As the treason trial of Morgan Tsvangirai, leader of Zimbabwe’s opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), heads towards its conclusion, its effect on talks between the MDC and the ruling Zanu-PF is likely to loom large.
Tsvangirai is charged with plotting to assassinate President Robert Mugabe. The charges relate to a meeting in Montreal that was secretly videotaped by shadowy Canadian publicist Ari ben-Menashe, who had been contracted by the Zimbabwe government.
The trial, which began in February last year, resumed this week. The case is likely to have a major effect on the talks that are widely expected to restart soon, partly as a result of South African President Thabo Mbeki’s prodding. But much will depend on how things pan out over the next few weeks.
If Mugabe’s government succeeds in its attempt to nail Tsvangirai, the MDC will probably be significantly weakened because it risks being thrown into turmoil just ahead of next year’s parliamentary poll. This will leave Zanu-PF more secure in a campaign that has already seen the harnessing of the machinery of state to its powerful bandwagon.
Consequently, power relations between the two parties would
shift and so, effectively, would the nature and outcome of any negotiated settlement.
The ruling party has already expressed its preference for MDC secretary general Welshman Ncube as a negotiating partner. If Tsvangirai’s treason trial proves a trump card for Zanu-PF, the MDC could use its litigation against Mugabe for alleged electoral-rigging as a bargaining chip. Zanu-PF is distinctly unhappy at the prospect of that particular can of worms being opened in public.
As a result, Mugabe can accept a deal that frees Tsvangirai while at the same time conferring legitimacy on his own buffeted stewardship. Mugabe’s ego is badly battered because of the dispute over his 2002 re-election. These two cases place the proposed talks in jeopardy, yet at the same time they offer the opportunity for dialogue.
The two parties are both hard-pressed for a solution to the political and economic crisis besetting the country. Inflation stands at 600% and unemployment at 70%. But neither is capable of finding a viable solution alone.
There is also to some extent a political balance of power. Zanu-PF commands the instruments of coercion while MDC holds sway on the moral high ground. Mugabe may be secure in his rural fiefdom, but Zimbabwe’s teeming cities are solidly MDC.
Informal talks between Justice Minister Patrick Chinamasa and Ncube are thought to have established some common ground in terms of constitutional reform. But agreement on the modalities for free and fair elections is still way off. The MDC wants an independent electoral commission — as distinct from a body answerable to Mugabe — and access to the public media. It wants the military removed from its role in polling supervision and Zanu-PF’s thuggish militias disbanded.
Zanu-PF is currently dragging its feet over talks for that reason. It hopes it can get by without too much painful structural change.
If the government fails in its arraignment of Tsvangirai, the MDC might emerge from its predicament more confident about the talks. Tsvangirai would come out reinvigorated and hardened by his ordeal, even though further charges are pending.
Some political observers believe it would take at least three months of serious talks to resolve the Zimbabwe deadlock.
When the new Constitution is in place and the democratic space has been opened to unfettered political activity, the MDC says it would want fresh parliamentary and presidential elections held concurrently.
The MDC and civil society are adamant about resisting the trap of a government of national unity, which Mbeki is touting. What they want is free and fair elections.
Although some observers say Zanu-PF does not want electoral reforms because it is scared of defeat in free and fair polls, it is possible that during talks the ruling party may prove more amenable to reform if it sees some sort of change as inevitable, including the stepping down of its octogenerian leader.
A statement in this regard would prove salutary. But Mugabe shows every sign of hanging on. His reported assurance to Mbeki that he will not use repressive security and media laws has proved less than binding. Where one law has proved off limits, others from the colonial armoury have proved useful.
Introducing and consolidating democratic institutions should not be difficult for Zimbabwe because the country is democratic in form but totalitarian in substance. In other words, democratic institutions exist but they are stuffed with authoritarian matter. It is that contradiction that needs to be resolved if and when the two sides meet, perhaps next month. — Â