwandan government alleged to the Mail & Guardian that Congolese troops have been attacking Moba, on the southern shores of Lake Tanganyika, since October 16, making a mockery of Kabila’s Maputo commitments.
Alleged ceasefire violations like these, and the disengagement of opposing forces, are supposed to be monitored by the United Nations observer force (Monuc), but it has too few observers to do the job properly. The UN has provisionally agreed to 500 observers, and 5 000 troops to protect them, but will not deploy the bulk of the force until the belligerents stop fighting. The latest deadline set by the UN Security Council for them to do so, or risk losing Monuc, is mid-December. The attitude of the United States in the council will be of critical importance to the final deployment decision, so US presidential elections in November add a new unknown to the diplomatic calculations.
The council’s refusal to deploy Monuc thus far is taken by the Zimbabwean government as evidence of a US conspiracy to keep the war going. A Zimbabwean government representative said the US is the “rich uncle” of Uganda and Rwanda, and should be directly brought into the peace process as an interested party. South Africa’s role in ending the war has been fettered until now by the perception among the backers of Kabila – Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia – that it is insufficiently neutral, because of South Africa’s friendly relations with Uganda and Rwanda, the backers of anti-Kabila rebels. Kabila has also objected to Congolese rebel leaders meeting Mbeki in South Africa, and has forbidden South African participation in Monuc.
South Africa insists on its neutrality in the Congolese conflict, but Mbeki’s concern over regional perceptions to the contrary had until Maputo made him far less assertive in the peace process then many commentators had wanted him to be. A major change in Maputo was that Mbeki, who already commands considerable influence over the Rwandan and Ugandan governments, acquired new leverage over Zimbabwe, since Mugabe’s invitation to Mbeki was a tacit admission that he needs Mbeki’s help to extract Zimbabwe from a military commitment it cannot afford, and which is damaging Mugabe politically. Beyond the Maputo summit, Mbeki clearly hopes that this leverage over Zimbabwe will translate into influence on Kabila, whose maddeningly obtuse behaviour has been a major factor stalling the peace process. Mbeki’s officials readily concede the difficulties involved in dealing with Kabila, but suggest that his scope for simply disregarding summit pledges once back in Kinshasa has at least been diminished. Certainly the Zimbabwean government’s views matter to Kabila, since were its troops to leave Congo, Kabila would fall from power. Zimbabwean pressure is thought to have been behind Kabila’s sudden change of stance on Monuc last month, when he gave it permission, after months of opposition, to deploy in government-held territory.
However, in Equateur province, around Mbandaka, north of Kinshasa, where government forces assisted by Zimbabweans are battling the Mouvement pour la libSration du Congo (MLC) and Ugandan troops, orders from Kabila still restrict the movements of Monuc observers. Kabila’s government has not budged either, despite pressure from Zimbabwe, over its refusal to accept Sir Ketumile Masire, the former Botswanan president, as mediator in Congo’s political negotiations. This refusal, which has completely blocked the political process, was not on the agenda of the Maputo summit, which concentrated only on the military situation. Mugabe’s influence over Kabila is compromised by the fact that just as Kabila needs him, so he increasingly needs Kabila, because if Kabila were to fall, all the money Zimbabwe has expended on this war would go to waste, with serious implications for Mugabe back home. In military terms, Kabila’s survival depends on Mbandaka remaining in government hands, since there is no major settlement between the town and Kinshasa and thus nowhere to resist the continued advance of the MLC. So seriously do Kabila’s allies take the threat to Mbandaka that after their summit in Windhoek on October 8 they promised a full- scale assault if necessary to prevent it falling.
This promise was directed specifically at Uganda, whose troops sustain the MLC. Mbeki will be counting on Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni to keep his troops away from Mbandaka if his plan is to work, but the area is characterised by thick jungle and endless river tributaries and is impossible to monitor properly. However, Museveni is concerned to demonstrate his commitment to the Lusaka accord, in part out of alarm at negative donor perceptions generated by Uganda’s involvement in the Congo war. This may also be the motivation for his recent attempts to patch up Uganda’s quarrel with Rwanda, which led to hundreds dying when their troops clashed in Kisangani last June. Mbeki flew to Rwanda for a two-day state visit on Wednesday, with a strong government and business delegation in tow. Although the trip was arranged some way in advance, and primarily concerns bilateral relations, it is also being used to sustain the momentum of Mbeki’s latest peace initiative. While those close to Mbeki express optimism at the initiative’s prospects, the belligerents in Congo, and other observers, are more sceptical. But if, when the regional heads of state meet again in two weeks, their troops really have withdrawn from their front lines, the optimists will have been justified.