As leaders of the G8 meet in Evian, France, African recovery and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (Nepad) will be prominently on the agenda for the second year in a row.
Many Africans are now asking whether this unprecedented elevation of African issues has truly delivered progress for the world’s poorest continent or whether the G8 has delivered an elaborate brush-off.
The truth is somewhere between the extremes. Critics of the developed world argue that it has only responded with paltry amounts of new aid and rhetoric that may never translate into action. This line of reasoning tends to assume that unless all nations follow the United Nations suggestion of 0,7% of gross domestic product going to aid then Nepad is a failure.
While Africa has not won every battle, there have been quite a number of positive developments in the past year. The UN Development Programme, Canada and Japan have pledged to directly fund the Nepad secretariat. Canada has removed all trade restrictions for least-developed countries. The United States has extended its Africa Growth and Opportunity Act and passed a $15-billion Bill to fight Aids in Africa. The European Union, the US and Canada, among others, have pledged large percentage increases in aid to Africa. And the G8 last year approved an additional $1-billion in debt relief.
One important Nepad goal is to change the nature of the relationship between African states and aid donors to get donors to support an African agenda instead of dictating an agenda conceived in Europe or elsewhere. Success in this is hard to measure because Africa and developed states interact in thousands of different settings.
However, it seems that some things have changed. There is anecdotal evidence that donors are listening to recipients’ plans. The UN has pledged to make Nepad the guiding framework for all of its member agencies working in Africa. Precisely how this will change the way the UN does business is unclear because Africa has yet to put forward detailed plans for Nepad.
One area of valid African complaint is that donors frequently pledge support but fail to actually deliver. In response to such complaints, Canada announced that it would publish this week a report card on how it has fulfilled its Nepad pledges.
A more specific assessment of Nepad is difficult because some of the key problems it seeks to change are quite long-term in nature, and the way Nepad has been defined makes it difficult to say whether success or failure belongs to Nepad or elsewhere. I see three key issues ahead for Nepad.
Trade
Nepad seeks a better deal from the world. While it must be credited with significantly elevating attention to unfair trade practices, ultimate victory will require years of relentless pressure. The signs are that the next ministerial meeting of the World Trade Organisation is headed for stalemate over agriculture. The big issue is developed world subsidies. The EU is the biggest culprit with four times the subsidies of the US. The transatlantic rift over the Iraq war has spilled into the trade arena with threats of trade retaliation flying furiously. Europe wants to stall on agriculture and use it as a bargaining chip to win advantages in other areas.
France, the chief defender of EU farm subsidies, announced support for removal of “trade-distorting” subsidies and export incentives affecting Africa. Australia, the most ardent supporter of scrapping all farm subsidies, complains that the French proposals are simply smoke and mirrors because it is not possible for the EU to stop subsidising commodities sold into Africa but keep subsidies for the same goods to be sold elsewhere.
Regardless of the technicalities, France has acknowledged the fundamental moral case brought by least-developed nations that they are effectively blocked from competing in the one area where Africa is most competitive.
Translating this into final victory will require that Africa do three things. First, it has been very slow in preparing for the Doha round of trade talks and still does not have a well-organised, adequately funded team to negotiate on trade matters. The longer Africa waits to join the fray, the more likely it will be forced to accept compromises drafted between the US and the EU. Second, Africa must take the fight out of the trade negotiating rooms — where better financed and staffed competitors have the advantage — and on to the streets and editorial pages of the developed world. The end of apartheid and the Vietnam War came because of similar public pressures.
Third, Africa must focus on what exactly promotes trade. Many African states have never fully utilised the duty-free quotas that they have been granted by the EU in the Lome process, while trade under Lome has declined from 6,7% of the EU market in 1976 to 3% in 1998. Part of the problem is tariff structures designed to allow in raw materials but block manufactured goods. But part of the problem lies in dysfunctional African infrastructure, high costs and governments that prey on, rather than assist, business.
Peace
The Nepad process has made significant moves to end African conflicts. Plans for an African Peace and Security Council have been formed and discussions are under way to create an African peacekeeping force able to respond rapidly when the developed world resists intervention. African efforts to broker peace in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, Somalia, Côte d’Ivoire, Burundi and Zimbabwe show a growing determination to act.
However, Africa has made critical mistakes in its diplomacy. For example, Côte d’Ivoire embarked on an intentional campaign of xenophobia and disenfranchisement of northerners and immigrants. Africa’s response was to send in Togo strongman Gnassingbé Eyadéma, the longest-serving autocrat in Africa, to convince the Côte d’Ivoire government to be more democratic.
A key issue is how to fund interventions. Both African peacekeeping deployments and even simple mediation efforts are chronically delayed because of lack of funds. A proposal has been put forward to create a standing peacekeeping fund that can be drawn from quickly. It is a good idea and deserves a hard-sell at the G8 summit. While the developed world may suffer donor fatigue, there is growing realisation post-September 11 that Africa cannot be allowed to slide into dysfunction and conflict.
Defining Nepad
Aside from peace and trade, to which direct solutions can be found, Nepad faces significant problems because of the way it has been defined — or rather, not defined. It is described as a programme, which implies there are people doing things and spending money. However, the Nepad secretariat is quick to assert that it is not an implementation agency. It has no projects of its own, beyond conferences, and is not creating any kind of central financing system. The secretariat says it is involved in coordination and liaison, while other agencies will do the actual work. The problem is that the cure for what ails Africa is not more meetings and coordination. Critically, Nepad has not defined what African members commit to when they say they embrace Nepad.
The vast majority of African problems inherently must be solved at national level and yet there is virtually no action happening at the national level. Only three African parliaments have discussed Nepad. As a result, Nepad can lay claim to laying some important foundations for African reform, but it cannot, by virtue of its diffuse organisation, truly claim to achieve anything tangible. Other bodies, funders and nations must do all the doing.
Unfortunately, too many African states are sitting on the sidelines thinking that some cadre of Nepad engineers and bankers will soon arrive and begin fixing things. Compounding this problem is the poor communication and secrecy that are official policy at the secretariat. Only ancient documents are available on the Nepad website and the draft sectoral plans will not be released to the public until final, according to secretariat staff. Effectively this makes it impossible for business or academics to assess where Nepad is going or to offer meaningful assistance. This must change both at the secretariat level and at the national level. If it does not, civil society will remain frozen out.
The most fundamental problem with African political systems is that they are inadequately attentive to the demands of citizens and politicians are too consumed with themselves. If politicians are unwilling to listen to citizens, a peer review every three years by other African states is hardly going to provide the needed motivation. Hence the make-or-break issue for Nepad is how effectively it enlists civil society.
Without broad civil society backing for the cause of reform, which is Nepad’s underlying mission, politicians will see neither incentive nor pressure to change the way they do business and Africa will not advance.
Ross Herbert is Africa Research Fellow at the South African Institute of International Affairs and directs its Nepad and governance programme