As conflict approaches, doubts and confusion grow. No civilised nation goes to war lightly. This can only be justified if the hazards of inaction vastly outweigh the hazards of the battlefield. In the case of Saddam Hussein, this is clearly the case.
Comparisons with Hitler should be avoided. Yet there are similarities between him and Saddam. Hitler had, as Saddam has, one solitary interest in his country. He regarded it as an instrument for aggrandisement, and human misery was justified in pursuit of that goal. By April 1945 Hitler had lost interest in the German people’s welfare. As they had failed him and history, their continued existence was of no further value. There is no evidence that Saddam feels any more benevolent towards his fellow Iraqis.
Almost as soon as he waded through blood to power, he attacked Iran. At that stage there was little censure from the West. It was just after the United States embassy hostage affair, and anything that curbed the ayatollahs seemed excusable.
Almost as soon as he had failed to defeat Iran, Saddam invaded Kuwait. Had he succeeded, he would have been master of much of the Gulf’s oil supplies, with his boot on the windpipe of the world economy. But he was driven out, and had to console himself with butchering his own people: trying to oppress the Kurds and destroy the Marsh Arabs’ ancient way of life.
Throughout this, he was not only trying to enhance his power by conventional weapons. He has also been desperate to acquire weapons of mass destruction. He already has a bio- logical arsenal. He does not yet possess a sophisticated long-range delivery system, but he is trying to develop rocketry. He has also made attempts to bribe Russian nuclear scientists.
But if he were left to his own devices, in command of Iraq’s oil wealth and manufacturing sector, it would be a matter of time before he acquired terrible weapons and a means of delivering them. The dangers of such a man possessing such weaponry are so great that containment is not enough. A pre-emptive war is justified, and Article 54 of the United Nations Charter would provide cover for such a venture.
There are risks. Though it seems unlikely that Iraqis will fight hard to save Saddam, there will have to be a bombing campaign. Saddam has gone to considerable trouble to station military hardware in civilian areas. Even with smart weapons there will be collateral damage. But Iraqis will be so much better off without Saddam that this is acceptable.
There are graver risks, however. Once he knows that he is finished Saddam will try anything. We will require vigilance and luck to frustrate attacks on the West. There are also legitimate fears as to the long-term stability of the region. Outside Iraq, Iran and Kuwait, Saddam is a hero to the Muslim masses. Action against him coupled with inaction in the Holy Land will cause outrage. We will just have to hope that this is containable.
But the US response to the problems of the region is more creative than most non-US commentators acknow-ledge. Iraq could become a rich country with a highly educated population. It would then be a force for progress in a region deficient in progress.
With some notable exceptions — Morocco, Jordan, Oman and other smaller Gulf states — the quality of government in the Arab world is low. There is widespread oppression and misuse of resources. The choice would appear to lie between corrupt, authoritarian regimes that might support the West, and militant theocracies that give succour to terrorists.
Partly because of their optimism about human affairs, the Americans refuse to accept that this is the only choice. They do not see why ”Arab government” should continue to mean a combination of joke and atrocity. They believe that regime change in Iraq will stimulate the process of improvement. This policy may be bold, even reckless. But it is not doomed to failure. Nor is it hostile to the interests of the Arab street.
On visits to Washington since September 11, I have been struck by the intellectual ferment among those concerned with foreign affairs. The attack on the US mainland has led the Bush administration to re-examine every aspect of US foreign policy. The Americans have realised that in a world in which terrorists will find it increasingly easy to acquire weapons of mass destruction it is impossible to tolerate rogue states, or failed states.
But the corollary of this is the belief that all states must be encouraged to improve their people’s lot. After the overthrow of Saddam, the US will have to help with Iraqi nation-building. It hopes that this will encourage an outbreak of nation-building in the region, not excluding a Palestinian state. The Americans are not only going to war to help themselves.
Tony Blair understands all this. Thus far, however, he has kept his conclusions to himself. That is an error. For there is a good case to make. Blair has satisfied himself that the Americans are acting in good faith, for compelling reasons, and that Britain will be right to give them every assistance.
But he has sources of information that are naturally denied to the public. He should now produce some of the evidence that can be publicised, and use his powers of persuasion to make his case. It is an irresistible case.
Bruce Anderson is editor-at-large of the London-based Spectator magazine — Â