The already tense Burundi peace process acquired pressure-cooker status last week when a summit was called to sign final documents before vital technical talks had even started.
The government of Burundi and the country’s largest rebel group picked up where they left off on October 8 with what were characterised as technical talks.
These talks were designed to put the nuts on bolts on that date’s Pretoria Protocol that recommitted the largest rebel group, the Forces for the Defence of Democracy (FDD) led by Pierre Nkurunziza, to the ceasefire they signed last December.
Nkurunziza and President Domitien Ndayizeye were, therefore, left with a day to agree in effect on the details of sharing power.
According to the protocol, this will give the rebels 40% of the top jobs in the army, four government ministries and just less than 20% of the seats in the national Parliament.
They also had to decide whether to declare a general amnesty for acts covering the decade of civil war, which has cost more than 300 000 lives, or set this aside for the time being by granting temporary immunity to the combatants.
Finally they had to map out the FDD’s transformation from rebel group to political party. The FDD is particularly concerned with getting a definition of ”fighter” because this would affect the status of many of their cadres during and after the demobilisation and reintegration process.
The talks were due to start last Monday but only got under way on the Thursday. Burundi’s ambassador to South Africa, Patricia Rwimo, said President Ndayizeye had problems finding a flight to South Africa.
In the meantime Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni called the summit, designed to lock the FDD into the Arusha peace process that is already two-thirds through its course without having achieved the peace it was designed to achieve.
It was not immediately clear whether this was a ploy by the Ugandan leader to inject a sense of urgency into the Pretoria negotiations or a demonstration of confidence that the peace process was running smoothly.
Faced with the time constraint, and the load facing the negotiators, the summit was postponed. The real pressure to deliver on that peace now falls on Nkurunziza.
His FDD fighters have to be cantoned, disarmed and eventually reintegrated into either the Burundi armed forces into civilian life. This is an extremely complex process and the FDD has been shown to have disparate elements unwilling to go along with the agreements signed by Nkurunziza.
In addition to raids on the Burundi army and some civilian targets — subsequent to the Pretoria Protocol being signed — FDD elements have been hitting at the older, but smaller, Hutu rebel group, the National Liberation Front of Agaton Rwasa.
Rwasa has rejected any involvement in the peace process, having been excluded from the original negotiations in Arusha.
In the past the FDD has armed and supplied the FNL, which has limited its operation to the capital Bujumbura and its outskirts.
It suited Nkurunziza to have Rwasa’s men keep the army busy around the capital while the FDD was active elsewhere.
But with his reputation as the major Hutu rebel leader capable of delivering peace in the balance, Nkurunziza has had to enter a liaison of convenience with Rwasa and even attempt to bring him to heel. He has also had to claim FNL territory he believes belongs in FDD hands. If he is unable to deliver peace, Nkurunziza is at least expected to get his backers in Tanzania to agree not to support the FNL.
The behaviour of the regional players, Tanzania and Uganda, who have backed the rebels, is vital to the success of the process.
Rwasa bridles at claims — particularly from South Africa — that his movement will wither away.
He strongly resents the fact that the latest protocol makes no provision for himself and his men — necessitating new negotiations if and when he comes into the process.
Jan van Eck, a conflict analyst with the Institute for Security Studies who spends half his time in Burundi, says he has never seen the place so tense and chaotic. Van Eck has identified two distinct schools that have emerged: the Arusha group, comprising the government and other signatories to the agreement — including the FDD now — and the anti-Arusha group.
At present the FNL, far from fading away, is becoming something of a magnet for the anti-Arusha group. Significantly this includes a chunk of the minority Tutsis, who are prepared to put aside ethnic differences for the time being to bring down the Arusha process.
Arusha remains the only game in town for the international community, which will doubtless continue to press the FNL to get aboard — and the other signatories to do everything to accommodate it. Yet it remains precarious.
Burundian peace efforts have failed too many times for the population to believe they will succeed.
While rebels put ethnic problems aside for now, this is plainly not necessarily the case with the broader population.
Two years into the Arusha process, Hutu politicians, who returned to Burundi from exile, still require 24-hour protection by South Africa. This must say something about the trust and sense of reconciliation in that country.