President Thabo Mbeki is arguably the most visionary African leader since former Ghana president Kwame Nkrumah, but like Nkrumah his far-sightedness for continental renewal depends on his domestic constituency.
In all of Africa’s democracies, support for idealistic continental initiatives has to be matched by real delivery to the masses within the time frames set by popular elections.
As an elite-driven plan, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (Nepad) would appear to be paying off. Peace initiatives in Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan have led to progress in line with Nepad’s objectives of stability, security and prosperity.
The signing of peace agreements in July between Rwanda and Kinshasa, and between arch-opponents Khartoum and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) are, indeed, an expression of partnership.
The Congo deal was the result of the efforts of a South African team headed by Deputy President Jacob Zuma, but also reflected the role of others, including Clare Short, Secretary of International Development in the United Kingdom, on which Kigali is heavily dependent for financial support.
The Sudanese peace talk were chaired by President Daniel arap Moi of Kenya, but their success has depended on the backing of Washington and, importantly, the security guarantees being provided both for and by Uganda. But peace is a process, not an agreement.
Longer-term stability depends on a number of factors, including a willingness for continued dialogue and compromise long after the negotiators have departed. This requires, at the most basic level, a stake in peace, both internally and regionally, which is enabled by an inclusive political process.
In the case of the Congo, the involvement of the Rwandan-backed Rally for Congolese Democracy in a transitional government of national unity will depend on the provision of fundamental security guarantees to Rwanda. Understandably, its polity is still determined principally by the genocide of eight years ago.
In Sudan, peace will hinge on the acceptance of the outcome of the process of self-determination for the south, however it turns out, and the building of trust between Khartoum and the SPLA, a relationship scarred by 30 years of war.
But peace is only one component of Nepad and African recovery. The other pillar is the need for macroeconomic reform and management while maintaining political stability. The events of the past month raise more questions in this regard than they provide answers.
First, the showmanship of Libya’s Moammar Gadaffi at the Africa Union (AU) summit in Durban served to obscure the reformist character of the AU. More importantly, the inclusion of Libya and Kenya on an expanded Nepad implementation committee, which now has 20 members, can hardly be regarded as an advert for positive change.
If nothing else, Gadaffi’s antics have illustrated — and hopefully convinced Africa’s reformers of — the importance of promoting excellence and an external view of African state heterogeneity and difference, rather than a superficial solidarity that could drag all down to the lowest common member-state denominator.
Second, the contents of the proposed South African mining charter illustrated a core tension within Nepad and African states: populist support for macroeconomic reform. The document was probably leaked to coincide with the South African Communist Party’s yearly conference and thus cement the African National Congress’s populist credentials. While it has — temporarily, one hopes — driven down the value of mining stocks and thus undermined the logic of economic stability, it has paradoxically boosted socio-political stability and party support, through offering black empowerment and enrichment, at least in the short term.
Herein lies Nepad’s greatest challenge.
Peace agreements are amenable to elite negotiation and resolution, but economic and social reform
affect and thus require the support of the broader electorate. The real problem with such reforms is that they are often at least temporarily dislocative, and they affect the poor and disempowered far more than political elites.
The elites remain largely insulated from the effects of structural adjustment, privatisation, right-sizing as well as economic and fiscal discipline. Indeed, such policies are deeply unpopular and have the potential to threaten the longevity of reformist governments in Africa.
Greg Mills and Tim Hughes are with the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA)